Mr. Borts moved to strike out the word "member," and insert "citizen." He considered the whole section superfluous, but desired that it shouid appear in the most acceptable form.

Mr. NORTON suggested the word "inhabitant,” which amendment was accepted by Mr. Botts.

Mr. HALLECK observed that the clause was properly worded. The term "inhabitant" would apply to a certain class of people who were not entitled to the rights of citizens, but who were entitled to protection as inhabitants.

Mr. JONES objected to any such interpretation. The reading of the section is, no member of this State shall be disfranchised." That is to say, no citizen having certain rights, such as the right of voting, shall be deprived of them. You cannot deprive an Indian of a right to vote, when he has no such right. It applies to the full rights of a citizen. A citizen cannot be partly a citizen. This section requires to be analyzed. "No member,” &c. Now a member of a State must have the rights and privileges of a citizen thereof; because if he has not, the article gives them to him. An Indian cannot be deprived of the rights secured to a white man without due process of law. The word disfranchised is applied to citizens in contra-distinction to foreigners. A man who is not franchised cannot be disfranchised; a foreigner in the United States, who is not a citizen, cannot be disfranchised. The provision is superfluous, and he (Mr. Jones) would not support it.

Mr. SHERWOOD supposed the word "memĥer" referred not only to Indians, negroes, and Africans, but to citizens; and that the word disfranchised referred particularly to citizens. "No member," either a citizen or a foreigner, Indian, negro, or African, "shall be disfranchised." A citizen being the only member who who could be disfranchised, is therefore referred to by that word. A citizen of the State of New York, by the commission of certain crimes specified in the statute books, is disfranchised by law. This is intended to secure to him all the rights to which he is entitled, unless by his own act he is disfranchised.

Mr. HASTINGS. There is another view of this question. Whether it is designed or not, the adoption of this section of the bill of rights would secure to certain classes, Indians and Africans, (if Africans are ever introduced here,) precisely the same rights that we ourselves enjoy. There is no clause in relation to the introduction of slaves or any other class of men. If you provide that no member of this State shall be deprived of the rights and immunities of a citizen, it is to be presumed that such member enjoys those privileges and immunities. If you declare that no man shall be decapitated for a certain crime, it may reasonably be presumed that he has a head. It must be clear, therefore, that that section proposed to be amended, was not designed by the mover to produce an effect of this kind. The word "inhabitant" would not be proper. Indians are inhabitants, but they do not enjoy those privileges in any portion of the United States; they are disfranchised. Yet we declare here, that they shall not be disfranchised without due process of law.

Mr. BOTTS thought the objections of the gentleman who had just taken his seat, to the word "inhabitant,” were based upon an erroneous impression of the word "disfranchised." Every inhabitant of this State is franchised. It is not the elective franchise that is meant. The term embraces the general rights of a freeman. All classes of men possess rights and privileges. An Indian has rights— he has a right to his life. There can be no objection to the word "inhabitant.” If the gentleman is correct, and the inhabitant has no rights, of course he cannot be deprived of them. He (Mr. Botts) would vote against the whole section, because he considered it entirely superfluous.

Mr. ORD could not agree with his colleague (Mr. Botts) as to the meaning of the word "disfranchise." The popular meaning of the word "franchise" is the right of suffrage. It is derived from the French, and it would be well to be sure of the precise meaning. Words are things. If this is true, we are giving to all

inhabitants, whites, Indians, blacks, and mulattoes, the right of suffrage. The Constitution of New York has the word "member.' Member and inhabitant mean different things. A member of a State, is a citizen. If gentlemen had left the word citizen, it would be more appropriate, and he would be disposed to vote for the amendment.

Mr. JONES said that, in France the word franchise is used to express a political right. In the Constitution of Louisiana it is used in the same sense. It refers to the right of suffrage.

Mr. ORD quoted from Webster's dictionary: Franchise, N. Exemption from any onerous duty; privilege; immunity; right granted; a district to which a privilege or exemption belongs; v. To enfranchise-to make free. It is a word derived from the French, and means simply the right of suffrage, and nothing more. This amendment, which it is proposed to substitute for the first article of the re. port of the Committee, is, therefore, out of place here. It relates to certain rights which come properly under the provisions of the legislative department. It should be left to the Committee to be inserted in that part of the Constitution. He moved to lay it on the table.

Mr. DENT differed from his colleague (Mr. Ord) on one point. If the word “disfranchised” has reference to the right of suffrage and nothing more, what is the meaning of the words following-or deprived of any of the rights or privi leges secured to the citizens, thereof." It appears from this, that the word must have reference to the whole community, and not to a particular class entitled to special privileges; for this class is afterwards defined by the term citizen..

Mr. Borts rose to rescue a good old English word from the hands of the enemy. In the days of the Anglo-Saxons, a man who had been a serf, was made frank or free. The word has reference to freedom. It may be well enough to declare, that we shall not deprive the inhabitants of this State of their franchise or free. dom, except by the law of the land; but there does not appear to be any necessity for making such a declaration, inasmuch as they cannot be deprived of such rights in any other way. The gentleman from San Joaquin (Mr. Jones) refers to the word as used in Louisiana. Does he mean to say, that because a man fights a duel in that State, he is deprived of the privilege of voting, and no other privilege? Is that the only punishment? The meaning must extend beyond the right of suffrage; for the man who commits crime is not only deprived of that right, but of many others.

Mr. GWIN had some doubts as to the propriety of using this word. He thought the shortest way of settling the question was to reject the amendment.

Mr. Borts suggested that if a gentleman was obliged to take a dose of physic, he had a right to make it as palatable as possible. He intended to vote against the whole section. To save time, however, he would withdraw his amendment. Mr. GWIN moved to reject the first section.

Mr. HALLECK. This is a very excellent provision. It is drawn up to cover certain rights. The object is this. There are two members of a community-one has several rights, another but a single right. Neither of these members shall be deprived of the one right or of the several rights, unless by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers. The person possessing but a single right cannot deprived of it except in the same way with the individual who has several rights.

Mr. GWIN could not see how a man could be disfranchised of any of his rights except by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.

Mr. WOZENCRAFT would vote for Mr. Botts' amendment, and against the whole. He thought it was the shortest way of accomplishing the object.

Mr. BOTTS stated that he had withdrawn his amendment.

Mr. PRICE could see no necessity for telling people in a bill of rights that their rights are secured to them by law. They understand that very well.

Mr. Gwix asked if there was any Constitution, of all the States, containing anything about franchise, except that of New York.

Mr. ORD had looked over the whole thirty Constitutions, and had found none.

Mr. NORTON said it was taken verbatim from the Constitution of New York. Mr. McCARVER thought it a matter of no importance where it came from. He was opposed to its adoption. We designate in this Constitution who are entitled to the right of franchise. Having given that right, no one under our system of government can be deprived of it except by law.

Mr. SHANNON was of opinion that the section defined itself. “No member shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen." This does not refer to the single right of voting or the elective franchise. It includes all the rights and privileges secured to citizens. There can be no understanding here as to the previous existence of those rights. It is for the very purpose of creating a fundamental law of the land to determine them, that this Convention is now assembled.

Mr. NORTON had but a word to say in regard to this section. It is admitted that there is nothing improper in it. Objection is made to it on the ground that all American citizens know they possess these rights and privileges, without a formal statement of the fact. It is necessary, however, that not only citizens should be protected in the enjoyment of their rights, but all who are inhabitants of the State. Besides a large proportion of the citizens of California have had no opportunity heretofore of knowing so much about the rights and privileges of American citizens, and the protection given to all classes under our laws, as they are now about to have. It is necessary that they should see upon the face of this Constitution that their rights are to be secured to them. It will be a guarantee that they will not be deprived of such rights except by the law of the land or the judgment of their peers. There are foreigners in this country who are entitled to the protection of our laws. That of itself is a consideration of great importance. If there is no harm in this provision, and it can do the least possible good, it should be permitted to remain in the Constitution.

Mr. GWIN objected to it, not because it was improper, but because everything inserted in this Constitution should be proper, and not negative. Louisiana had the same descriptive population unacquainted with our laws. He would also refer to Arkansas, Missouri, and Florida. Is there anything of the same kind in their Constitutions? Because it happens to be in one Constitution, it is not necessary to put it in ours. It is a precedent that should not be established.

Mr. SEMPLE. Suppose we pass this provision in the bill of rights, will it not cramp our action hereafter? Other sections must come up defining who are entitled to certain rights. Here you declare that no citizen shall be deprived of any of his rights or privileges unless by due process of law. Particular classes must necessarily be deprived of the right of suffrage. You proceed in another section to deprive them of that right. This is not due process of law. If such a provision is necessary at all, it cannot properly be introduced in this part of the Constitution. It must be incorporated in that portion which defines the classes entitled to the right of suffrage. He (Mr. Semple) would therefore vote for the rejection, with the view of considering the proposition in its appropriate place. Mr. DIMMICK was in favor of having this in the bill of rights, and for this reason. That nothing should be introduced into the Constitution or the laws of this country, which would disfranchise any person, who, under a particular law, has the right of citizenship. He had heard gentlemen say that under the Mexican law, there is a class who have the right of elective franchise, and he knew they were in favor of prohibiting them from the enjoyment of this right. He considered the bill of rights the proper place for this section. In another part of the Constitution it would be easy to determine who were entitled to the right of suffrage, without reference to this.

Mr. GWIN wished to know what class under the Constitution of Mexico did the gentleman refer to. Was it the Indian population?

Mr. DIMMICK stated that the Indians could not vote; but that there was a portion of the population having Indian blood in their veins who were entitled to that privilege.

Mr. Borrs renewed his amendment.

Mr. PRICE moved to strike out the latter clause-"except by the judgment of his peers."

Mr. ORD was not quite satisfied that the meaning of the word franchise was thoroughly understood. It seemed to him that the latter part of the clause covered the whole ground. The word "disfranchised" might be stricken out altogether, leaving the other portion of the section to stand. He therefore moved the following :

3. No inhabitant of this State shall be deprived of his rights or privileges, unless by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.

;

Mr. Jones expressed surprise at one argument urged in favor of this section that the original citizens of this country require to be told that they are entitled to the rights of citizenship. He believed it was no more necessary to tell them that than it was to tell him. It might be a very charitable concession to award to them in a bill of rights the privileges of citizenship; but he would remind gentlemen that these privileges were already guarantied to them by the treaty of peace and by the Constitution of the United States. It was unnecessary to patent their rights by a declaration of this kind.

The question was then taken on the amendment of Mr. ORD, and it was rejected.

The question was then taken on the amendment of Mr. Borrs, and it was rejected.

The question recurring on the first section as reported by the Committee,
On motion of Mr. GWIN, it was stricken out.

The Committee then rose, reported progress, and asked leave to sit again. Report accepted and leave granted.

Mr. SHANNON, from the Committee on Rules of the House, submitted a written report, which, on motion of Mr. GILBERT, was laid on the table, subject to call on Monday morning at 10 o'clock.

Mr. BOTTS desired to draw the attention of the House to a state of things that existed with regard to the Secretaries. They were up until twelve o'clock every night, preparing manuscript copies of the reports for the House. There was no printing press. This was a burden that ought not to fall upon the shoulders of these gentlemen. He therefore moved the following resolution:

Resolved, That when copies of reports are ordered by this House, that the Secretary shall be authorized to contract for the same, making an immediate report of the terms of the contract to the President of the Convention for his approval.

The resolution was adopted.

On motion of Mr. GWIN, the House then took a recess till 3 o'clock.

AFTERNOON SESSION, 3 O'CLOCK, P. M.

The Convention met pursuant to adjournment.

The House then resolved itself into Committee of the Whole on the special order of the day.

The question came up on the second section of the report of the Committee, and it was adopted, viz:

3. The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate forever. But a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all civil cases, in the manner to be prescribed by law.

Mr. Borts thought this the place in which Virginia might appear most appropriately. One of the most eloquent and beautiful clauses in the Constitution of Virginia, was the following, in the bill of rights. He proposed it as a substitute for the third section reported by the Committee:

That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and, therefore, all men are

equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity toward each other.

Mr. HALLECK remarked that this left out a very important provision contained in the article from the Constitution of New York, in regard to witnesses appearing in court.

Mr. NORTON was decidedly opposed to the amendment. He could see no objection to the section as reported by the Committee. It is plain and explicit. It not only guarantees to every man his rights in matters of religion, but protects the community from any violation of the peace, and from all acts of licentiousness calculated to impair the well-being of society, or infringe upon the dignity of the State.

Mr. Borts remarked, that under the clause reported by the Committee, a declaration might be made that the Roman Catholic religion is inconsistent with the safety of the State. He wanted to prohibit the Legislature from making such a declaration. He wanted a bill of rights to declare, what the bill of rights of Virginia does, in the most appropriate and beautiful language-the right of man to worship in his own way. The one does it-the other does not.

Mr. SHERWOOD said that the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Botts,) was evidently not acquainted with the history of the new sects in the State of New York, or he would see the propriety of the restrictions contained in the section reported by the Committee. There have been sects known there to discard all decency, and admit spiritual wives, where men and women have herded together, without any regard for the established usages of society. It was for this reason that the clause was put in the Constitution of New York. No such thing as an attempt to limit the Roman Catholics to any fixed rules of worship was intended; but it was deemed necessary that society should be protected from the demoralizing influence of fanatical sects, who thought proper to discard all pretentions to decency.

The question was taken on the amendment of Mr. Botts, and it was rejected. The question was then taken on the proposition of the Committee, and it was adopted, as follows:

4. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed, in this State, to all mankind; and no person shall be rendered incompetent to bear witness on account of his opinions on matters of religious belief; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this State.

The question being on the fourth section reported by the Committee,

Mr. Borts moved to amend it by introducing, after the words "public safety,” the words "in the opinion of the Legislature," as follows:

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety, IN THE OPINION of the LEGISLATURE, may require its suspension.

Mr. McCARVER was opposed to leaving to the Legislature the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. It would be very inconvenient, in cases of great emergency, to wait until the Legislature could convene. In most of the States, the sessions are annual, and in some they occur only once in two years. There is not likely to be any abuse of this power. The emergency must be shown. It must be established that the public safety requires the suspension. No executive officer would undertake to exercise the power, unless compelled to do so by the necessity of the case.

Mr. NORTON was clearly of opinion that the proposed amendment was no improvement upon the original section. The only way the writ of habeas corpus can be suspended, is by the Executive of the State. He is the only person who can declare the country under martial law; and this power of suspending the writ is given to him for obvious reasons. It would be impossible, in many cases, for the Legislature to be convened at a proper time. It is only in cases of invasion, or