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tion suit, and the land bid off by a company of persons, who proposed subdividing and selling it in parcels. The sale was confirmed in their names, but by mutual arrangement the deed was made to one only, for convenience in selling and conveying. This deed failed to convey the title, because not following the sale. The legislature afterwards passed an act providing that, on proof being made to the satisfaction of the court or jury before

which such deed was offered in evidence that the land [* 372] was sold fairly and without fraud, * and the deed exe

cuted in good faith and for a sufficient consideration, and with the consent of the persons reported as purchasers, the deed should have the same effect as though it had been made to the purchasers. That this act was unobjectionable in principle was not denied ; and it cannot be doubted that a prior statute, authorizing the deed to be made to one for the benefit of all and with their assent, would have been open to no valid objection.?

In certain Connecticut cases it was insisted that sales made of real estate on execution were void, because the officer had included in the amount due, several small items of fees not allowed by law. It appeared, however, that, after the sales were made, the legislature had passed an act providing that no levy should be deemed void by reason of the officer having included greater fees than were by law allowable, but that all such levies, not in other respects defective, should be valid and effectual to transmit the title of the real estate levied upon. The liability of the officer for receiving more than his legal fees was at the same time left unaffected. In the leading case the court say: “ The law, undoubtedly, is retrospective ; but is it unjust ? All the charges of the officer on the execution in question are perfectly reasonable, and for necessary services in the performance of his duty; of conses quence they are eminently just, and so is the act confirming the levies. A law, although it be retrospective, if conformable to entire justice, this court has repeatedly decided is to be recognized and enforced." 2

1 See Davis v. State Bank, 7 Ind. by certain specified defects and irregu. 316, and Lucas v. Tucker, 17 Ind. 41, larities. for decisions under statutes curing ? Beach v. Walker, 6 Conn. 1973 irregular sales by guardians and ex- Booth v. Booth, 7 Conn. 330. And ecutors. In many of the States gen- see Mather v. Chapman, 6 Coulle eral laws will be found providing 54; Norton v. Pettibone, 7 Conu. 318; that such sales shall not be defeated Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 119;

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In another Connecticut case it appeared that certain marriages had been celebrated by persons in the ministry who were not empowered to perform that ceremony by the State law, and that the marriages were therefore invalid. The legislature had afterwards passed an act declaring all such marriages valid, and the court sustained the act. It was assailed as an exercise of the judicial power ; but this it clearly was not, as it purported to settle no controversies, and merely sought to give effect to the desire of the parties, which they had ineffectually attempted to carry out by means of the ceremony which proved insufficient. And while it was not claimed that the act was void in so far as it made effectual the legal relation * of matrimony between [* 373] the parties, it was nevertheless insisted that rights of property dependent upon that relation could not be affected by it, inasmuch as, in order to give such rights, it must operate retrospectively. The court in disposing of the case are understood to express the opinion that, if the legislature possesses the power to validate an imperfect marriage, still more clearly does it have power to affect incidental rights. 66 The man and the woman were unmarried, notwithstanding the formal ceremony which passed between them, and free in point of law to live in celibacy, or contract marriage with any other persons at pleasure. It is a strong exercise of power to compel two persons to marry without their consent, and a palpable perversion of strict legal right. At the same time the retrospective law thus far directly operating on rested rights is admitted to be unquestionably valid, because manifestly just.” 1

It is not to be inferred from this language that the court understood the legislature to possess power to select individual members of the community, and force them into a relation of marriage with each other against their will. That complete control which the legislature is supposed to possess over the domestic

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Smith o. Merchand's Ex'rs, 7 S. & R. i Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 380); Underwood v. Lilly, 10 S. & R. 224, per Hosmer, J. The power to Ti: Bleakney v. Bank of Greencastle, validate void marriages held not to 17 S. & R. 61; Menges v. Wertman, exist in the legislature where, by the 1 Penn. St. 218; Weister o. Hade, 52 constitution, the whole subject was Peng. St. 474; Ahl v. Gleim, 52 referred to the courts.

White v. Pena. St. 432; Selsby v. Redlon, White, 105 Mass. 325. 19 Wis. 17 ; Parmelee v. Lawrence, 48 III. 331.

tion suit, and the land bid off by a company of persons, who proposed subdividing and selling it in parcels. The sale was confirmed in their names, but by mutual arrangement the deed was made to one only, for convenience in selling and conveying. This deed failed to convey the title, because not following the sale. The legislature afterwards passed an act providing that, on proof being made to the satisfaction of the court or jury before

which such deed was offered in evidence that the land [* 372] was sold fairly and without fraud, * and the deed exe

cuted in good faith and for a sufficient consideration, and with the consent of the persons reported as purchasers, the deed should have the same effect as though it had been made to the purchasers. That this act was unobjectionable in principle was not denied ; and it cannot be doubted that a prior statute, authorizing the deed to be made to one for the benefit of all and with their assent, would have been open to no valid objection."

In certain Connecticut cases it was insisted that sales made of real estate on execution were void, because the officer had included in the amount due, several small items of fees not allowed by law. It appeared, however, that, after the sales were made, the legislature had passed an act providing that no levy should be deemed void by reason of the officer having included greater fees than were by law allowable, but that all such levies, not in other respects defective, should be valid and effectual to transmit the title of the real estate levied upon. The liability of the officer for receiving more than his legal fees was at the same time left unaffected. In the leading case the court say : “ The law, undoubtedly, is retrospective ; but is it unjust ? All the charges of the officer on the execution in question are perfectly reasonable, and for necessary services in the performance of his duty; of cousequence they are eminently just, and so is the act confirming the levies. A law, although it be retrospective, if conformable to entire justice, this court has repeatedly decided is to be recognized and enforced.” 2

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1 See Davis v. State Bank, 7 Ind. by certain specified defects and irregu316, and Lucas v. Tucker, 17 Ind. 41, larities. for decisions under statutes curing 2 Beach v. Walker, 6 Conn. 197; irregular sales by guardians and ex- Booth v. Booth, 7 Conn. 350. And ecutors. In many of the States gen- see Mather v. Chapman, 6 Conn. eral laws will be found providing 54; Norton v. Pettibone, 7 Conn. 319; that such sales shall not be defeated Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 14%;

In another Connecticut case it appeared that certain marriages had been celebrated by persons in the ministry who were not empowered to perform that ceremony by the State law, and that the marriages were therefore invalid. The legislature had afterwards passed an act declaring all such marriages valid, and the court sustained the act. It was assailed as an exercise of the judicial power; but this it clearly was not, as it purported to settle no controversies, and merely sought to give effect to the desire of the parties, which they had ineffectually attempted to carry out by means of the ceremony which proved insufficient. And while it was not claimed that the act was void in so far as it made effectual the legal relation * of matrimony between [* 373] the parties, it was nevertheless insisted that rights of property dependent upon that relation could not be affected by it, inasmuch as, in order to give such rights, it must operate retrospectively. The court in disposing of the case are understood to express the opinion that, if the legislature possesses the power to validate an imperfect marriage, still more clearly does it have power to affect incidental rights. 6. The man and the woman were unmarried, notwithstanding the formal ceremony which passed between them, and free in point of law to live in celibacy, of contract marriage with any other persons at pleasure. It is a strong exercise of power to compel two persons to marry without their consent, and a palpable perversion of strict legal right. At the same time the retrospective law thus far directly operating on vested rights is admitted to be unquestionably valid, because manifestly just.” 1

It is not to be inferred from this language that the court understood the legislature to possess power to select individual members of the community, and force them into a relation of marriage with each other against their will. That complete control which the legislature is supposed to possess over the domestic

Smith e. Merchand's Ex’rs, 7 S. & R. o

1 Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 2x); Underwood v. Lilly, 10 S. & R. 224, per Hosmer, J. The power to 97; Bleakney v. Bank of Greencastle, validate void marriages held not to 17 S. & R. 61; Menges v. Wertman, exist in the legislature where, by the 1 Penn. St. 218; Weister v. Hade, 52 constitution, the whole subject was Penn. St. 474; Ahl v. Gleim, 52 referred to the courts.

White v. Peon. St. 432; Selsby v. Redlon, White, 105 Mass. 325. 19 W'is. 17 ; Parmelee v. Lawrence, II. 331.

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tion suit, and the land bid off by a company of persons, who proposed subdividing and selling it in parcels. The sale was confirmed in their names, but by mutual arrangement the deed was made to one only, for convenience in selling and conveying. This deed failed to convey the title, because not following the sale. The legislature afterwards passed an act providing that, on proof being made to the satisfaction of the court or jury before

which such deed was offered in evidence that the land [* 372] was sold fairly and without fraud, * and the deed exe

cuted in good faith and for a sufficient consideration, and with the consent of the persons reported as purchasers, the deed should have the same effect as though it had been made to the purchasers. That this act was unobjectionable in principle was not denied ; and it cannot be doubted that a prior statute, authorizing the deed to be made to one for the benefit of all and with their assent, would have been open to no valid objection.

In certain Connecticut cases it was insisted that sales made of real estate on execution were void, because the officer hyd included in the amount due, several small items of fees not allowed by law. It appeared, however, that, after the sales were made, the legislature had passed an act providing that no levy should be deemed void by reason of the officer having included greater fees than were by law allowable, but that all such levies, not in other respects defective, should be valid and effectual to transmit the title of the real estate levied upon. The liability of the officer for receiving more than his legal fees was at the same time left unaffected. In the leading case the court say: “ The law, undoubtedly, is retrospective ; but is it unjust? All the charges of the officer on the execution in question are perfectly reasonable, and for necessary services in the performance of his duty; of consequence they are eminently just, and so is the act confirming the levies. A law, although it be retrospective, if conformable to entire justice, this court has repeatedly decided is to be recognized and enforced." 2

1 See Davis v. State Bank, 7 Ind. by certain specified defects and irregu316, and Lucas v. Tucker, 17 Ind. 41, larities. for decisions under statutes curing 2 Beach v. Walker, 6 Conn, 1971 irregular sales by guardians and ex- Booth v. Booth, 7 Conn. 330. And ecutors. In many of the States gen- see Mather 0. Chapman, 6 Coun. eral laws will be found providing 54; Norton v. Pettibone, 7 Conn. 317; that such sales shall not be defeated Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 119;

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