CHAPTER I. NATURE OF THE REGULATIVE COGNITIONS. viously used, but not ex plained. IN our discussions hitherto we have frequently made use of such terms as "being," "substance," "time," "space," "resemblance," and others of somewhat similar Terms preimport. But we have not at all considered their origin or their nature. Possibly we have not all observed, what is true, that none of these cognitions have been in any way accounted for among the products of the faculties and powers of the mind that have, so far, come under our notice. They evidently arise from some other power, separate and distinct from all of them. They are very important cognitions, and furnish conditions for most of the knowledge which we gain, and are essential to all profitable and efficient intellectual action. For this reason it might seem more scientific to have discussed them first. Dr. Hopkins does this, following out strictly his policy of taking the conditioning and conditioned successively, and in the order which these words imply. The reason why I have not thought this best for my Reason for purpose is, that the operations and products of the mind here implied are more abstruse and difficult of apprehension than the others, and it earlier. seemed better to defer the consideration of them till the pupil should become more familiar with psychologic terms and facts. not consider ing these cognitions As has been intimated, these cognitions do not come to They do not come to us through any of the powers previously described. us through any of the faculties which we have, up to this time, examined. We do not perceive them; they are not the product of the Inner-Sense, though this may make us aware of their existence, as it does of other facts and operations of the soul. They are not given by the representative faculty, as this gives us nothing which had not been previously in the mind, and therefore does not account for their origin. Elaboration cannot produce them, since they are not directly implied in any of the conceptions or judgments with which this faculty deals; and yet, without these as a condition, probably most of our reasoning would be futile. Nearly all modern philosophers have referred them to a separate power, and the few who have not done so have found it necessary to treat them as a distinct and peculiar class of mental products. They have three characteristics. There are three characteristics of these cognitions which it is well to bear in mind. 1. They arise from the energy of the mind itself. They are not given through the senses, nor by the testimony of others, nor through any process of comparison, abstraction, generalization, or inference. We simply know them at once and distinctly; we know them because we are so constituted, and because, when the time comes for us to know them, we cannot help knowing them, they force themselves into our consciousness. It is from this fact that they get the name of necessary cognitions or ideas. 2. As just intimated, we know them when the time comes to know them. They are under regulation, as well as being regulative. They have their occasions and conditions, and come only on these occasions and under these conditions. They do not arise hap-hazard. There is always a reason |