lutely necessary that the executive government should be made independent of the assistance of the legislative body, until such time as the tranquillity of the country shall be established, and the public mind, now agitated and deceived by factious and designing men, shall be disabused, and restored to a healthy state."

And when Lord Gosford put it to the Council, how it was possible to make the executive independent under the present constitution, they replied, that

"it is advisable to suspend for a limited time such parts thereof as relate to the calling and meeting of the provincial parliament, and that, in the interim, the local government should be authorized to revive such laws as it may deem necessary, and as have expired within the last two years, and to continue those which may hereafter expire. They also recommend the repeal of the imperial act 1 and 2 William IV. (Lord Ripon's) in order to enable the executive to defray the expenses of the civil government, and of the administration of justice."

It is no part of our plan to describe the outbreak which occurred at the commencement of the winter; nor indeed are the materials perfect. Two things appear clear, namely, that high treason was committed, and a civil war commenced, and that some of the members of the Assembly, who had been instrumental in its contumacious proceedings, were deeply concerned in the more gentle treason, though the principal of them appear to have prudently kept out of the war.

Thanks to the talents and energy of Sir John Colborne,* and the loyalty of a great body of Canadians, the insurrection was soon put down. As to the legal proceedings against the conspirators, we are scantily informed.

Of the measures suggested by Lord Gosford, one only received the immediate approval of his majesty's ministers. They lost no timet in accepting his resignation. They adopted this suggestion, bad reasons and all, and the government devolved upon Sir John Colborne, the judicious, spirited, and modest commander of the forces. After a short deliberation ministers authorized Sir John to proclaim martial law, if he should find it advisable. This measure, however, had already been taken by Lord Gosford and his council. §

ment.

"

*The following may interest those who are watching Sir J. Colborne at this moColborne has my will and all my papers.' As he spake these words Major Colborne, his military secretary, entered the room. He addressed him with his wonted kindness, then, turning to Anderson, said, Remember you go to Willoughby Gordon and tell him that it is my request, and that I expect he will give a Lieutenant Colonelcy to Major Colborne,-he has been long with me, and I know him to be most worthy of it."-Last Moments of Sir John Moore, in Moore's Life, ii. December 6, p. 106.

228.

+ November 27, p. 93.

§ December 6, No. 32 of 1838, p. 16.

Our space allows us to say but little of the debates of the present session; indeed, though there have been speeches of great ability, and some severe attacks upon the Government, there has not been much novelty, unless we find it in a speech of Mr. Hume, who, dealing copiously with all his party, in general vituperation of the Tories, seldom brings any one Tory, or Tory measure, in comparison with Whiggery without preferring the Tory.

"He wished that the noble lord (John Russell) had acted more in the spirit of Lord Aberdeen. He thought that the intentions of Lord Aberdeen were good, and had that nobleman remained in office up to the present time, he had no doubt, from the great attention which he paid to the facts brought before him, and from the manner in which he drew his conclusions, that there would have been none of the rebellion, none of the disturbances, which they were now compelled to regret. He was bound to say so; taking it for granted that Lord Aberdeen would have acted upon the reasoning adopted by him during the short time that he was at the head of the Colonial Office, and which, if carried into effect, would certainly have done much good."*

It is possible that Mr. Hume underrates the wrong-headedness and rebellious spirit of Mr. Papineau. We are not sure that the insurrection would have been avoided, but we are sure that the case of the English government would have been plainer and stronger; and the questions now at issue would have been settled in 1836.

And this at least is quite clear, that they would not have been driven to adopt a measure more arbitrary, or more offensive, than that which, after all their conciliatory flourishes, the Whig Ministers have proposed-nothing less than to suspend the constitution of Lower Canada, and to give absolute power there to a Governor and Councillors, holding at the pleasure of the Crown.†

Still we are of opinion that that measure was necessary, and that Lord John Russell's bill, as amended by Sir Robert Peel, was wisely passed, in the emergency created by the conduct of the Assembly; of which body, indeed, it might have been resolved, that "they had abdicated the government, and that the House was thereby vacant.”

In that emergency, it was of absolute necessity that some such act should pass without delay, and it was impossible to accomplish with due rapidity a more permanent arrangement.

But we greatly disapprove of the steps which the Government is taking with a view to that permanent arrangement.

Of the appointment of the Earl of Durham, as Governor Ge

* January 16, xl. 50.

This is the effect of the Act, 2 Vict. c. 9.

neral, we say nothing. It has certainly been very well received by all parties in this country. It is not the way of the Tories to find fault with an appointment made by the Crown, without some evidence of its impropriety. The Radicals fancy that Lord Durham is their leader. The Whigs, if not a little afraid of him, certainly admire him most at a distance. And one cause of his popularity is, that he is not a devoted adherent of the present administration. Yet one thing a little startles us. While we give credit to Lord Durbam for considerable talents, a high sense of honour, and many virtues, we own it is new to us to hear of his powers of conciliation. How comes it, if such be his qualities, that he is not in the Cabinet? We have heard, indeed, that, except in the case of the compact alliance with another Lord for a purpose which, abused as the term is, can scarcely be called liberal, it has been found rather difficult to act with him.

But allowing Lord Durham to be a fit man for Governor-General, we object to another mission of inquiry. With the exception perhaps of the question of uniting the two provinces, there is nothing to inquire about: there is no point upon which ministers or parliament can want further materials. Excepting that being composed of one man, it may not be quite so controversial, this commission is liable to all the objections made to that of 1835. And it is, as well as that, liable to the objection which we have made to the Committee of 1828.

From the circumstances under which Lord Durham is sent, and especially from the communication to parliament, publication and sale of his instructions, he must make a public report. Ministers have cast away their right to require from him a secret and confidential opinion; all that he says must be laid before parliament, and sold to the inhabitants of both hemispheres at two pence per sheet. Are ministers prepared to do no more and no less than he recommends? If not, how weakly and how idly is this new embarrassment created, which will arise from their rejecting the counsel of their chosen delegate!

But now, turning aside from ministerial vagaries and party politics, let us consider the measures which, in the relative position of England and Canada, it will be just and wise to adopt. We will not dwell on the question of Emancipation.

It has been proposed to unite the two Canadas, and, sometimes, to unite all the colonies, with the view of their forming, at no distant period, an independent federative state. This extensive project is more than we can comprise in our space: we give no opinion upon it at present. But not only to this, but to the project of re-uniting the two Canadas, we say, the settlement of the Constitution of Lower Canada must not be postponed. We

must not in a hurry force the one province upon another; and there is no reason for believing that either province is now desirous of the union. Lord Durham may obtain opinions and weigh them well, but he must not interrupt the settlement of Lower Canada.

Emancipation and annexation we for the present equally reject. The three great questions which remain, namely, the financial question, the constitution of the Legislative Council, and the responsible cabinet,-all depend upon a preliminary question, how much of the spirit and practice of the British Constitution can be transferred to Canada?

It may strike a careless observer, and we fear that it has appeared to those who were capable of more accurate observation, to be possible to have two or more independent states, each with a free constitution, under one king, and forming one empire. Ireland was (after 1782) independent, why not Canada?

Ireland, from the time at which she became independent, to that at which she became incorporated with Great Britain, was governed by influence. Unquestionably the Irish parliament might have so exercised its power as greatly to embarrass England, and, as we have already said, there was once but a narrow escape from a collision. It was the possibility of this collision that produced the union.

Lord Grenville, in introducing the measure to the Lords, thus concluded an exposition, very applicable to the present question, of the incompatibility of two independent legislatures in the same empire. The countries are reduced to the alternative of either giving up the exercise of the independence of the parliament of the one country, or of all bond of connection between the two.'

In the case of Ireland the only remedy was an incorporated legislature. Ireland was too rich and too powerful to acquiesce in any other, and she was, moreover, too essential a part of the empire. Her concurrence was necessary, and her support important, in wars and preparations for war. Great Britain, for her own sake, could not contemplate the alternative of separation. And her propinquity admitted of that remedy, which was unquestionably most complete for the evils which it was intended to cure, though there are also some points of superiority in the remedy which is applicable to a distant colony.

That remedy consists in confining the independent functions of the colonial legislature to such matters as concern herself only, and do not interfere with the general interests of the empire, or with the maintenance of the supremacy of the parent state; to

*Parl. Hist. xxxiv. 664.

which supremacy it is (amongst other things) essential that the king's government in the colony should be independent.

This rule implies that the colony consists of persons having a common interest; and affords, moreover, the materials for a legislature which may be trusted for making just and equal laws, and providing for the administration of justice. If not, it is as much the duty of a paternal government to interpose with its supreme authority, as it is the duty of the select class, which elects and composes a legislature, to provide for those to whom that function s denied. And if the colonists are of two descriptions or races, not having, or thinking that they have not, common interests, it is then the duty of the parent state to see that there is no dangerous collision between the two; and more especially to protect its own peculiar people who may settle in the colony. Such are the grounds upon which we contend

1st, That the Constitution of Lower Canada ought not to be re-established without the institution of "a Civil List."

And considering the state of the province, the probability of a contest of races, the insufficient education of the legislators, we hold-

2nd, That this Civil List ought to provide not only for the government, but for the judges, and for the administration of justice.

In regard to the ordinary expenses of the government, we think that the former practice of England is more applicable to Canada, *than that which has lately superseded it. We would therefore not leave the government dependent upon the votes of the Assembly, for any part of the ordinary expenditure, fixed upon a moderate scale. As for the judges, there is no difference of opinion, but we would add, (with Sir Charles Grey,) the expenses of administering justice; seeing especially that these, in England, though not provided for by a grant of Parliament, are (by means of fees, rates, and other such receipts) equally independent of Parliament.

The utility of this Civil List, whether granted for the Queen's life, or for seven years, would be annihilated if it were dependent, at the end of the term, on the pleasure of the Assembly. The government must look to Parliament itself for the renewal, or it will be periodically powerless.

It is objected, that this arrangement will deprive the Assembly of its constitutional power of controlling the government by refusing supplies.

*We think too, that it is more fit for England, and more congenial with our Constitution.