The definition of the Absolute by absolute cause is, therefore, suicidal; for it defines by relation and conditions, that which is conceived only as exclusive of both.-The same is true of the definition of the Absolute by substance. But of this we do not now speak. The vice of M. Cousin's definition of the Absolute by absolute cause, is manifested likewise in its applications. He maintains that his theory can alone explain the nature and relations of the Deity; and on its incompetency to fulfil the conditions of a rational theism, we are willing to rest our demonstration of its radical unsoundness. "God," says our author, "creates; he creates in virtue of his creative power, and he draws the universe, not from nonentity, but from himself, who is absolute existence. His distinguishing characteristic being an absolute creative force, which cannot but pass into activity, it follows, not that the creation is possible, but that it is necessary." We must be very brief. The subjection of the Deity to a necessity—a necessity of self manifestation identical with the creation of the universe, is contradictory of the fundamental postulates of a divine nature. On this theory, God is not distinct from the world; the creature is a modification of the creator; and whilst creating is an act necessary to the Deity, as he is eternal, so must creation be eternal, and the universe consequently without beginning. Now, without objecting, that the simple subordination of the Deity to necessity, is in itself, by depriving him of liberty, tantamount to his dethronement, let us see to what consequences this necessity, on the hypothesis of M. Cousin, inevitably leads. On this hypothesis, one of two alternatives must be admitted. God, as necessarily determined to pass from absolute essence to relative manifestation, is determined to pass either from the better to the worse, or from the worse to the better. A third possibility, that both states are equal, as contradictory in itself, and as contradicted by our author, it is not necessary to consider. The first supposition must be rejected. The necessity in this case determines God to pass from the better to the worse; that is, operates to his partial annihilation. The power which compels this must be external and hostile, for nothing operates willingly to its own deterioration; and, as superior to the pretended God, is either itself the real deity, if an intelligent and free cause, or a negation of all deity, if a blind force or fate. cause. The second is equally inadmissible :-that God, passing into the universe, passes from a state of comparative imperfection, into a state of comparative perfection. The divine nature is identical with the most perfect nature, and is also identical with the first If the first cause be not identical with the most perfect nature, there is no God, for the two essential conditions of his existence are not in combination. Now, on the present supposition, the most perfect nature is the derived; nay the universe, the creation, the ywóμevov, is, in relation to its cause, the real, the actual, the ovτws ov. It would also be the divine, but that divinity supposes also the notion of cause, while the universe, ex hypothesi, is only an effect. It is no answer to these difficulties for M. Cousin to say, that the Deity, though a cause which cannot choose but create, is not however exhausted in the act; and though passing with all the elements of his being into the universe, that he remains entire in his essence, and with all the superiority of the cause over the effect. The dilemma is unavoidable :-Either the Deity is independent of the universe for his being or perfection; on which alternative our author must abandon his theory of God, and the necessity of creation: Or the Deity is dependent on his manifestation in the universe for his being or perfection; on which alternative, his doctrine is assailed by the difficulties previously stated. — The length to which the preceding observations have extended, prevents us from adverting to sundry other opinions of our author, which we conceive to be equally unfounded. For example, (to say nothing of his proof of the impersonality of intelligence, because, forsooth, truth is not subject to our will), what can be conceived more self-contradictory than his theory of moral liberty? Divorcing liberty from intelligence, but connecting it with personality, he defines it to be a cause which is determined to act by its proper energy alone. But (to say nothing of remoter difficulties) how liberty can be conceived, supposing always a plurality of modes of activity, without a knowledge of that plurality;-how a faculty can resolve to act by preference in a particular manner, and not determine itself by final causes;-how intelligence can influence a blind power without operating as an efficient cause ;-or how, in fine, morality can be founded on a liberty which, at best, only escapes necessity by taking refuge with chance-these are problems which M. Cousin, in none of his works, has stated, and which we are confident he is unable to solve. After the tenor of our previous observations, it is needless to say that we regard M. Cousin's attempt to establish a general peace among philosophers, by the promulgation of his Eclectic theory, as a failure. But though no converts to his Unconditioned, and viewing with regret what we must regard as the misapplication of his distinguished talents, we cannot disown a strong feeling of interest and admiration for those qualities, even in their excess, which have betrayed him, with so many other aspiring philosophers, into a pursuit which could only end in disappointment; we mean his love of truth, and his reliance on the powers of man. Not to despair of philosophy is “a last infirmity of noble minds." The stronger the intellect, the stronger the confidence in its force; the more ardent the appetite for knowledge, the less are we prepared to canvass the uncertainty of the fruition. "The wish is parent to the thought." Loath to admit that our science is at best the reflection of a reality we cannot know, we strive to penetrate to existence in itself; and what we have laboured intensely to attain, we at last fondly believe we have accomplished. But, like Ixion, we embrace a cloud for a divinity. Conscious only of,-conscious only in and through, limitation, we think to comprehend the Infinite; and dream even of establishing the science - the nescience of man, on an identity with the omniscience of God. It is this powerful tendency of the most vigorous minds to transcend the sphere of our faculties, which makes a "learned ignorance" the most difficult acquirement-perhaps, indeed, the consummation, of knowledge. In the words of a forgotten, but acute philosopher :-" Magna, immo maxima pars sapentiæ est,— quædam æquo animo nescire velle." * ["INFINITAS! INFINITAS! Hic mundus est infinitas. Infinitas et totus est, Quod cernis est infinitas; (Nam mente nunquam absolveris;) Sed mente sola concipis, [See Appendix I. (B), for testimonies in regard to the limitation of our knowledge, from the limitation of our faculties.] In hacque parte quicquid est, Queis contineris undique; Infinitatem continet. Secare mens at pergito, Quiesce mens, et limites INFINITAS! INFINITAS! Proh, quantus heic acervus est! IL-PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION.* (OCTOBER, 1830.) Euvres Complètes de THOMAS REID, chef de l'école Ecossaise. Publiées par M. TH. JOUFFROY, avec des Fragments de M. ROYER-COLLARD, et une Introduction de l'Editeur.-Tomes II. -VI. 8vo. Paris, 1828-9, (not completed.) WE rejoice in the appearance of this work, and for two reasons. We hail it as another sign of the convalescence of philosophy, in a great and influential nation; and prize it as a seasonable testimony by intelligent foreigners to the merits of a philosopher, whose reputation is, for the moment, under an eclipse at home. Apart from the practical corruption, of which (in the emphatic language of Fichte) "the dirt-philosophy" may have been the cause, we regard the doctrine of mind, long dominant in France, as more pernicious, through the stagnation of thought which it occasioned, than for the speculative errors which it set afloat. The salutary fermentation, which the scepticism of Hume determined in Scotland and in Germany, did not extend to that country; and the dogmatist there slumbered on, unsuspicious of his principles, nay even resigned to conclusions, which would make [* In French by M. Peisse; in Italian by S. Lo Gatto; in Crosse's Selections. Some deletions, found necessary in consequence of the unexpected length to which the Article extended, (especially from the second paragraph on this page, to "contributed," near the top of p. 43), have been restored. Otherwise, I have added little or nothing to this criticism beyond references to my Dissertations supplementary of Reid, when the points under discussion are there more fully or more accurately treated.] |