præfens à præterito in futurum procedit; nihilque eft in Tempore conflitutum, quod totum Vitæ fuæ Spatium pariter poffit amplecti! This is undeniably a mark of Imperfection to live by change, to lofe what is paft, to want what is yet to come, and to place infinite Happiness in a fucceffion of Things, though all pleasant. If any ftate were good, why fhould it pafs? If any thing fhould be pleasant, why should it not be prefent? Why should it be first in Expectation, a minute in Enjoyment, and then' in Reflection only? This, I fay, is plainly a mark of Imperfection; it is our own flate; and therefore to be denied concerning a Mind infinitely perfect. From all this we may fee that when God created the Universe, as there was no new Object of Knowledge prefented to his Intellect, nor any new Defire to his Will, fo there was no new Difficulty farted to his Power; fince, as was above fhewn, to perform must be equally eafy to a necellary Infinity of Power. as to will the performance. The creation of a World, the fuperintendence of his own Works, the methods of Providence, and the whole fcheme and procedure, efpecially with refpect to rational Beings, were no Novelties to him, but what he had in view, familiar (if I may fo fay) from Eternity. In a word, after we have once more confidered that, if there be a neceffity for any Being, it must be for infinite Being; and and if there be a neceffity for any Perfection, it must be for infinite Perfeclion (it cannot be for infinite diminished by any Quantity, in either cafe;) after this, 1 fay, it would be a low, unphilofophical Prejudice to think that God could be lonely, and without Entertainment, before the exiftence of his own Effects, or put to any difficulty by them after they exifted; that he could have bettered his Condition by them, or that it would have been worfe without them. I cannot conclude, without faying fomething of the unfucceffive Exiflence of the Deity, or of his unfucceffive Eternity. This is an extremely abstruse Speculation, and there hath been much Controverfy about it. What we may fay fafely in it will be eafily feen, I humbly conceive, from what goes before. There There is certainly no fucceffion of Ideas, Defires, or Will, in the infinite or neceffary Mind; and therefore no change or mutability in it. This follows, when we confider that the manner of Existence of a neceffarily exifting Mind must be itself necessary and immutable. Thus there is really no actual fucceffion in the minner of God's Exijlence, that is, in his Eternity, nay, not after the exiflence of a material World. The changes and fucceffions that then happen, happen to fomething else, not to HIM. And yet, fince the fucceffive or changing Existence of Creatures is co-exifting with the unfucceffive and immutable Existence of the Deity, we may fee that this co-existence might have been ages fooner, or that the one doth not exclude the other, nor is inconfiftent with it, but as being infinitely greater, comprehends it. We fee in another cafe, that though all Motion (a mark of Finity, and itself fucceffive) is in Space, yet Space itself is immoveable. It is, as I am apt to think, fomething like this fucceffive and unfucceffive Existence, both co-exfting, which ARISTOTLE means when he allows Time to be within the mundane Limits, but not without them. Confider his own words. Χρόνος δέ ἐσιν ἀριθμος κινήσεως· κίνησις δὲ ἄνευ φυσικό σώματος ἐκ ἐςὶν ἔξω δὲ τῷ ὀυρανῶ δέδεικται ὅτι ἔτ ̓ ἐσὶν, ἔτ ̓ ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι σώμα. As if he had faid, "There is an unfucceffive Existence, wherever there are not Changes and Viciffitudes by motion." Thus far then, I think we may go with clearness, and understand what we fay. On the other hand, it is, I think, fcarce intelligible, to apply this fucceffiveness or unfucceffiveness (fo to speak) to Time itself, or to Eternity abftractedly taken these seem applicable only to Beings exifting by themfelves: therefore they (i. e. Time and Eternity) feem capable of no alteration or change in themselves, abstracting from the Beings existing in them. If all created Beings were taken away, all poflibility of any mutation, or fucceffion of one thing to another would appear to be alfo removed. Abstract Succeflion in Eternity is fcarce to be underflood. What is it that fucceeds? One ४T — velut Unda fupervenit minute to another perhaps? [ Undam.] But when we imagine this, we fancy that the Minutes are things separately exifting, which keep on their own course, though there were no Being at all exifting. This is the common notion, and yet it is a manifeft Prejudice. Time is nothing but the Existence of created, fucceffive Beings, and Eternity, the necessary Existence of the Deity. Therefore, if this neceffary Being hath no change or fucceffion in his Nature, his Existence must of course be unsucceffive. We seem to commit a double over-fight in this case: first we find Succeffion in the neceffary Nature and Existence of the Deity himself, which is wrong, if the reasoning above be conclufive: and then we afcribe this Succeffion to Eternity, confidered abstractedly from the eternal Being. And suppose it [one knows not what] a Thing subsisting by itself, and flowing one minute after another. This is the work of pure Imagination, and contrary to the reality of Things. Hence the common metaphorical expreffions, "Time runs apace.” "Let us lay hold on the prefent minute," and the like. The Philofophers themselves miflead us by their Illustrations. They compare Eternity to the motion of a Point, running on for ever, and making a traceless infinite line. Here the Point is fuppofed a Thing actually fubfifting, reprefenting the prefent minute, and then they ascribe motion to a mere Non-entity, to illuftrate to us a fucceffive Eternity. Hence all the Perplexities of a paft Eternity, made up of finite fucceffive Parts: and hence the contradiction of a Punctum ftans; though in this cafe a Pundam ftans is no more a contradiction than a Punctum movens: for in truth the Punctum is nothing at all, either to ftand fill or move forward. As to the expreffion nunc ftans, by which fome Schoolmen have chofen to defcribe Eternity; it certainly implies oppofite Ideas, if applied to our existence, or if our manner of exiftence be applied to the Deity. For then we make [nunc] a relative Term which hath a reference to past and future. But this is a wrong ap plication; plication; and if once we allow an all-perfect Mind which hath an eternal, immutable, and infinite Comprehenfion of all Things, always (and allow it we muft) the diftinction of past and future vanishes with respect to fuch a Mind; and the expreffion nunc ftans will appear to have propriety. In a word, if we proceed ftep by step, as above, the Eternity or Exiftence of the Deity will appear to be, Vita interminabilis tota fimul & perfecta Poffeffio, how much foever this may have been reckoned a Paradox hitherto. All this diffuse Reasoning may (for the fake of memory) be comprized in two or three fentences. For, firft, an infinitely perfect Mind must have a perfect Comprehenfion of all Things, always: and then, this Mind must always will what is infinitely reasonable, according to this infinite Knowledge. From these two Propositions it follows, That there can be no fucceflion of Ideas, nor change of Will, in fuch a Mind. And, lastly, it must be as easy to infinite Power to perform according to the rule of infinite Reason as to will the Performance; for fuppofing Difficulty denies Infinity of Power. And hence the actions of fuch a Being occafion no change in the manner of his Existence; and yet, as directed by infinite Reason, they cannot be phyfically necessary. ******************** L ETT ER S. LETTER CXIV. A few days ago the following fell into my hands, the inferting of which, I judge will be acceptable to every ferious Reader. Το every one of an Honest and good Heart, in all the Chriftian Denominations. My dear Fellow Traveller, Know not whether thou art a Churchman, a Prefbyterian, Independent, Baptift, Quaker, or one of any other denomination, domestic or foreign: but, be it, in these divided VOL. III. F day's 1 days, which of them all it may, it makes nothing to me, in respect of my present purpose, and unconnected with the main matter; fo as either to recommend or disparage thee in my opinion on that account. One thing I am, however, fure of; and that is, that thou, as well as myself, art a fallen human creature, redeemed by the precious blood of Christ, as of a Lamb without blemish and without spot. Now, if thou art in any degree fenfible within thy own heart of this thy fad fall into a life of fin and mifery, and of thy happy redemption out of it to a better and more blissful one in our Saviour Jefus Chrift; or, art only, from the very bottom of thy heart, defirous to be made inwardly fenfible of thy very important state and condition in both these respects; then let me inform thee, without more ceremony, any thy company and farther converfation would be very acceptable and agreeable to me. that I need not tell thee, that the generality of almost all the divided denominations above-mentioned are in fact men of this world, and fo devoted to it as to be incapable of entertaining any predominant real concern about falvation in their hearts for as they admit no inward fenfe of their fall there, fo neither can they by faith have any real heart's enjoyment of the redemption in Chrift. Thy observation must also have made thee sensible, that it is not every one making a high pro, feffion of Chrift, that really poffeffes the spirit of Chrift; neither doth every one that takketh much of him, therefore walk in him. If thou fhouldft happen to be of this falfe and counterfeit fort, (which are now-a-day's too numerous, and a fad fcandal to the precious liberty of confcience we enjoy) thou wilt have no benefit by my converfation, nor I by thine: unless thou wert to become heartily willing and defirous of being that in reality, which thou now only profeffeft outwardly with thy lips; and fo, to be converted from thy Pharifaical bypocrify to |