meridian splendour, and bequeathing to his countrymen, in more ample terms of security, the imperishable principles of the Virginia resolutions, as the most glorious of texts for future commentary, and as the palladium of the sacred rights and dearest liberties of the unborn generations of freemen who are yet to inhabit this western world. But how vain are all earthly calculations. We have lived to see this gentleman, so exalted in our affections, drawn out, in some unguarded moment, from his retiring and peaceful pursuits into the vortex of party opinions and politics; and he stands before the High Priest of NewEngland, and publicly renounces his articles of faith, and studies to prove them as the worst of heresies. He now addresses a letter to the editor of the North-American Review, in which he avers that there has been a total misconception of the meaning of the Virginia resolutions, that nothing was intended beyond a mere invitation to the other States to concur in a declaration of opinion that the alien and sedition laws were unconstitutional, and he here reasserts the doctrine set forth by him in the "Federalist." We do not know that we can adopt a better mode of shewing the inconsistency of Mr. Madison's opinions, than by placing them in striking contrast in the same page.

In the Report of 1799. "It appears to your committee to be a plain principle founded in common sense, and illustrated by common practice and essential to the nature of compacts, that where resort can be had to no tribunal superior to the authority of the parties, the parties themselves must be the rightful judges, whether the bargain made (the Constitution) has been pursued or violated." Again: "the States then being the parties to the constitutional compact, and in their sovereign capacity it follows of necessity there can be no tribunal over their authority to decide in the last resort, whether the com pact made by them be violated, and consequently, that as the parties to it, they must decide in the last resort such ques tions, as may be of sufficient magnitude to require their interposition."

In the letter of 1830. "Between these different constitutional governments, the one operating in all the States, the other operating separately in each, with the aggregate powers of government divided between them,it could not escape attention, that controversies would arise concerning the boundaries of jurisdiction,and that some provision ought to be made for such occurrences. Again: "it is true, that in controversies relating to the boundary of the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the General Government. But this does not alter the principle of the case."

It must be borne in mind, that in 1799, Mr. Madison does not refer to a revolutionary right in the citizens of the States to resist oppression. On the contrary, he refers to a mode of redress in cases of palpable infractions of the Constitution, as resulting to the State sovereignties from the nature of the compact.

If we look into Mr. Madison's reasons in 1799, for objecting to the Supreme Court as the arbiter, we shall find that he is far from asserting that it is only in those "instances of usurped power which the forms of the Constitution would never deem within the control of the judicial departments," (tariff and internal improvements,) where he thinks the States ought to be the rightful judges. He distinctly means, that in every case where the judiciary and a particular State shall differ, as to the validity of a power exercised by Congress, which such State shall deem a palpable breach of the Constitution, the State is to judge and not the Supreme Court. After stating the consequences of "raising the decision of the judiciary above the auhority of the sovereign parties to the Constitution," he proceeds"The resolution supposes that dangerous powers not delegated (meaning the alien and sedition laws,) may not only be usurp ed and executed by the other departments, but that the judicial

department, also, may exercise or sanction dangerous powers beyond the grant of the Constitution, (alluding to the same alien and sedition laws,) and, consequently, that the ultimate right of the parties to the Constitution to judge whether the compact had been dangerously violated, must extend to violations by the judiciary as well as by the executive or legislature." Now if there be a deduction from this passage which is irresistible, it is certainly this: That to the parties to the compact, and not to the judiciary, belongs the right to determine in every case where there is a difference of opinion, for if the State shall deem a power dangerous and not delegated, there is, according to Mr. Madison, a judicial violation of the Constitution, if the judges "sanction" such a power. The judges, honestly no doubt, thought the alien and sedition laws constitutional, but still Mr. Madison regarded them as an instance of such a judicial violation as would authorize the "ultimate right of the parties to the Constitution to judge whether the compact has been dangerously violated." In 1830, Mr. Madison says "the judiciary alone is the expounding provision in the Constitution, and none of the parties can rightfully renounce it more than any other part of the Constitution." It is the arbiter which is to prevent "an appeal to the sword" and a recurrence to revolution. But in 1799, when the judges honestly expounded the alien and sedition laws as constitutional, Mr. Madison pronounces them as "sanctioning dangerous powers beyond the grant of the Constitution." In 1830, the Supreme Court is the only sole expositor of the Constitution. In 1799, the States are the only rightful judges. If this be not inconsistency, then the English language is to us, at least, unintelligible.

A distinguished statesman and friend of ours has made some observations on the other part of Mr. Madison's extraordinary letter, which he permits us to use. They are so good that we prefer to give his own words rather than by an abridgement to impair the force of what he has said.

"In support of the extraordinary position that the Virginia resolutions of '98, in maintaining the right of a State to interpose for arresting the progress of an unconstitutional law," intended only to assert the right of interposing by "reason and argument," and of arresting the progress of a law by the force of public opinion—the answers of the several States which protested against these resolutions, have been appealed to by Mr. Madison, in order to shew that they were so understood at the time. According to our reading of these protests, they are utterly inconsistent with the idea that the Virginia resolutions contained nothing more than a harmless appeal to public opinion. We incline to think, that if such had been their acknowledged character, no objection what

ever would have been made to them by any State in the Union, and we hardly think it would have been found necessary for Mr. Madison, to prepare and publish an elaborate Report of fifty pages, to establish the right of the Legislature of Virginia to express an opinion. To see how far this idea is sustained by the resolutions of the other States, we will make a few extracts from them.

"Extract from the Protest of the State of Rhode-Island against the Virginia Resolutions of 1798.

'1st. Resolved, That the Constitution of the United States vests in the Federal Courts exclusively, and in the Supreme Court of the United States ultimately, the authority of deciding on the constitutionalty of any act of the Congress of the United States.

2dly. That, for a State Legislature to assume that authority, [that is, to decide judicially on the binding efficacy of acts of Congress] would be,

1st. Blending together Legislative and Judicial powers.

2dly. Hazarding an interruption of the peace of the States by civil discord in case of a diversity of opinions among the State Legislatures, each State having no resort for vindicating its own opinions but by the strength of its own arms.'

"And yet Mr. Madison now says, that if the Virginia resolutions had been regarded as leading to such consequences, it must be presumed that this would have been a conspicuous object of denunciation.' Here, however, we see that this suposed tendency of the Virginia resolutions was most conspicuously denounced by the State of Rhode-Island, which considered them not as a mere harmless expression of opinion, but as the assumption of judicial power to be sustained by force.

"Protest of Massachusetts.

This Legislature are persuaded that the decision of all cases of law and equity, arising under the Constitution of the United States, and the construction of all laws made in pursuance thereof, are exclusively rested by the people in the Judicial Courts of the United States, and that the people have not constituted the State Legislatures the judges of the acts or measures of the Federal Government,' &c.

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But should Virginia persist in the assumption of the right to declare the acts of the National Government unconstitutional, and should she oppose, successfully, HIR FORCE AND WILL to those of the nation, the Constitution would be reduced to a mere cypherto the form and pageantry of authority, without the energy of power,' &c.

"Here it will be perceived, that Massachusetts considered Virginia as assuming a judicial authority over acts of Congress alleged to be unconstitutional-to be followed up by sustaining her decision by forceand in this view of the subject, the Resolutions of '98 were denounced by Massachusetts.

"Protest of New-Hampshire.

"That the State Legislatures are not the proper tribunal to determine the constitutionality of the laws of the General Government, that the duty of such decision is properly and exclusively confided to the Judicial department.'

"Protest of Vermont.

'Resolved, That the General Assembly of the State of Vermont do highly disapprove of the Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of Virginia, as being unconsti tutional in their nature and dangerous in their tendency. It belongs not to a State Legislature to decide on the constitutionality of laws made by the General Govern ment, this power being exclusively vested in the Judiciary Courts of the Union,' &c.

"It will be here seen that these Resolutions are, throughout, entirely inconsistent with the idea that the Virginia resolutions contained nothing more than a mere appeal to public opinion; they were, on the contrary, regarded at the time as containing the distinct assertion of the right of a State to decide authoritatively on the constitutional validity of an act of Congress-which 'unauthorized assumption of power,' it was supposed, would lead to a resort to force; and was, on that account, 'most conspicuously denounced' by the protesting States. It was in reply to these protests, that Mr. Madison produced his celebrated REPORT; and in what spirit does he reply to them? Does he attempt to allay the apprehensions of the protesting States, by declaring that they had entirely mistaken the true intent and meaning of the Virginia resolutions?-that they did not intend to assert the right of a State to judge of infractions of the Constitution?' or to determine that certain acts of Congress are unconstitutional, and, therefore, void? That Virginia, on the contrary, admitted (what Mr. Madison now contends for) that the Supreme Court had the exclusive jurisdiction of all such questions, and were the arbiters appointed by the Constitution to decide them ultimately and conclusively? Does he tell them to dismiss all their apprehensions of any collision between the States, or any possible resort to force on either side, since Virginia contended for no more than the right to appeal to public opinion, to induce a repeal of the obnoxious laws; and if she failed in that appeal, would cheerfully submit to the will of the majority, and abide by the decisions of the Federal court? No! nothing like it. On the contrary, he denies explicitly the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal courts;' by which he tells us, the decision of the judiciary would be raised above the authority of the sovereign parties to the Constitution.' He asserts, 'that the States, as sovereign parties to the compact, must ultimately decide whether the Constitution has been violated; and, that in the case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous breach of the Constitution, by the exercise by the Federal Government, of powers not granted by it, the States must have a right to interpose for the purpose of arresting the progress of the evil of usurpation, and of maintaining WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE LIMITS the authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to them.' And that, if in such a case they could not interpose, even so far as to arrest the progress of the evil, and thereby to PRESERVE THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF, there would be an end to all relief from usurped powers," &c. Mr. Madison then goes into an elaborate argument to prove that this right claimed for the State of Virginia, results of necessity from the Constitution, being a compact between sovereign States," who could have no common umpire, and who must, therefore, 'judge for themselves whether the compact had been preserved or violated.' The only answer which he attempts to give to the confusion, civil discord and force, predicted by the protesting States, as resulting from the Doctrines of Virginia, is, that the case was analogous to that of a treaty between sovereign nations, where, though the right of each party to judge for itself was universally admitted such consequences did not follow, and therefore ought not to be anticipated VOL. VI. NO. 12.

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