not yet finally adjusted, that the war in Europe is not yet terminated, and that the evacuation of our Western posts, when it shall happen, will demand a provision for garrisoning and securing them. You will consider this subject with a compre hensiveness equal to the extent and variety of its relations. The Secretary at War will be directed to lay before Congress the present state of the

With the review of our army is naturally connected that of our militia establishment. It will merit inquiry what imperfections, in the existing plan, experience may have unfolded; what improvements will comport with the progress of public opinion. The subject is of so much magnitude, in my estimation, as to beget a constant solicitude that the consideration of it will be renewed, till the greatest attainable degree of perfection is accomplished. Time, while it may furnish others, is wearing away some advantages for forwarding the object. None better deserves the persevering attention of our public councils.

In contemplating the actual condition of our Western bor ders, the pleasure it is calculated to afford ought not to cause us to lose sight of a truth, to the confirmation of which every day's experience contributes, viz.: That the provisions heretofore made are inadequate to protect the Indians from the violences of the irregular and lawless part of the frontier inhabitants; and that, without some more effectual plan for restraining the murders of those people, by bringing the murderers to condign punishment, all the exertions of the government to prevent or repress the outrages of the Indians, and to preserve peace with them, must prove fruitless-all our present agreeable prospects fugitive and illusory. The frequent destruction of innocent women and children, chiefly the victims of retaliation, must continue to shock humanite, while an expense truly enormous will drain the treasure of the Union.

To enforce the observance of justice upon the Indians, it is indispensable there should be competent means of rendering justice to them. If to these means could be added a provision to facilitate the supply of the articles they want on reasonable terms (a measure the mention of which I the more readily re

peat, as in all the conferences with them they urge it with solicitude), I should not hesitate to entertain a strong hope of a permanent good understanding with them. It is agreeable to add that even the probability of their civilization, by perseverance in a proper plan, has not been diminished by the experiments thus far made.

Gentlemen of the House of Representatives:-The state of the revenue in its several relations, with the sums which have been borrowed and reimbursed, pursuant to different acts of Congress, will be submitted by the proper officer-together with an estimate of the appropriations necessary to be made for the current service of the ensuing year. Reports from the late and present director of the Mint (which I shall also cause to be laid before you), will show the situation and progress of that institution, and the necessity of some further legislative provisions for carrying the business of it more completely into execution, and for checking abuses which appear to be arising in particular quar

ters.

Whether measures may not be advisable to reinforce the provision for the redemption of the public debt, will not fail, I am sure, to engage your attention. In this examination, the question will naturally occur, whether the present be not a favorable juncture for the disposal of the vacant lands of the United States, northwest of the Ohio. Congress have demonstrated the sense to be, and it were superfluous to repeat more, that whatever will tend to accelerate the honorable extinguishment of our public debt, will accord as much with the true interest of our country as with the general sense of our consti

tuents.

Gentlemen: The progress in providing materials for the frigates, and in building them, and the state of the fortifications of our harbors, the measures which have been pursued for obtaining proper sites for arsenals, and for furnishing our magazines with military stores; and the steps which have been taken in execution of the law for opening a trade with the Indians, will also be presented for the information of Congress.

MESSAGE

FOR WASHINGTON TO CONGRESS, IN REPLY TO A CALL FOR PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

Draft by Hamilton.

March 29th, 1796.

I have received your resolution of the

inst., and have con

sidered it with the attention always due to a request of the House of Representatives. I feel a consciousness (not contradicted I trust by any part of my conduct) of a sincere disposition to respect the rights, privileges, and authorities of Congress collectively, and in its separate branches-to pay just deference to their opinions and wishes-to avoid intrusion on their province -to communicate freely information pertinent to the subjects of their deliberation. But this disposition, keeping steadily in view the public good, must likewise be limited and directed by the duty incumbent upon us all, of preserving inviolate the constitutional boundary between the several departments of the government; a duty enjoined by the very nature of a Constitution, which defines the powers delegated, and distributes them among different depositories; enforced by the solemn sanction of an oath; and only to be fulfilled by a regard no less scrupulous for the rights of the Executive, than for those of every other department.

When I communicated to the House of Representatives the treaty lately made with Great Britain, I did not transmit the papers respecting its negotiation, for reasons which appeared to me decisive.

It is contrary to the general practice of governments, to promulge the intermediate transactions of a foreign negotiation, without weighty and special reasons. The motives for great delicacy and reserve on this point are powerful. There may be situations of a country, in which particular occurrences of a nego tiation, though conducted with the best views to its interest, and

even to a satisfactory issue, if immediately disclosed, might tend to embarrassment and mischief in the interior affairs of that country. Confidential discussions and overtures are inseparable from the nature of certain negotiations, and frequently occur in others. Essays are occasionally made by one party to discover the views of another in reference to collateral objects; motives are sometimes assigned for what is yielded by one party to another; which, if made public, might kindle the resentment or jealousy of other powers, or might raise in them pretensions not expedient to be gratified. Hence it is a rule of mutual convenience and security among nations, that neither shall, without adequate cause and proper reserves, promulge the details of a negotiation between them; otherwise, one party might be injured by the disclosures of the other, and sometimes without being aware of the injury likely to be done.

Consequently, the general neglect of this rule in the practice of a government, would naturally tend to destroy that confidence in its prudence and delicacy-that freedom of communication with it, which are so important in the intercourses between nation. and nation, towards the accommodation of mutual differences and the adjustment of mutual interests.

Neither would it be likely to promote the advantage of a nation, that the agents of a foreign government with which it was at any time in treaty, should act under the apprehension that every expression, every step of theirs, would presently be exposed, by the promulgation of the other party, to the criticism of their political adversaries at home. The disposition to a liberal, and, perhaps, for that very reason, a wise policy in them, might be checked by the reflection, that it might afterwards. appear from the disclosures on the other side, that they had not. made as good bargains as they might have made. And while they might be stimulated by this to extraordinary effort and perseverance, maxims of greater secrecy and reserve in their cabinet would leave their competitors in the negotiation without the same motive to exertion. These having nothing to fear from the indiscretion of the opposite government, would only have to manage with caution their communications to their own. The

consequence of such a state of things would naturally be an increase of obstacles to the favorable close of a negotiation, and the probability of worse bargains for the nation in the habit of giving indiscreet publicity to its proceedings.

The agents of such a nation themselves would have strong inducements to extreme reserve in their communications with their own government, lest parts of their conduct might subject them in other quarters to unfriendly and uncandid constructions, which might so narrow the information they gave, as scarcely to afford sufficient light, with regard either to the fitness of their own course of proceeding, or the true state and prospects of the negotiation with which they were charged.

And thus, in different ways, the channels of information to a government might be materially obstructed by the impolitic practice of too free disclosure, in regard to its foreign negotiations.

Moreover, it is not uncommon for the instructions to nego tiating agents, especially where differences are to be settled, to contain observations on the views and motives of the other party, which after an amicable termination of the business it would be contrary to decorum, unfriendly and offensive to make public. Such instructions also frequently manifest views which, if disclosed, might renew sources of jealousy and ill-will which a treaty had extinguished, might exhibit eventual plans of proceed ing which had better remain unknown for future emergencies, and might even furnish occasion for suspicion, and pretext for discontent, to other powers. And in general, where more had been obtained by a treaty than the ultimata prescribed to the negotiator, it would be inexpedient to publish those ultimata; since, among other ill effects, the publication of them might prejudice the interest of the country in future negotiations with the same or with different powers.

These reasons explain the grounds of a prevailing rule of conduct among prudent governments, namely, not to promulge without weighty cause, nor without due reserves, the particulars of a foreign negotiation. It so happens indeed that many of them have no immediate application to the case of the present