Not an entity, but a power.

power of the mind. It is defined by Dr. Hopkins as "that constituent of man's being by which he is capable of free action, knowing himself to be thus capable." Says Dr. Reid, "Every man is conscious of a power to determine, in things which he conceives to depend upon his determination. To this power we give the name of Will." Dr. Whedon defines Will as "that power of the soul by which it intentionally originates an act or state of being;" or, more precisely, "Will is the power of the soul by which it is the conscious author of an intentional act."

Definitions.

Acts with reference to

the other

powers.

The Will, though not subject to coercion by any other power of the mind, or by any power or condition outside of the mind, nevertheless always acts with reference to these other powers and conditions. We can see this better if we take a concrete case. A poor man comes to me. I am informed of his wants, and convinced that he is a proper object of charity. So far my intellect alone acts, and my judgment decides as to the facts of the case. Further, my feelings are moved. I sincerely pity the man, and desire his relief. Here my sensibilities are engaged. I have at my disposal five dollars, which I know will supply his need and mitigate his sufferings. Here intelligence again becomes an element in the case. I desire to supply the man's wants with this money, but I have purposed to myself to purchase with that money a new book, which promises to be of great utility to me. I desire to use the money in this way. Here, again, the sensibilities are in activity, and with this peculiarity, that I have two opposing desires, both of which cannot be gratified. Let us suppose that I will find the greater pleasure

in buying the book. My mind at once inclines to that action, but at this point I become conscious of another feeling the feeling that I ought to relieve this man's want. Here duty opposes itself to inclination.

So far there has been no action of the will, on the main point. I begin to balance the incentives to action implied in the situation. My intellect is working again. It is possible for me to decide either way. I am clearly conscious of this, and there would otherwise be no conflict. There is no power to coerce me. I may decide in favor of my own gratification. If I do this, I am certain, after it is done, that I might have done the opposite. But we will suppose that I decide to do what I ought to do, instead of what will merely please me. I determine to give the man the money. This is a real act of the will. I have determined, or, as we say in parlance, I have "made up my mind."

The real act

common of the will.

But the act is not

Volition.

yet complete. There must follow an effort to convey the money to the man. This is what some of our best writers call Volition, as distinguished from Choice, or Determination. Others make volition include the choice, and regard the former as the real act of the will. However they are to be named or regarded, here are certainly two distinct elements, or perhaps we may say, two distinct acts. The one follows from, and is con sequent upon, the other. It is true the volition Consequent may not follow instantly. I might determine upon choice, to do a certain deed to-morrow, or next week, follow. but when the time comes the conditions have been so changed as to make it expedient for me to change my determination. It seems to me there is an act of will in the choice or determination made.

yet may not

Choice, as an act of the

will, incom

As intimated, it would appear that an act of the will is incomplete unless there be, in addition to the choice, a putting forth of effort to carry it into execution. This, where the determination has reference to plete. an immediate action, inevitably follows the decision, but if it be a choice or determination concerning a future action this effort may be postponed, and may never be made. It is to be observed here, furthermore, that this effort must be distinguished from the physical action. This is no part of the volition.

It

is the movement solely in the mind with which we are here concerned.

Dr. Hopkins regards the Will as having these two conTwo constitu- stituents, Choice and Volition; and holds that ents of will. the quality of freedom inheres in the former,

and not in the latter.

We find, then, that the act of willing is connected with, and conditioned upon, several other acts of the mind. There is first an intellectual operation. There must be intelligence of objects or acts between which to choose, or there can be no choice. There must also be a desire, or there can be no choice.

Will dependent on other acts.

It is impossible to conceive of a choice among a number of objects in none of which one felt any interest, and for none of which there was any desire. Then there is choice or decision, and finally the effort or volition. This last, we are to remember, is not the physical effort; it may stop short of that. It is the effort of the

Volition not

physical effort.

mind to carry out its choice. It usually results in the exertion of physical energy, but the mind, as it moves toward this end, may see, before it comes to the point to affect the physical instrument, that it would be useless.

I may determine to go out of a room, but before I arrive at the door even, I may ascertain that it is so fastened that physical effort would be useless. I therefore abstain from such effort; but, nevertheless, there was a complete act of will, including the volition.

CHAPTER II.

What is motive? Not a part nor a

CHOICE AND MOTIVE.

DESIRE, in its relation to the Will, constitutes what is called Motive. By some writers this is reckoned as a part of the willing, and by others it is regarded as the cause of the action of the Will. Most of the recent writers on this subject deny both these doctrines. But motive is so closely connected with the act of the mind in willing, that we need to say a few words about it.

cause of the willing.

Motive an essential condition.

It is unquestionably true that the mind will not act in willing without motives. As has already been seen, it is impossible to conceive of the mind as making a choice, where there is no desire for any of the objects or acts among which the choice is to be exercised. Hence we may regard the motive as a condition of action. But a condition is not a cause. not a cause. A cause is that which produces an effect. A condition, though producing nothing, is that without which something could not be. That is, the consequent could not exist without it, but it could exist without the consequent.

A condition

There may be several Conflicting Motives operating upon the mind at the same time. The child desires to eat his Conflicting cake now; he also desires to keep the whole or motives. a part of it till to-morrow. Here are two conflicting desires operating as motives.

Only one of these