[* 396] * And this rule is not confined to the grant of a corporate franchise, but it extends to all grants of franchises or privileges by the State to individuals, in the benefits of which the people at large cannot participate. "Private statutes," says Parsons, Ch. J., "made for the accommodation of particular citi- zens or corporations, ought not to be construed to affect the rights or privileges of others, unless such construction results from express words or from necessary implication." And the grant of apply to private grants to individuals, of powers or privileges designed to be exercised with special reference to their own advantage, although involving in their exercise incidental benefits to the community generally. The former are to be expounded largely and beneficially for the purposes for which they were enacted; the latter liberally, in favor of the public, and strictly as against the grantees. The power in the one case is original and inherent in the State or sovereign power, and is exercised solely for the general good of the community; in the other it is merely derivative, is special if not exclusive in its character, and is in derogation of common right, in the sense that it confers privileges to which the members of the community at large are not entitled. Acts of the former kind, being dictated solely by a regard to the benefit of the public generally, attract none of that prejudice or jealousy towards them which naturally would arise towards those of the other description, from the consideration that the latter were obtained with a view to the benefit of particular individuals, and the apprehension that their interests might be promoted at the sacrifice or to the injury of those of others whose interests should be equally regarded. It is universally understood to be one of the implied and necessary conditions upon which men enter into society and form governments, that sacrifices must sometimes be required of individuals for the general benefit of the community, for which they have no rightful claim to specific compensation; but, as between the several individuals composing the community, it is the duty of the State to protect them in the enjoyment of just and equal rights. A law, therefore, enacted for the common good, and which there would ordinarily be no inducement to pervert from that purpose, is entitled to be viewed with less jealousy and distrust than one enacted to promote the interests of particular persons, and which would constantly present a motive for encroaching on the rights of others." 1 Coolidge v. Williams, 4 Mass. 140. See also Dyer v. Tuscaloosa Bridge Co., 2 Port. (Ala.) 296; Grant v. Leach, 20 La. Ann. 329. In Sprague v. Birdsall, 2 Cow. 419, it was held that one embarking upon the Cayuga Lake six miles from the bridge of the Cayuga Bridge Co., and crossing the lake in an oblique direction so as to land within sixty rods of the bridge, was not liable to pay toll under a provision in the charter of said company which made it unlawful for any person to cross within three miles of the bridge without paying toll. In another case arising under the same charter, which authorized the company to build a bridge across the lake or the outlet thereof, and to rebuild in case it should be destroyed or carried away by the ice, and prohibited all other persons from erecting a bridge within ferry rights, or the right to erect a toll-bridge, and the like, is not only to be construed strictly against the grantees, but it will not be held to exclude the grant of a similar and competing privilege to others, unless the terms of the grant render such construction imperative.1 * The Constitution of the United States contains pro- [* 397] visions which are important in this connection. One of these is, that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States,2 and all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to its jurisdiction, are declared to be citizens thereof, and of the State wherein they reside. The States are also forbidden to make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States, or to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, or to deny to any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Although the precise meaning of "privileges and immu three miles of the place where a bridge should be erected by the company, it was held, after the company had erected a bridge across the lake and it had been carried away by the ice, that they had no authority afterwards to rebuild across the outlet of the lake, two miles from the place where the first bridge was built, and that the restricted limits were to be measured from the place where the first bridge was erected. Cayuga Bridge Co. v. Magee, 2 Paige, 116; s. c. 6 Wend. 85. In Chapin v. The Paper Works, 30 Conn. 461, it was held that statutes giving a preference to certain creditors over others should be construed with reasonable strictness, as the law favored equality. In People v. Lambier, 5 Denio, 9, it appeared that an act of the legislature had authorized a proprietor of lands lying in the East River, which is an arm of the sea, to construct wharves and bulkheads in the river, in front of his land, and there was at the time a public highway through the land, terminating at the river. Held, that the proprietor could not, by filling up the land between the shore and the bulkhead, obstruct the public right of passage from the land to the water, but that the street was, by operation of law, extended from the former terminus over the newly made land to the water. Compare Commissioners of Inland Fisheries v. Holyoke Water Power Co., 104 Mass. 446; s. c. 6 Am. Rep. 247. 1 Mills v. St. Clair County, 8 How. 569; Mohawk Bridge Co. v. Utica and S. R. R. Co., 6 Paige, 554; Chenango Bridge Co. v. Binghamton Bridge Co., 27 N. Y. 87; s. c. 3 Wall. 51. 2 Const. of United States, art. 4, § 2. See ante, pp. *15, *16. 3 Const. of United States, 14th Amendment. 4 Const. of United States, 14th Amendment. The fourteenth amendment is violated by a statute which allows the overseers of the poor to commit paupers and vagrants to the work-house without trial. Portland v. Bangor, 65 Me. 120; Dunn v. Burleigh, 62 Me. 24. It does not confer the right of suffrage upon females. Van Valkenburgh v. Brown, 43 Cal. nities" is not very conclusively settled as yet, it appears to be conceded that the Constitution secures in each State to the citizens of all other States the right to remove to, and carry on business therein; the right by the usual modes to acquire and hold property, and to protect and defend the same in the law; the right to the usual remedies for the collection of debts and the enforcement of other personal rights, and the right to be exempt, in property and person, from taxes or burdens which the property, or persons, of citizens of the same State are not subject to.1 To this extent, at least, discriminations could not be made by State laws against them. But it is unquestionable that many other rights and privileges may be made as they usually are — to depend upon actual residence: such as the right to vote, to have the benefit of exemption laws, to take fish in the waters of the State, and the like. And the constitutional provisions are not violated by a statute which allows process by attachment against a debtor not a resident of the State, notwithstanding such process is not admissible against a resident.2 The protection by due process of law has already been considered. It was not within the power of the States before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, to deprive citizens of the equal protection of the laws; but there were servile classes not thus shielded, and when these were made freemen, there were some who disputed their claim to citizenship, and some State laws were in force which established discriminations against them. To settle doubts and preclude all such laws, the fourteenth amendment was adopted ; and the same securities which one citizen may demand, all others are now entitled to. Judicial Proceedings. Individual citizens require protection against judicial action as well as against legislative; and perhaps the question, what con 43; Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162. See ante, p. 391, note. Granting licenses for the sale of intoxicating drinks to males only, does not violate a constitutional provision which forbids the grant of special privileges or immunities. Blair v. Kilpatrick, 40 Ind. 315. 1 Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. 380; Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 554; Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 343; Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 281. 2 Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 554; State v. Medbury, 3 R. I. 141. And see generally the cases cited, ante, p. *16, note. stitutes due process of law, arises as often when judicial action is in question as in any other cases. But it is not so difficult here to arrive at satisfactory conclusions, since the bounds of the judicial authority are much better defined than those of the legislative, and each case can generally be brought to the test of definite and well-settled rules of law. Jurisdiction The proceedings in any court are void if it wants jurisdiction of the case in which it has assumed to act. is, first, of the subject-matter; and, second, of the persons [* 398] whose rights are to be passed upon.1 A court has jurisdiction of any subject-matter, if, by the law of its organization, it has authority to take cognizance of, try, and determine cases of that description. If it assumes to act in a case over which the law does not give it authority, the proceeding and judgment will be altogether void, and rights of property cannot be devested by means of them. It is a maxim in the law that consent can never confer jurisdiction: 2 by which is meant that the consent of parties cannot empower a court to act upon subjects which are not submitted to its determination and judgment by the law. The law creates courts, and upon considerations of general public policy defines and limits their jurisdiction; and this can neither be enlarged nor restricted by the act of the parties. Accordingly, where a court by law has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of a controversy, a party whose rights are sought to be affected by it is at liberty to repudiate its proceedings and refuse to be bound by them, notwithstanding he may once have 1 Bouvier defines jurisdiction thus: ton v. Boston, 12 Pick. 7; Chapman "Jurisdiction is a power constitution- v. Morgan, 2 Greene (Iowa), 374; ally conferred upon a court, a single Thompson v. Steamboat Morton, 2 judge, or a magistrate, to take cogni- Ohio, N. s. 26; Gilliland v. Adminiszance and decide causes according to trator of Sellers, 2 Ohio, N. s. 223; law, and to carry their sentence into Dicks v. Hatch, 10 Iowa, 380; Overexecution. The tract of land within street v. Brown, 4 McCord, 79; Green which a court, judge, or magistrate v. Collins, 6 Ired. 139; Bostwick v. has jurisdiction is called his territory; Perkins, 4 Geo. 47; Georgia R. R., and his power in relation to his terri- &c. v. Harris, 5 Geo. 527; State v. tory is called his territorial jurisdic- Bonney, 34 Me. 223; Little v. Fitts, 33 Ala. 313; Ginn v. Rogers, 4 Gilm. 131; Neill v. Keese, 5 Tex. 23; Ames v. Boland, 1 Minn. 365; Brady v. Richardson, 18 Ind. 1; White v. Buchanan, 6 Cold. 32. tion." 3 Bouv. Inst. 71. 2 Coffin v. Tracy, 3 Caines, 129; Blin v. Campbell, 14 Johns. 432; Cuyler v. Rochester, 12 Wend. 165; Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N. Y. 9; Pres consented to its action, either by voluntarily commencing the proceeding as plaintiff, or as defendant by appearing and pleading to the merits, or by any other formal or informal action. This right he may avail himself of at any stage of the case; and the maxim that requires one to move promptly who would take advantage of an irregularity does not apply here, since this is not mere irregular action, but a total want of power to act at all. Consent is sometimes implied from failure to object; but [*399] there can be no * waiver of rights by laches in a case where consent would be altogether nugatory.1 In regard to private controversies, the law always encourages voluntary arrangements; 2 and the settlements which the parties may make for themselves, it allows to be made for them by arbitrators mutually chosen. But the courts of a country cannot have those controversies referred to them by the parties which the law-making power has seen fit to exclude from their cognizance. If the judges should sit to hear such controversies, they would not sit as a court; at the most they would be arbitrators only, and their action could not be sustained on that theory, unless it appeared that the parties had designed to make the judges their arbitrators, instead of expecting from them valid judicial action as an organized court. Even then the decision could not be binding as a judgment, but only as an award; and a mere neglect by either party to object the want of jurisdiction could not make the decision binding upon him either as a judgment or as an award. Still less could consent in a criminal case bind the defendant; since criminal charges are not the subject of arbitration, and any infliction of criminal punishment upon an individual, except in pursuance of the law of the land, is a wrong done to the State, whether the individual assented or not. Those cases in which it has been held that the constitutional right of trial by jury cannot be waived are strongly illustrative of the legal view of this subject.3 1 Bostwick v. Perkins, 4 Geo. 47; Hill v. People, 16 Mich. 351; White v. Buchanan, 6 Cold. 32. If the parties cannot confer jurisdiction upon a court by consent, neither can they by consent empower any individual other 3 Brown v. State, 8 Blackf. 561; Work v. Ohio, 2 Ohio, N. s. 296; Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 128; Smith v. People, 9 Mich. 193; Hill . People, 16 Mich. 351. See also State v. Turner, 1 Wright, 20. 2 Moore v. Detroit Locomotive Works, 14 Mich. 266; Coyner v. Lynde, 10 Ind. 282. |