Logic and the Modalities in the Twentieth Century

Dov M. Gabbay, John Woods
Elsevier, 10/05/2006 - 732 páginas
Logic and the Modalities in the Twentieth Century is an indispensable research tool for anyone interested in the development of logic, including researchers, graduate and senior undergraduate students in logic, history of logic, mathematics, history of mathematics, computer science and artificial intelligence, linguistics, cognitive science, argumentation theory, philosophy, and the history of ideas.
This volume is number seven in the eleven volume Handbook of the History of Logic. It concentrates on the development of modal logic in the 20th century, one of the most important undertakings in logic’s long history. Written by the leading researchers and scholars in the field, the volume explores the logics of necessity and possibility, knowledge and belief, obligation and permission, time, tense and change, relevance, and more. Both this volume and the Handbook as a whole are definitive reference tools for students and researchers in the history of logic, the history of philosophy, and any discipline, such as mathematics, computer science, artificial intelligence, for whom the historical background of his or her work is a salient consideration.

· Detailed and comprehensive chapters covering the entire range of modal logic.
· Contains the latest scholarly discoveries and interpretative insights that answer many questions in the field of logic.

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Páginas seleccionadas


A View of its Evolution Rob Goldblatt
Epistemic Logic Paul Gochet and Pascal Gribomont
Deontic Logic Paul McNamara
Relevant and Substructural Logics Greg Restall
A N Priors Logic Peter Øhrstrøm and Per F V Hasle
The Philosophical Background Peter Øhrstrøm and Per F V Hasle
The Gamut of Dynamic Logics Jan van Eijck and Martin Stokhof
Situation Theory and Situation Semantics Keith Devlin
Dialogue Logic Erik Krabbe
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Passagens conhecidas

Página 111 - I conclude then that the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing that something is the case are first that what one is said to know be true, secondly that one be sure of it, and thirdly that one should have the right to be sure.
Página 151 - Take, for instance, the possible fat man in that doorway; and, again, the possible bald man in that doorway. Are they the same possible man, or two possible men? How do we decide? How many possible men are there in that doorway ? Are there more possible thin ones than fat ones? How many of them are alike?
Página 442 - So far, then, as I have anything that you could call a philosophical creed, its first article is this: I believe in the reality of the distinction between past, present, and future. I believe that what we see as a progress of events is a progress of events, a coming to pass of one thing after another, and not just a timeless tapestry with everything stuck there for good and all.
Página 144 - If we could recover our pre-Fregean semantic innocence, I think it would seem to us plainly incredible that the words "The earth moves", uttered after the words "Galileo said that", mean anything different, or refer to anything else, than is their wont when they come in other environments.
Página 414 - ... happening and that it isn't about to happen, and after it has happened we say that it has happened, that it is no longer happening and that it is not going to happen. Stated in words these semantic rules might seem circular, but taught in connection with a concrete situation they are wholly clear. And our conventions with regard to tenses are so well worked out that we have practically the materials in them for a formal calculus.17 Where all is so desirably definite, what room is there for puzzles...
Página 142 - It provides that, given a true statement of identity, one of its two terms may be substituted for the other in any true statement and the result will be true.
Página 155 - But it is clear that Pierre, as long as he is unaware that the cities he calls 'London' and 'Londres' are one and the same, is in no position to see, by logic alone, that at least one of his beliefs must be false. He lacks information, not logical acumen. He cannot be convicted of inconsistency: to do so is incorrect. We can shed more light on this if we change the case. Suppose that, in France, Pierre, instead of affirming "Londres est jolie," had affirmed, more cautiously...
Página 486 - ... definition of an absolute time. No doubt it is possible to refine the procedure so as to obtain a precise definition, but perhaps only by introducing more or less arbitrary elements (such as, eg, the size of the regions or the weight function to be used in the computation of the mean motion of matter).
Página 667 - is useful for three things : for exercise of the mind, for converse with other men, and for knowing how to question and handle the principles of philosophy." And the object of his ' Topics ' is, as he tells us, " to discover a method by which we shall be able to reason from probabilities on any given question, and to defend a position without being driven to contradict our own assertions.
Página 151 - Quine, in addressing the comparison between the transworld and the transtemporal, concludes that « the devastating difference is that the series of momentary cross-sections of our real world is uniquely imposed on us, for better or for worse, whereas all manner of paths of continuous gradation from one possible world to another are free for the thinking up...

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Acerca do autor (2006)

Dov M. Gabbay is Augustus De Morgan Professor Emeritus of Logic at the Group of Logic, Language and Computation, Department of Computer Science, King's College London. He has authored over four hundred and fifty research papers and over thirty research monographs. He is editor of several international Journals, and many reference works and Handbooks of Logic.

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