CHAPTER VIII.

THE MALEVOLENT OR MALEFICENT AFFECTIONS.

As previously intimated, while Dr. Hopkins's objection to the classification of the Affections as Benevolent or Malevolent has much force, the substitute which he proposes is open to almost equally grave objections. It is for this reason, as well as for the reason that no one is likely to be misled, that I adhere to the old nomenclature.

to others than ourselves.

It has already been shown that the Affections are the most complex of the sensibilities. They differ from the Emotions in having an element of desire; they differ from the Desires and Appetites in the fact that both the latter Have regard are self-regarding, while the Affections are altruistic, or regardful of others. This is true of both the Benevolent and the Malevolent Affections. They seek to affect others than the subject. The former aim at some good for others, the latter at some ill. The radical element in the one is love; in the other, hate. It is true that in very many instances neither the one nor the other of these elements is very pronounced; still, in some form, rudimentary or otherwise, it is present.

The Malevolent Affections have many forms. I mention first that of Anger. This involves an unpleasant feeling on the part of the subject, which is accompanied by anger. a desire to affect disagreeably the person who is presumed to have caused the unpleasantness.

Nature of

affections.

tary.

Anger is the basis of all the so-called Malevolent Affections. Those known by other designations are either modifications of this, or in some way involve Basis of all it. It is partly instinctive and partly voluntary. malevolent The former characteristic applies to those sudden excitations of passion which arise on certain occasions, without thought on the part of the person Instinctive affected. The latter refers to the feeling that is and volunprolonged, and, perhaps, intensified or otherwise modified by reflection and consideration. Sometimes the feeling excited by some action or other is greatly diminished or wholly nullified when the case is examined, and full account is taken of the circumstances and conditions. On the other hand, an act which at first produces no feeling, or only a slight one, and which is scarcely noticeable, on being revolved in the mind, and considered in certain of its relations, becomes a serious offence, and produces a corresponding increase of unpleasant feeling. Frequently the additional and aggravating elements are from Affected by the world of imagination, instead of being found imagination. matter of fact, and are fruitful sources of misunderstanding and states of mind for which there is no justification.

Of instances of purely instinctive anger we have the fact that little children who get hurt by running against some obstacle, are disposed to wreak their petty vengeance on the insensate object. The savage breaks and tramples upon the arrow that wounds him. Even in highly civilized and cultivated persons this feeling is not always absent. I have seen a refined lady, of great prominence in society, take up a pen to write a hurried note, and, finding it good for nothing, dash it from her with great vigor, as

if in resentment at its failure to do its duty. For the most part, however, in persons of any considerable discipline and education, this passion is under control. If any fail to govern themselves in this

Usually regarded as culpable in cultivated persons.

respect, as in many others, a reasonable public sentiment regards it as a sign of weakness and culpability. By some it has been denied that this feeling properly belongs to our constitution. It has been thought to impeach the wisdom and righteousness of the Creator to suppose that He should implant in with our con- us an element of character which implies hate. stitution. He commands all men to love one another, and therefore it would be inconsistent for Him to put a principle the very opposite of this into our nature.

Supposed by some to be inconsistent

We are to

look at the

phenomena of necessarily as they should be.

the soul as

But we are to remember, in the first place, that we are now looking at the phenomena of the human soul as they manifest themselves; that is, as they are, not Certainly this is one of these manifestations, and is as nearly universal as any which exposes itself to our observation. If it be a part of our constitution, as it now is, we may reasonably conclude that either the Creator placed it there for some wise purpose, or that our nature has been in some way perverted so that it no longer expresses the design of the Creator.

they are, not as they should be.

Then, again, we see, if we look at the matter carefully, that there are a proper place and use for such a principle; not, probably, in its intense and perverted manifestations, but in its essential and purely natural action. As has been Instinctive implied, instinctive resentment has no moral

resentment

no moral character.

character. It acts before reason and judgment have opportunity to furnish any basis for moral

conduct, and without their direction. It seems to have been designed to protect persons in case of sudden and unforeseen attacks, where, if time were taken for deliberation and consideration of ways and means, action would be too late.

how far

Voluntary resentment can be justified only so far as it is essential to the welfare of the individual and the protection of society. That a person who in- Voluntary jures another should be made to pay some sort resentment, of a penalty, must be affirmed by the sense of justifiable. justice in every man's mind. This penalty, before society became developed and organized, must naturally be inflicted by the hand of the individual injured, or, if he were dead or disabled, by the nearest relative. This was the primitive method of the administration of justice, and prevailed far down the history even of organized society. Later came the universal usage among civilized peoples to surrender this individual function to society, which, in turn, undertook to guarantee the protection and defence of the individual. Still, there remains a proper and natural A proper and resentment towards a person committing a wanton injury. This does not imply that it may sentment. not be modified by various other elements of character. A love for all men may easily quench the rising hatred which is involved in anger or resentment. A spirit of forgiveness towards the culprit comes into exercise on the penitence of the latter, often even when this is wanting. A repression of whatever savors of unkindness and vindictiveness will be found in every person of much moral cultivation. But the feeling of resentment is, at the bottom, a natural and not unwholesome element of the human constitution.

natural individual re

MODIFICATIONS OF ANGER.

As has been intimated, resentment or anger is the basis of all the so-called malevolent affections. There are many modifications of it, known by different names.

Different kinds of resentment.

Indignation is the feeling we have when a palpable and wanton wrong has been done, either to ourselves or to another. Wrath is anger intensified, and, as some would say, felt by a superior towards an inferior, though this is somewhat doubtful. Rage is a violent outburst of anger, expressing itself in violent language or action. Fury is rage venting itself in a still wilder and more extravagant manner. Revenge, or Vindictiveness, is anger cherished, and seeking satisfaction in some evil done to its object in return for some evil experienced. Envy is resentment and ill-feeling experienced when others prove themselves superior to us, and who, as we are apt to think, are less worthy of this success than ourselves. It is usually regarded as a most unworthy disposition, and is universally reprobated. Jealousy is akin to envy, and yet is sufficiently distinct from it to have a designation of its own. It is a painful feeling, and one of the most powerful that can affect a person. Its chief peculiarity is, that it is directed towards an object devotedly loved, which, at the same time, becomes an object of suspicion and resentment. The strength and bitterness of the jealousy are usually proportioned to the depth and intensity of the love bestowed. The suspicion or surmise that forms the occasion for the feeling is usually that the person loved is bestowing favor on another, and therefore is withdrawing something from the subject. Under its influence one is incapable of judging correctly of the