be considered that are prominent and significant. The reservation was a part of a very much larger tract which the Indians had the right to occupy and use and which was adequate for the habits and wants of a nomadic and uncivilized people. It was the policy of the Government, it was the desire of the Indians, to change those habits and to become a pastoral and civilized people. If they should become such the original tract was too extensive, but a smaller tract would be inadequate without a change of conditions. The lands were arid and, without irrigation, were practically valueless. And yet, it is contended, the means of irrigation were deliberately given up by the Indians and deliberately accepted by the Government. The lands ceded were, it is true, also arid; and some argument may be urged, and is urged, that with their cession there was the cession of the waters, without which they would be valueless, and "civilized communities could not be established thereon." And this, it is further contended, the Indians knew, and yet made no reservation of the waters. We realize that there is a conflict of implications, but that which makes for the retention of the waters is of greater force than that which makes for their cession. The Indians had command of the lands and the waters-command of all their beneficial use, whether kept for hunting, "and grazing roving herds of stock," or turned to agriculture and the arts of civilization. Did they give up all this? Did they reduce the area of their occupation and give up the waters which made it valuable or adequate? And, even regarding the allegation of the answer as true, that there are springs and streams on the reservation flowing about 2,900 inches of water, the inquiries are pertinent. If it were possible to believe affirmative answers, we might also believe that the Indians were awed by the power of the Government or deceived by its negotiators. Neither view is possible. The Government is asserting the rights of the Indians. But extremes need not be taken into account. By a rule of interpretation of agreements and treaties with the Indians, ambiguities occurring will be resolved from the standpoint of the Indians. And the rule

should certainly be applied to determine between two inferences, one of which would support the purpose of the agreement and the other impair or defeat it. On account of their relations to the Government, it cannot be supposed that the Indians were alert to exclude by formal words every inference which might militate against or defeat the declared purpose of themselves and the Government, even if it could be supposed that they had the intelligence to foresee the "double sense" which might some time be urged against them.

Another contention of appellants is that if it be conceded that there was a reservation of the waters of Milk River by the agreement of 1888, yet the reservation was repealed by the admission of Montana into the Union, February 22, 1889, c. 180, 25 Stat. 676, "upon an equal footing with the original States." The language of counsel is that "any reservation in the agreement with the Indians, expressed or implied, whereby the waters of Milk River were not to be subject of appropriation by the citizens and inhabitants of said State, was repealed by the act of admission." But to establish the repeal counsel rely substantially upon the same argument that they advance against the intention of the agreement to reserve the waters. The power of the Government to reserve the waters and exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and could not be. The United States v. The Rio Grande Ditch & Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690, 702; United States v. Winans, 198 U. S. 371. That the Government did reserve them we have decided, and for a use which would be necessarily continued through years. This was done May 1, 1888, and it would be extreme to believe that within a year Congress destroyed the reservation and took from the Indians the consideration of their grant, leaving them a barren waste-took from them the means of continuing their old habits, yet did not leave them the power to change to new ones.

Appellants' argument upon the incidental repeal of the agreement by the admission of Montana into the Union and the power over the waters of Milk River which the State thereby acquired

VOL. CCVII-37

to dispose of them under its laws, is elaborate and able, but our construction of the agreement and its effect make it unnecessary to answer the argument in detail. For the same reason we have not discussed the doctrine of riparian rights urged by the Gov

ernment.

Decree affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER dissents.

207 U. 8.

Opinions Per Curiam, Etc.

OPINIONS PER CURIAM, ETC., FROM OCTOBER 14, 1907, TO JANUARY 6, 1908.

No. 14. GALBAN AND COMPANY, APPELLANTS, v. THE UNITED STATES. Appeal from the Court of Claims. Submitted October 15, 1907. Decided October 21, 1907. Per Curiam. Judgment affirmed. Nealy v. Henkel, 180 U. S. 109; Pearcy v. Stranahan, 205 U. S. 257, and cases cited. See opinion below, 40 C. Cl. 495. Mr. Barry Mohun, Mr. W. W. Dudley and Mr. L. T. Michener for appellants. The Attorney General and Mr. Assistant Attorney General Van Orsdel for appellee.

No., Original. Ex parte: IN THE MATTER OF THOMAS B. CLEMENT, PETITIONER. Submitted October 14, 1907. Decided October 21, 1907. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied. Mr. George N. Baxter for petitioner. The Attorney General opposing.

No. 260. CLARK WOODARD SPRAGUE, SOLE SURVIVING EXECUTOR, ETC., PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. JACOB BETZ ET UX. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. Motion to dismiss submitted October 21, 1907. Decided October 28, 1907. Per Curiam. Dismissed for the want of jurisdiction. New Orleans Waterworks Company v. Louisiana, 185 U. S. 336; Newburyport Water Company v. Newburyport, 193 U. S. 561; and see Thomas v. Provident Loan and Trust Company, 138 Fed. Rep. 348; S. C., 200 U. S. 618. Case below, 87 Pac. Rep. 916. Mr. Charles S. Fogg for plaintiff in error. Mr. John F. Shafroth for defendants in error.

Opinions Per Curiam, Etc.

207 U.S.

No. 306. W. F. BAIRD, ADMINISTRATOR, ETC., PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. J. D. MONROE ET AL. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of California. Motions to dismiss or affirm submitted October 21, 1907. Decided October 28, 1907. Per Curiam. Dismissed for the want of jurisdiction. Oxley Stave Company v. Butler County, 166 U. S. 648; Hulbert v. Chicago, 202 U. S. 275; Miller v. Cornwall Railroad Company, 168 U. S. 134; Mutual Life Insurance Company v. McGrew, 188 U. S. 291; Howard v. Fleming, 191 U. S. 126; New Orleans Waterworks Company v. Louisiana, 185 U. S. 336. Mr. Rufus H. Thayer for plaintiff in error. Mr. John M. York for defendants in error.

No. 358. THE BLYTHE COMPANY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. BANKERS' INVESTMENT COMPANY ET AL. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of California. Motions to dismiss or affirm submitted October 21, 1907. Decided October 28, 1907. Per Curiam. Dismissed for the want of jurisdiction. Blythe v. Hinckley, 84 Fed. Rep. 228; Blythe Company v. Blythe, 172 U. S. 644; Blythe Company v. Hinckley, 111 Fed. Rep. 827; Blythe Company v. Hinckley, 184 U. S. 701; Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333; Dupaneur v. Rochereau, 21 Wall. 130; Metcalf v. Watertown, 153 U. S. 671; Blythe Company v. Bankers' Investment Company, 147 California, 82; Missouri Pacific Railway v. Fitzgerald, 160 U. S. 558, 582; Temple v. Hagar, 4 Wall. 432, 434. Mr. George W. Towle for plaintiff in error. Mr. Frederic D. McKenney, Mr. E. S. Heller and Mr. Thomas 1. Bergin for defendants in error.

No. 30. MRS. WILLIAM F. HARDIN ET AL., PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. COTTONWOOD LUMBER COMPANY. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas. Submitted October 30, 1907. Decided November 4. 1907. Per Curiam.