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the obligation of contracts. And even a provision in a corporate charter, empowering the legislature to alter, modify, or repeal it, would not authorize a subsequent act which, on pretence of amendment, or of a police regulation, would have the effect to appropriate a portion of the corporate property to the public use. And where by its charter the corporation was empowered to construct over a river a certain bridge, which must necessarily constitute an obstruction to the navigation of the river, a subsequent amendment making the corporation liable for such obstruction was held void, as in effect depriving the corporation of the very right which the charter assured to it. So where the charter reserved to the legislature the right of modification after the corporators had been reimbursed their expenses in constructing the bridge, with twelve per cent interest thereon, an amendment before such reimbursement, [* 579] requiring the construction of a fifty-foot draw for the passage of vessels, in place of one of thirty-two feet, was held unconstitutional and void. So it has been held that a power to

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1 Ibid. And see State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189. Compare Camden, &c. R. R. Co. v. Briggs, 2 N. J. 623; and also Philadelphia, &c. R. R. Co. v. Bowers, 4 Houst. 506, in which an act regulating freights and fares, where no such power was reserved in the charter, was held void. A view opposed to this is intimated by Ryan, Ch. J., in Attorney-General v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 35 Wis. 425.

which limits the rates of fare and freight which may be charged; for the exercise of this might be carried to an extent which would annihilate the whole value of railroad property. The power, however, is very fully sustained, where the right to amend is reserved in the charter. AttorneyGeneral v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 35 Wis. 425; Blake v. Winona, &c. R. R. Co., 19 Minn. 418; s. c. 18 Am. Rep. 345; Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. Rep. 155; Peck v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 6 Biss. 177. See a like rule applied to a ferry company in Parker v. Metropolitan R. R. Co., 109 Mass. 506. A requirement that rates of fare and freight shall be annually fixed and published is legitimate as an exercise of the police power. Railroad Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 560.

It has been held that the reservation of a right to amend or repeal would not justify an act requiring a railroad company to cause a proposed new street or highway to be taken across their track, and to cause the necessary embankments, excavations, and other work to be done for that purpose at their own expense; thus not only appropriating a part of their property to another public use, but compelling them to fit it for such use. Miller v. N. Y. and Erie R. R. Co., 21 Barb. 513. This, however, can scarcely be a more severe exercise of the power than is the amendment to the charter of a railroad corporation 18 Conn. 53.

Bailey v. Philadelphia, &c. R. R. Co., 4 Harr. 389. Compare Commonwealth v. Penn. Canal Co., 66 Penn. St. 41; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 329.

4 Washington Bridge Co. v. State,

a municipal corporation to regulate the speed of railway carriages, would not authorize such regulation, except in the streets and public grounds of the city; such being the fair construction of the power, and the necessity for this police regulation not extending further. But there are decisions on this point which are the other way.2

On the other hand, the right to require existing railroad corporations to fence their track, and to make them liable for all beasts killed by going upon it, has been sustained on two grounds: first, as regarding the division fence between adjoining proprietors, and in that view being but a reasonable provision for the protection of domestic animals; and second, and chiefly, as essential to the protection of persons being transported in the railway carriages.3 Having this double purpose in view, the

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1 State v. Jersey City, 29 N. J.

2 In Buffalo and Niagara Falls R. R. Co. v. Buffalo, 5 Hill, 209, it was held that a statutory power in a city to regulate the running of cars within the corporate limits would justify an ordinance entirely prohibiting the use of steam for propelling cars through any part of the city. And see Great Western R. R. Co. v. Decatur, 33 Ill. 381; Branson v. Philadelphia, 47 Penn. St. 329; Whitson v. Franklin, 34 Ind. 396. Affirming the general right to permit the municipalities to regulate the speed of trains, see Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. v. Haggerty, 67 Ill. 113; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Lewis, 79 Penn. St. 33; Haas v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 41 Wis. 44. That the legislature may compel railroad companies to carry impartially for all, see Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. v. People, 67 Ill. 11. But if the carriage is of persons from State to State, the State has no such control. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. Rep. 485.

3 Thorpe v. Rutland and Burlington R. R. Co., 27 Vt. 156; New Albany and Salem R. R. Co. v. Tilton, 12 Ind. 3; Same v. Maiden, 12 Ind. 10; Same v. McNamara, 11 Ind. 543;

Ohio and Mississippi R. R. Co. v. McClelland, 25 Ill. 145; Madison and Indianapolis R. R. Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 230; Indianapolis and Cincinnati R. R. Co. v. Townsend, 10 Ind. 38; Same v. Kercheval, 16 Ind. 84; Corwin v. N. Y. and Erie R. R Co., 13 N. Y. 42; Horn v. Atlantic and St. Lawrence R. R. Co., 35 N. H. 169, and 36 N. H. 440; Fawcett v. York and North Midland R. Co., 15 Jur. 173; Smith v. Eastern R. R. Co., 35 N. H. 356; Bulkley v. N. Y. and N. H. R. R. Co., 27 Conn. 479; Jones v. Galena, &c. R. R. Co., 16 Iowa, 6; Winona, &c. R. R. Co. v. Waldron, 11 Minn. 515; Bradley v. Buffalo, &c. R. R. Co., 34 N. Y. 429; Sawyer v. Vermont, &c. R. R. Co., 105 Mass. 196; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Riblet, 66 Penn. St. 164; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 360; Kansas Pacific R. R. Co. v. Mower, 16 Kan. 573; Wilder v. Maine Central R. R. Co., 65 Me. 332. As to the degree of care required of railroad companies in keeping up their fences, compare Antisdel v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 26 Wis. 145; Lemmon v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 32 Iowa, 151; Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. v. Barrie, 55 III. 226, and cases cited therein. A statute making railroad companies liable for

owner of beasts killed or injured may maintain an action for the damage suffered, notwithstanding he may not himself be free from negligence. But it would, perhaps, require an express legislative declaration that the corporation should be liable

for the beasts thus destroyed to create so great an in- [* 580] novation in the common law. The general rule, where

a corporation has failed to obey the police regulations established for its government, would not make the corporation liable to the party injured, if his own negligence contributed with that of the corporation in producing the injury.2

The State may also regulate the grade of railways, and prescribe how, and upon what grade, railway tracks shall cross each

injuries by fire communicated by their locomotive engines was sustained as to companies previously in existence, in Lyman v. Boston and Worcester R. R. Co., 4 Cush. 288; Rodemacher v. Milwaukee, &c. R. R. Co. 41 Iowa, 297; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 592; Gorman v. Pacific Railroad, 26 Mo. 441. But it is not competent to make railroad companies liable for injuries for which they are in no way responsible. It is therefore held that an act imposing upon railroad companies the expense of coroners' inquests, burial, &c., of persons who may die on its cars, or be killed by collision, &c., is invalid as applied to cases where the company is not in fault. Ohio, &c. R. R. Co. v. Lackey, 78 Ill. 55. That it is as competent to lessen the common law liabilities of railroad companies as to increase them, see Kerby v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 76 Penn. St. 506. And see Camden and Amboy R. R. Co. v. Briggs, 22 N. J. 623; Trice v. Hannibal, &c. R. R. Co., 49 Mo. 188. 1 Corwin v. N. Y. and Erie R. R. Co., 13 N. Y. 42; Indianapolis and Cincinnati R. R. Co. v. Townsend, 10 Ind. 38; Jeffersonville, &c. R. R. Co. v. Nichols, 30 Ind. 321; Same v. Parkhurst, 34 Ind. 501; Suydam v. Moore, 8 Barb. 358; Fawcett v. York and North Midland R. Co., 15 Jur. 173; Waldron v. Rensselaer and

Schenectady R. R. Co., 8 Barb. 390; Horne v. Atlantic and St. Lawrence R. R. Co., 35 N. H. 169; ̧ O'Bannon v. Louisville, &c. R. R. Co., 8 Bush, 348; Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Arnold, 47 Ill. 173; Hinman v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 28 Iowa, 491.

2 Jackson v. Rutland and Burlington R. R. Co., 25 Vt. 150. And see Marsh v. N. Y. and Erie R. R. Co., 14 Barb. 364; Joliet and N. I. R. R. Co. v. Jones, 20 Ill. 221; Tonawanda R. R. Co. v. Munger, 5 Denio, 255, and 4 N. Y. 255; Price v. New Jersey R. R. Co., 31 N. J. 229; Drake v. Philadelphia, &c. R. R. Co., 51 Penn. St. 240. In Indianapolis and Cincinnati R. R. Co. v. Kercheval, 16 Ind. 84, it was held that a clause in the charter of a railroad corporation which declared that when the corporators should have procured a right of way as therein provided, they should be seised in fee-simple of the right to the land, and should have the sole use and occupation of the same, and no person, body corporate or politic, should in any way interfere therewith, molest, disturb, or injure any of the rights and privileges thereby granted, &c., would not take from the State the power to establish a police regulation making the corporation liable for cattle killed by their cars.

other; and it may apportion the expense of making the necessary crossings between the corporations owning the roads. And it may establish regulations requiring existing railways to ring the bell or blow the whistle of their engines immediately before passing highways at grade, or other places where their approach might be dangerous to travel,2 or to station flagmen at such or any other dangerous places.3 And it has even been intimated that it might be competent for the State to make railway corporations liable as insurers for the safety of all persons carried by them, in the same manner that they are by law liable as carriers of goods; though this would seem to be pushing the police power to [* 581] an extreme. But those statutes which have recently

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1 Fitchburg R. R. Co. v. Grand Junction R. R. Co., 1 Allen, 552, and 4 Allen, 198; Pittsburgh, &c. R. R. Co. v. S. W. Penn. R. R. Co., 77 Penn. St. 173. The legislature may regulate the speed at highway and other crossings. Rockford, &c. R. R. Co. v. Hillmer, 72 Ill. 235. "While the franchise of a railroad company licenses generally unlimited speed, power is reserved to the legislature to regulate the exercise of the franchise for public security." Ryan, Ch. J., in Horn v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 38 Wis. 463. The regulation is in favorem vitæ. Haas v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 41 Wis. 44.

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The legislature has the power, by general laws, from time to time, as the public exigencies inay require, to regulate corporations in their franchises, so as to provide for the public safety. The provision in question is a mere police regulation, enacted for the protection and safety of the public, and in no manner interferes with or impairs the powers conferred on the defendants in their act of incorporation." Galena and Chicago U. R. R. Co. v. Loomis, 13 Ill. 548. And see Stuyvesant v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 7 Cow. 604; Benson v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 10 Barb. 240; Bulkley v. N. Y. and N. H. R. R. Co., 27 Conn. 486; Veazie v. Mayo,

45 Me. 560; s. c. 49 Me. 156; Galena and Chicago U. R. R. Co. v. Dill, 22 Ill. 264; Same v. Appleby, 28 Ill. 283; Ohio and Mississippi R. R. Co. v. McClelland, 25 Ill. 145; Clark's Adm'r v. Hannibal and St. Jo. R. R. Co., 36 Mo. 202; Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. v. Triplett, 38 Ill. 482; Commonwealth v. Eastern R. R. Co., 103 Mass. 254; s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 555.

8 Toledo, &c. R. R. Co. v. Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37. In many States now there are railroad commissioners appointed by law, with certain powers of supervision, more or less extensive. Respecting these it has been said in Maine: Our whole system of legislative supervision through the railroad commissioners acting as a State police over railroads, is founded upon the theory that the public duties devolved upon railroad corporations by their charter are ministerial, and therefore liable to be thus enforced." Railroad Commissioners v. Portland, &c. R. R. Co., 63 Me. 269; s. c. 18 Am. Rep. 208.

Thorpe v. Rutland and Burlington R. R. Co., 27 Vt. 152. Carriers of goods are liable as insurers, notwithstanding they may have been guiltless of negligence, because such is their contract with the shipper when they receive his goods for transportation; but carriers of per

become common, and which give an action to the representatives of persons killed by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of another, may unquestionably be made applicable to corporations previously chartered, and may be sustained as only giving a remedy for a wrong for which the common law had failed to make provision.1 And it cannot be doubted that there is ample power in the legislative department of the State to adopt all necessary legislation for the purpose of enforcing the obligations of railway companies as carriers of persons and goods to accommodate the public impartially, and to make every reasonable provision for carrying with safety and expedition.2

Restraints on Sale of Liquors. Those statutes which regulate or altogether prohibit the sale of intoxicating drinks as a beverage have also been, by some persons, supposed to conflict with the federal Constitution. Such of these, however, as assume to

sons assume no such obligations at the common law; and where a company of individuals receive from the State a charter which makes them carriers of persons, and chargeable as such for their own default or negligence only, it may well be doubted if it be competent for the legislature afterwards to impose upon their contracts new burdens, and make them respond in damages where they have been guilty of no default. In other words, whether that could be a proper police regulation which did not assume to regulate the business of the carrier with a view to the just protection of the rights and interests of others, but which imposed a new obligation, for the benefit of others, upon a party guilty of no neglect of duty. But perhaps such a regulation would not go further than that in Stanley v. Stanley, 26 Me. 191, where it was held competent for the legislature to pass an act making the stockholders of existing banks liable for all corporate debts thereafter created; or in Peters v. Iron Mountain R. R. Co., 23 Mo. 107, and Grannahan v. Hannibal, &c. R. R. Co., 30 Mo. 546, where an act was sustained

which made companies previously chartered liable for the debts of contractors to the workmen whom they had employed.

1 Southwestern R. R. Co. v. Paulk, 24 Geo. 356; Coosa River Steamboat Co. v. Barclay, 30 Ala. 120. In Boston, Concord, and Montreal R. R. v. State, 32 N. H. 215, a statute making railroad corporations liable to indictment and fine, in case of the loss of life by the negligence or carelessness of the proprietors or their servants, was adjudged constitutional, as applicable to corporations previously in existence.

2 On this subject in general, see Redf. on Railw. c. 32, sec. 2; Louisville, &c. R. R. Co. v. Burke, 6 Cold. 45; New Albany and Salem R. R. Co. v. Tilton, 12 Ind. 3; Buckley v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., 27 Conn. 479; Ohio & Mississippi R. R. Co. v. McClelland, 25 Ill. 144; Bradley v. Buffalo, &c. R. R. Co., 34 N. Y. 429; Boston, C. & M. R. R. Co. v. State, 32 N. H. 215; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Riblet, 66 Penn. St. 164; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 360. And see other cases cited, ante, pp. #578-*579, notes.

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