The dissolution, or annulling, of a district is not an alteration.

When an alteration is made, the presumption arises that something of the original remains. Its total destruction precludes such a presumption. Under the constitution of 1822, the legislature could not pass any law creating, continuing, altering, or renewing any body politic or corporate without a vote of two-thirds in its favor.

The legislature repeatedly passed laws repealing charters, on the ground that a repeal was not an alteration, and that such repeal did not come within the spirit of the provision, any more than it did within its letter. Per Spencer, July 26, 1839.

A school district cannot delegate the power to select a school-house site. A designation should be specific as to location and size.

The inhabitants of District No. 15, in the town of Smyrna, at their first meeting, resolved that the trustees purchase a site for the schoolhouse, on the corner of Benjamin Hartwell's land, or on Seth Shep ard's land where the cooper's shop now stands.

The trustees selected the corner of Benjamin Hartwell's land, paid forty dollars for the site, and contracted for the erection of a house. They then called a special meeting, for the purpose of ratifying what they had done, and raising money to finish the house.

The meeting, by a vote of 26 to 12, refused to ratify their selection, and passed a resolution that the site should be "at a certain beech tree in widow Brown's hollow."

The supreme court, in the case of Benjamin vs. Hall, 17 Wendell, 437, decided that the district could not delegate the power to designate a school-house site to the trustees. It cannot make any difference whether a general authority to select is given, or whether the authority is to choose between two points.

The designation made by the special meeting is too indefinite. Verbal explanations, not a part of the record, though given at the meeting. cannot be permitted to locate the spot. The vote was utterly void for uncertainty.

Per Spencer, August 26, 1839.

Any subsequent resolution, directly, or necessarily repugnant, to a previous one, repeals it.

Per Spencer, September 7, 1839.

That part of the district library, purchased with money raised by tax upon the district, may be sold.

Per Spencer, September 17, 1839.

Three qualified voters constitute a valid meeting.

The annual meeting of District No. 9, Erin, and No. 12, Elmira, in 1839, was duly notified and held, at the time and place appointed at

the last preceding annual meeting. The district clerk and two other persons only were present. The proceedings of the meeting were regular. The law has not specified what number shall constitute a district meeting, and when the notice has been fair and public, and the meeting held at the usual time and place, and the proceedings regular, it must be deemed valid. Per Spencer, October 22, 1839.

A trustee cannot be librarian.

A librarian is subject to the direction of the trustees, and responsible to them. There is an incongruity in a man being subject and responsible to himself. There is the same incompatibility between the offices of librarian and trustee, as collector and trustee.

Per Spencer, November 25, 1839.

When a school-house is so decayed as to be no longer adapted to its purposes, the district may raise money by tax to build a new one, by a majority vote, and without a special notice of the intent to propose such a tax, at an annual or a special meeting.

Per Spencer, January 15, 1840.

The occupancy of a school-house sufficient notice to purchaser of land.

Twenty years previous to the date of appeal, District No. 6, Lincklaen, had taken a lease of a site for the school-house, for as long a period as the same should be occupied for a district school. James S. Graves purchased the land and appurtenances, without any reservation, and forbade the trustees from entering upon it, or from occupying the school-house.

Mr. Graves purchased the land subject to the lease, and the fact that the land was occupied by the district for a school-house and site, was sufficient notice to him. The district has a rightful claim to the possession of the land under the lease, and should take legal measures to assert their right. The occupancy is sufficient notice to the purchaser of the title of the district, and he is bound to ascertain it at his peril, notwithstanding the omission to put the lease upon record.

Per Spencer, January 23, 1840

Trustees are not empowered to receive a note in payment for a tax imposed by them, and cannot maintain an action to enforce payment.

The trustees of District No. 8, in the town of Mentz, took a note from S. P. Clark in payment of a tax assessed upon his farm. Upon appeal it appeared that Mr. Clark had been erroneously taxed in District No. 8, while he was yet a resident of District No. 7. Held that the note was void, and could not be collected, even if the tax had been legally assessed.

Per Spencer, March 24, 1840.

An order by a board of officers of two towns, dissolving a joint district, and setting off a part thereof to a district partly in a third town, valid as to dissolution, but illegal as to annexing part to district partly in third town.

The commissioners of Argyle and Fort Edward, on the 31st December, 1838, dissolved joint District No. 4, in said towns, and annexed one portion thereof to district No. 15, in Argyle, and the residue to District No. 3, in the town of Fort Edward. District No. 3, was a joint district, partly in Fort Edward and partly in Greenwich; and the commissioners of the latter town were not notified of the meeting and did not attend. There may be cases where an order, void in part, is void altogether. In this the commissioners of Argyle and Fort Edward had jurisdiction over District No. 4, but not over District No. 3. The order for the dissolution of District No. 4, is therefore valid, and having no necessary connection with that part of the order annexing a part thereof to District No. 3, must stand, while the part of the order affecting District No. 3, is void, for want of jurisdictiou.

Per Spencer, May 21, 1840.

The same principle is established in another case.

On the 20th of April, 1840, the commissioners of the towns of Newstead and Clarence, set off from joint District No. 4, in Clarence and 2 in Newstead, all that part of the district lying in the town of Clarence.

Subsequently, and on the same day, the commissioners of Clarence formed District No. 19, in said town, out of the territory so set off, and a portion of District No. 5 in the same town; and also the farms of four persons set off on the same day by the commissioners of Clarence and Lancaster from two joint districts in said towns.

The acts of the commissioners were strictly in compliance with the law. A joint board was first formed and the inhabitants intended to be annexed to the new district were set off from the joint districts. Then the commissioners of Clarence within whose separate jurisdiction the inhabitants so detached reverted, very properly annexed them to the new district. This was the true mode of procedure. The powers of the joint board ceased when the territory ceased to be a joint district. Per Spencer, June 18, 1840.

Notice of alteration must be given before order can take effect.

When a district has been altered without the previous consent of the trustees, a notice in writing of the alteration must be served upon them. This notice is essential to the completion of the transaction, as without it the order cannot take effect. It cannot be presumed that the notice has been given because the order has been made. The doctrine of presumption applies only to those cases where the act in question should have been performed in the regular and ordinary course, previous to the final act, and was necessarily incidental to it; as after a sale upon execution, a levy will be presumed. A notice in writing is a condition

subsequent to an order for alteration, and until it is given the order lies in abeyance, and without effect.

Per Spencer, July 27, 1840.

The establishment of a district by a decision upon appeal to the department, is final and conclusive; and the district is not subject to alteration by the local authorities, while the circumstances remain unchanged. But it is absurd to contend that when the circumstances under which a decision is pronounced, have materially changed, and after the districts or either of them have increased or diminished in territory, number or valuation, the local authorities are precluded from interference, by the conclusive operation of a decision, founded on an entirely different state of facts. Such a doctrine would be entirely inconsistent with reason and good sense.

Per Spencer, September 24, 1840.

The county treasurer is bound to pay over to each town all the school money apportioned to it and received by him from the state treasury. He cannot retain a per centage for receiving and disbursing, out of the money in his hands. Whatever claim he has is a charge against the county.

Per Spencer, October 12, 1840.

The trustees are bound to call district meetings when requested to do so by a respectable number of inhabitants for a legitimate object.

One of the trustees of District No. 19, partly in Liecester and partly in Perry, resigned his office, and subsequently united with fifteen others in a petition to the remaining trustees to call a special meeting to fill the vacancy, and to transact such other business as might be deemed

necessary.

The trustees declined to make the call on the ground that they were apprehensive that the meeting if called, might make such disposition of the public money as would interfere with previous arrangements, and prove detrimental to the school then in operation.

The filling of an existing vacancy was a proper and legal purpose, and the meeting, if called within thirty days after the happening of the vacancy, might have elected a person. Before an appeal could be decided, the time within which the inhabitants can be called together, will have expired, and the vacancy must be filled by appointment. The trustees have no right to conjecture that a meeting will adopt measures to injure the school. The principle cannot be sanctioned for a moment, that the trustees may refuse to call a meeting of the inhabitants, upon the ground that the latter may adopt measures at variance with the views of the former, as to the interests and welfare of the district. The trustees are the representatives and servants of the district, bound to carry out and obey the will of the inhabitants, when

legally expressed, and not warranted in attempting in any manner to thwart their wishes.

Per Spencer, December 23, 1840.

Trustees cannot dismiss a teacher, on the ground that some of the inhabitants are dissatisfied with him, while they themselves are not dissatisfied.

James M. Grooty was employed to teach school in District No. 2, New Baltimore, for five months, at $11 a month, on condition that if the trustees should find any fault with him at the end of a month, they were to notify him, pay him for the month's services, and dismiss him. He taught school from the 9th November to the 21st day of January, when the trustees dismissed him, on the ground of dissatisfaction on the part of some of the inhabitants, at the same time publicly stating that they had no cause of complaint.

One month was ample time to discover faults of character, discipline, government and modes of teaching, and if the trustees did not, within that time, give Mr. Grooty notice, they could not subsequently dismiss him, and release themselves from their contract. A mere allegation that the inhabitants were dissatisfied, would be insufficient cause of dismissal at any time. They should be able to show who are dissatisfied and for what cause.

The teacher did not undertake, expressly, or by implication, to satisfy every person in the district, and it would have been absurd to require or expect it. The trustees were ordered to reinstate Mr. Grooty in his school, and at the end of five months from November 19, to pay him his wages at $11 per month, without any deduction for the time between his dismissal, and his reinstatement.

Per Spencer, March 6, 1841.

Children of non-residents are not entitled to attend a district school without permission of the trustees, and upon such terms as may be agreed upon. They cannot be permitted to share in the public money, appropriated to the district, under any circumstances.

Per Spencer, March 26, 1841.

A conditional consent to the alteration of a district cannot be given. The trustees must either give or withhold their consent. They can annex no conditions.

Per Spencer, April 12, 1841.

If the annual meeting be fairly and legally called, if there be nothing in the case to show a design to take any undue advantage of the majority, if there be no surprise or fraud of any kind, and the proceedings be in due and usual form, and those in attendance wait a reasonable time, any number of persons is competent to transact business. Persons who neglect to attend until an hour has elapsed after the time of meeting,