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X. Essays on Professional Education. By R. L. Edgeworth, Esq. F. R. S. M. R. I. A. &c.

166 XI. A Refutation of Calvinism, in which the Doctrines of

Original Sin, Grace, Regeneration, Justification, and
Universal Redemption, are explained ; and the pecu.
liar Tenets maintained by Calvin on those points are
proved to be contrary to Scripture, to the Writings
of the Antient Fathers of the Christian Church, and
to the public formularies of the Church of England.
By G. Tomline, D.D. F. R. S. Lord Bishop of Lin-
coln, and Dean of St. Paul's.

191 XII. Hindu Infanticide. An Account of the Mcasures adopt

ed for suppressing the Practice of the Systematic
Murder by their Parents of Female Intants; edited,

with Notes and Illustrations, by Edward Moor, F.R.S. 210
si XIII, The Vision of Don Roderick ; a Poem. By Walter
Scott, Esq.

221 XIV, Notices sur l'Inté: ieur de la France, écrites en 1806, par

M. Faber. Tom. I. St. Petersburgh, 1807.
Sketches of the Internal State of France. By M. Faber.
Translated from the French.

235 YT. A Comparative View of the Plans of Education as de

tailed in the Publications of Dr. Bell and Mr. Larcas-
ter, and Remarks on Dr. Bell's Madras School, and
Hints to the Managers and Committees of Charity
and Sunday Schools, on the Practicability of extend-
ing such Institutions upon Mr. Lancaster's Plan. By

Joseph Fox.
A Sermon preached in the Cathedral Church of St.

Paul, London, on Thursday, June 13, 1811. To
which is added, a Collection of Notes and Ilustrations,
By Herbert Marsh, D. D. F.R.S. Margaret Professor
of Divinity in the University of Cambridge. Third

Edition.
Comparative View of the two new Systems of Education

for the Infant Poor, in a Charge delivered to the
Clergy of the Officialty of the Dean and Chapter of
Durham, at Berwick-upon-Tweed, on Tuesday, May
12, 1811. By the Rev. R. G. Bowyer, LL.B, Pre-
bendary of Durham.

264

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THE

QUARTERLY REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1811.

Art. I. Philosophical Essays. By Dugald Stewart, Esq. F.R.S.

Ed. Emeritus Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, &c. &c. 4to. pp. 590. Edinburgh, Constable.

London, Cadell and Davies, and John Murray. 1810. A MONG the philosophers of the present day, we could not

easily mention a more justly respected name than that of the author of the volume before us. His treatise on the Philosophy of the Mind, which has been long before the public, must ever give him a high rank among those who have followed Locke in the track of genuine metaphysical inquiry. Some of his predecessors in this walk may have displayed a more subtle and adventurous genius, but in the solid attributes of the philosophical character he is surpassed by none; while he holds an indisputable pre-eminence in the art of recommending and embellishing his subject by the most expanded and attractive views of its dignity and importance. As a Lecturer, he has been long regarded as the chief ornament of a university, not a little celebrated for the eminence of its professors; but he has lately, we understand, though still in the vigour of life, retired from the academical chair, in order to dedicate himself without interruption to the prosecution of his favourite science.

The interest of the public in that important branch of philosophy which Mr. Stewart has so much illustrated and adorned has been, we think, for some time, greatly on the wane. All labour of the intellectual kind, which is not given to politics or polite literature, is wholly engrossed by the more brilliant and profitable pursuits of physical science. The study of the mind seems to be no longer thought in any degree necessary to the formation of the philosophical character, or to afford any conclusions of much interest or importance. We confess, that our opinion is altogether different; and, without wishing to derogate from the claims of the other sciences, must be permitted to say, that the philosophy of the mind is an object of paramount utility; for it is intimately and essentially connected with almost every other branch of kuowledge, VOL. VI. NO, XI.

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and with all the nobler concerns of human life. If this view of it be just, as we shall afterwards endeavour to show, it must follow that this study cannot be neglected without material injury to the general system of human knowledge, and the means of human improvement. We are therefore disposed to set a high value upon Mr. Stewart's persevering and powerful efforts for its advancement; and observe with singular satisfaction, the intimation with which he closes the volume before us, that he hopes soon to be able to resume and complete his unfinished analysis of the intellectual powers and capacities. The work with which he has in the mean time favoured the public, will be found in every respect correspondent to his fame. It is a collection of essays, all upon subjects connected with the philosophy of the mind. It commences with a long preliminary discourse in explanation of the nature and in vindication of the utility of that philosophy; and is then divided into two parts, each part containing a series of essays. In the first series, the author examines in the first place Locke's theory of the origin of ideas, and then points out, in separate essays, the errors to which that theory bas given rise in various metaphysical systems, both of this country and of France. In the second series, he is occupied with subjects of a more brilliant and interesting nature,--those of beauty, sublimity, and taste.

We propose, on account of their superior importance, to enter at some length into the consideration of the points discussed in the preliminary dissertation; and we begin by observing, that the philosophy of the mind is not a little injured in the public opinion from its common designation by the word metaphysics-a word equally applied to the repulsive and visionary speculations of the schoolmen. In the ancient systems of Greece, the philosophy of the mind was classed among the branches of physical science; and as the laws of mind are as much parts of the general system of nature as those of matter, this classification was evidently correct. But in after-times, it came to be considered as a branch of metaphysics, and to be classed with the useless sciences commonly included under the same name, in consequence of its forming a part of the subjects treated in those fourteen books of Aristotle's works, which their editor, Andronicus of Rhodes, chose to distinguish by the words Ta jeta TU QUO IXa. Among the schoolmen, the science of mind was studied with the same spirit as the frivolous sciences with which it was thus fortuitously classed; but now, after the improvements which it has received from those who have prosecuted it upon the plan of induction recommended by Bacon, it can no longer be considered as having any affinity with ontology, and its kindred abyurdities. The inductive science of mind indeed differs from the

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1811.
Stewart's Philosophical Essays.

3 inductive science of matter only in its subject and instruments; they are both essentially founded upon fact, and as the object of the latter is to investigate the general laws that regulate the material phenomena which we perceive, so the object of the former is to investigate the general laws that regulate the phenomena of which we are conscious.

From this view of the nature of the philosophy of the mind, it follows that all speculations regarding the causes or mechanism by which the intellectual phenomena are supposed to be produced, lie beyond its legitimate province. They belong to the region of conjecture, and not to that of inductive philosophy. Our propositions regarding the laws of thought may be verified by an appeal to experience; but no proposition regarding the essence of the thinking principle is capable of being examined by any such test; and it is therefore improper and unphilosophical to commix and confound these two very different classes of propositions under a common name. It is the great aim of the physiologico-metaphysical theories, so much in fashion in the present day, to explain how our different mental operations are produced by means of vibrations, and other changes in the state of the sensorium; but in truth, these speculations are exceedingly visionary, and at any rate it is quite clear that as they have neither the same objects nor the same evidence, so neither ought they to pass under the same name with conclusions founded upon consciousness. We admire the philosophy and the spirit of the following passage.

' For my part, I have no scruple to say that I consider the physiological problem in question, as one of those which are likely to remain for ever among the arcana of nature; nor am I afraid of being contradicted by any competent and candid judge, how sanguine soever may be his hopes concerning the progress of future discovery, when I assert that it has hitherto eluded completely all the efforts which have been madetowards its solution. As to the metaphysical romances above alluded to, they appear to me, after all the support and illustration which they have received from the ingenuity of Hartley, of Priestly, and of Darwin, to be equally unscientific in the design, and uninteresting in the execution; destitute, at once, of the sober charms of truth, and of those imposing attractions which fancy, when united to taste, can lend to fiction. In consequence of the unbounded praise which I have heard testowed upon them, I have repeatedly begun the study of them anew, suspecting that I might be under the influence of some latert and undue prejudice against this new mode of philosophizing, so much in vogue at present in England; but notwithstanding the strong predilection which I have always felt for such pursuits, my labour has uniformly ended in a sentiment of regret, at the time and attention which I had misemployed in so hopeless and so ungrateful a task, ---Prel. Dissert. p. 4.

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the mind was classed among the branches of phrsical science : 200 as the laws of mind are as much parts of the general sustem of nature as those of matter, this classification was evidently correct. But in after-times, it came to be considered as a branch of metzphysics, and to be classed with the useles sciences commonly in cluded under the same name, in consequence of its forming a pat of the subjects treated in those fourteen books of Iristotle's works, which their editor, Andronicus of Pbodes, chose to distinguish br the words Tz u.tk TZ 20x2. Among the schoolmen, the science of mind was studied with the same spirit as the frivolous sciences with ubich it was thus fortuitously classed; but noir, after the improrements which it has received from those who have prosecuted it upon the plan of induction recommended br Bacon, it can no longer be considered as having anr affinity with ontology, and its kindred absudities. The inductire science of mind indeed ditfers from the

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and with all the nobler concerns of human life. If this view of it be just, as we shall afterwards endeavour to show, it must follow that this study cannot be neglected without material injury to the general system of human knowledge, and the means of human improvement. We are therefore disposed to set a high value upon Mr. Stewart's persevering and powerful efforts for its advancement; and observe with singular satisfaction, the intimation with which he closes the volume before us, that he hopes soon to be able to resume and complete his unfinished analysis of the intellectual powers and capacities. The work with which he has in the mean time favoured the public, will be found in every respect correspondent to his fame." It is a collection of essays, all upon subjects connected with the philosophy of the mind. It commences with a long preliminary discourse in explanation of the nature and in vindication of the utility of that philosophy; and is then divided into two parts, each part containing a series of essays. In the first series, the author examines in the first place Locke's theory of the origin of ideas, and then points out, in separate essays, the errors to which that theory bas given rise in various metaphysical systems, both of this country and of France. In the second series, he is occupied with subjects of a more brilliant and interesting nature, --those of beauty, sublimity, and taste.

We propose, on account of their superior importance, to enter at some length into the consideration of the points discussed in the preliminary dissertation; and we begin by observing, that the philosophy of the mind is not a little injured in the public opinion from its common designation by the word metaphysics—a word equally applied to the repulsive and visionary speculations of the schoolmen. In the ancient systems of Greece, the philosophy of the mind was classed among the branches of physical science; and as the laws of mind are as much parts of the general systein of nature as those of matter, this classification was evidently correct. But in after-times, it came to be considered as a branch of metaphysics, and to be classed with the useless sciences commonly included under the same name, in consequence of its forming a part of the subjects treated in those fourteen books of Aristotle's works, which their editor, Andronicus of Rhodes, chose to distinguish by the words Tapeta TU QUO IXa. Among the schoolmen, the science of mind was studied with the same spirit as the frivolous sciences with which it was thus fortuitously classed; but now, after the improvements which it has received from those who have prosecuted it upon the plan of induction recommended by Bacon, it can no longer be considered as having any affinity with ontology, and its kindred absurdities. The inductive science of mind indeed differs from the

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