philosophy to man, the solution of the terrific oracle to Edipus:

"May'st thou ne'er learn the truth of what thou art!"

"Since the metaphysic of Locke," says M. Cousin, "crossed the channel on the light and brilliant wings of Voltaire's imagination, Sensualism has reigned in France without contradiction, and with an authority of which there is no parallel in the whole history of philosophy. It is a fact, marvellous but incontestable, that from the time of Condillac, there has not appeared among us any philosophical work, at variance with his doctrine, which has produced the smallest impression on the public mind. Condillac thus reigned in peace; and his domination, prolonged even to our own days, through changes of every kind, pursued its tranquil course, apparently above the reach of danger. Discussion had ceased his disciples had only to develope the words of their master: philosophy seemed accomplished."—(Journal des Savans, 1819.)

Nor would such a result have been desirable, had the one exclusive opinion been true, as it was false,-innocent, as it was corruptive. If the accomplishment of philosophy imply a cessation of discussion,-if the result of speculation be a paralysis of itself; the consummation of knowledge is only the condition of intellectual barbarism. Plato has profoundly defined man,— "The hunter of truth;" for in this chase, as in others, the pursuit is all in all, the success comparatively nothing. "Did the Almighty," says Lessing, "holding in his right hand Truth, and in his left Search after Truth, deign to proffer me the one I might prefer;-in all humility, but without hesitation, I should request-Search after Truth." We exist only as we energise; pleasure is the reflex of unimpeded energy; energy is the mean by which our faculties are developed; and a higher energy the end which their development proposes. In action is thus contained the existence, happiness, improvement, and perfection of our being; and knowledge is only precious, as it may afford a stimulus to the exercise of our powers, and the condition of their more complete activity. Speculative truth is, therefore, subordinate to speculation itself; and its value is directly measured by the quantity of energy which it occasions,-immediately in its discovery,-mediately through its consequences. Life to Endymion was not preferable to death: aloof from practice, a waking error is better than a sleeping truth.-Neither, in point of fact,

is there found any proportion between the possession of truths, and the development of the mind in which they are deposited. Every learner in science is now familiar with more truths than Aristotle or Plato ever dreamt of knowing; yet, compared with the Stagirite or the Athenian, how few, even of our masters of modern science, rank higher than intellectual barbarians! Ancient Greece and modern Europe prove, indeed, that "the march of intellect" is no inseparable concomitant of "the march of science; "that the cultivation of the individual is not to be rashly confounded with the progress of the species..

But if the possession of theoretical facts be not convertible with mental improvement, and if the former be important only as subservient to the latter; it follows, that the comparative utility of a study is not to be principally estimated by the complement of truths which it may communicate, but by the degree in which it determines our higher capacities to action. But though this be the standard by which the different methods, the different branches, and the different masters, of philosophy, ought to be principally (and it is the only criterion by which they can all be satisfactorily) tried; it is nevertheless a standard, by which, neither methods, nor sciences, nor philosophers, have ever yet been even inadequately appreciated. The critical history of philosophy, in this spirit, has still to be written; and when written, how opposite will be the rank, which, on the higher and more certain standard, it will frequently adjudge,-to the various branches of knowledge, and the various modes of their cultivation, to different ages, and countries, and individuals, from that which has been hitherto partially awarded, on the vacillating authority of the lower!

On this ground (which we have not been able fully to state, far less adequately to illustrate,) we rest the pre-eminent utility of metaphysical speculations. That they comprehend all the sublimest objects of our theoretical and moral interest;—that every (natural) conclusion concerning God, the soul, the present worth, and the future destiny of man, is exclusively metaphysical, will be at once admitted. But we do not found the importance, on the paramount dignity, of the pursuit. It is as the best gymnastic of the mind,-as a mean, principally, and almost exclusively conducive to the highest education of our noblest powers, that we would vindicate to these speculations the necessity which has too frequently been denied them. By no other

intellectual application (and least of all by physical pursuits) is the soul thus reflected on itself, and its faculties concentered in such independent, vigorous, unwonted, and continued energy;by none, therefore, are its best capacities so variously and intensely evolved. "Where is most life, there is the victory."

Let it not be believed, that the mighty minds which have cultivated these studies, have toiled in vain. If they have not always realised truth, they have always determined exertion; and in the congenial eloquence of the elder Scaliger:-"Eæ subtilitates, quanquam sunt animis otiosis otiosæ atque inutiles, vegetis tamen ingeniis summam cognoscendi afferunt voluptatem; sitæ scilicet in fastigio ejus sapientiæ, quæ rerum omnium principia contemplatur. Et quamvis harum indagatio non sit utilis ad machinas farinarias conficiendas; exuit tamen animum inscitiæ rubigine, acuitque ad alia. Eo denique splendore afficit, ut præluceat sibi ad nanciscendum primi opificis similitudinem. Qui, ut omnia plene ac perfecte est, ac præter et supra omnia; ita eos, qui scientiarum studiosi sunt, suos esse voluit, ipsorumque intellectum rerum dominum constituit."*

The practical danger which has sometimes been apprehended from metaphysical pursuits, has in reality only been found to follow from their stunted and partial cultivation. The poison has grown up; the antidote has been repressed. In Britain and in Germany, where speculation has remained comparatively free, the dominant result has been highly favourable to religion and morals; whilst the evils which arose in France, arose from the benumbing influence of a one effete philosophy; and have, in point of fact, mainly been corrected by the awakened spirit of metaphysical inquiry itself.

With these views, we rejoice, as we said, in the appearance of this translation of the works of Reid-in Paris-and under the auspices of so distinguished an editor as M. Jouffroy, less, certainly, as indicating the triumph of any particular system or school, than as a pledge, among many others, of the zealous yet liberal and unexclusive spirit, with which the science of mind has of late been cultivated in France. In the history of French philosophy, indeed, the last ten years stand in the most remark

* Bacon himself, the great champion of physical pursuits :-"Non inutiles scientiæ existimandæ sunt, quarum in se nullus est usus, si ingenia acuant et ordinent."-Hume, Burke, Kant, Stewart, &c., &c., might be quoted to the same effect. Compare Aristotle, Metaph. i. 2; Eth. Nic. x. 7.

able contrast to the hundred immediately preceding. The state of thraldom in that country during the century to one chronic despotism,-perpetuating itself by paralysing speculation, in rendering its objects, objects of disgust,-we have already presented, in a striking passage, written by M. Cousin, towards its conclusion; but a very different picture would await his pencil, were he now to delineate the subsequent progress of that spirit of philosophy, to whose emancipation, recovery, and exaltation, during the decade, he has himself so powerfully contributed. The present contrast, indeed, which the philosophical enthusiasm of France exhibits to the speculative apathy of Britain, is anything but flattering to ourselves. The new spirit of metaphysical inquiry, which the French imbibed from Germany and Scotland, arose with them precisely at the time when the popularity of psychological researches began to decline with us; and now, when all interest in these speculations seems here to be extinct, they are there seen flourishing, in public favour, with a universality and vigour corresponding to their encouragement.

The only example, indeed, that can be adduced of any interest in such subjects, recently exhibited in this country, is the favourable reception of Dr Brown's Lectures on the Philosophy of the Mind. This work, however, we regard as a concurrent cause of the very indifference we lament, and as a striking proof of its reality.

As a cause :-These lectures have certainly done much to justify the general neglect of psychological pursuits. Dr Brown's high reputation for metaphysical acuteness, gave a presumptive authority to any doctrine he might promulgate; and the personal relations in which he stood to Mr Stewart afforded every assurance, that he would not revolt against that philosopher's opinions, rashly, or except on grounds that would fully vindicate his dissent. In these circumstances, what was the impression on the public mind, when all that was deemed best established,-all that was claimed as original and most important in the philosophy of Reid and Stewart, was proclaimed by their disciple and successor to be naught but a series of misconceptions, only less wonderful in their commission than in the general acquiescence in their truth? Confidence was at once withdrawn from a pursuit, in which the most sagacious inquirers were thus at fault; and the few who did not relinquish the study in despair, clung with implicit faith to the revelation of the new apostle.

As a proof:-These lectures afford evidence of how greatly talent has, of late, been withdrawn from the field of metaphysical discussion. This work has now been before the world for ten years. In itself it combines many of the qualities calculated to attract public, and even popular, attention; while its admirers have exhausted hyperbole in its praise, and disparaged every philosophic name to exalt the reputation of its author. Yet though attention has been thus concentrated on these lectures for so long a period, and though the high ability and higher authority of Dr Brown, deserved and would have recompensed the labour; we are not aware that any adequate attempt has yet been made to subject them, in whole or in part, to an enlightened and impartial criticism. The radical inconsistencies which they involve, in every branch of their subject, remain undeveloped; their unacknowledged appropriations are still lauded as original; their endless mistakes, in the history of philosophy, stand yet uncorrected; and their frequent misrepresentations of other philosophers continue to mislead.* In particular, nothing has more convinced us of the general neglect, in this country, of psychological science, than that Brown's ignorant attack on Reid, and, through Reid, confessedly on Stewart, has not long since been repelled;-except, indeed, the general belief that it was trium

phant.

In these circumstances, we felt gratified, as we said, with the present honourable testimony to the value of Reid's speculations in a foreign country; and have deemed this a seasonable opportunity of expressing our own opinion on the subject, and of again vindicating, we trust, to that philosopher, the well-earned

* We shall, in the sequel, afford samples of these "inconsistencies," "mistakes," "misrepresentations," but not of Brown's "appropriations." To complete the cycle, and vindicate our assertion, we may here adduce one specimen of the way in which discoveries have been lavished on him, in consequence of his omission (excusable, perhaps, in the circumstances) to advertise his pupils when he was not original.-Brown's doctrine of Generalization, is identical with that commonly taught by philosophers—not Scottish; and, among these, by authors, with whose works his lectures prove him to have been well acquainted. But if a writer, one of the best informed of those who, in this country, have of late cultivated this branch of philosophy, could, among other expressions equally encomiastic, speak of Brown's return to the vulgar opinion, on such a point, as of "a discovery, &c. which will, in all future ages, be regarded as one of the most important steps ever made in metaphysical science;" how incompetent must ordinary readers be to place Brown on his proper level,-how desirable would have been a critical examination of his Lectures, to distribute to him his own, and to estimate his property at its true value! [See Diss. on Reid, pp. 868, 869, alibi.]