regulate only, and to prohibit sales by other persons than those who should be licensed by the public authorities, have not suggested any serious question of constitutional power. They are but the ordinary police regulations, such as the State may make in respect to all classes of trade or employment. But those which undertake altogether to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating drinks as a beverage have been assailed as vio

lating express provisions of the national Constitution, [* 582] and also as * subversive of fundamental rights, and therefore not within the grant of legislative power.

That legislation of this character was void, so far as it affected imported liquors, or such as might be introduced from one State into another, because in conflict with the power of Congress over commerce, was strongly urged in the License Cases before the Supreme Court of the United States; but that view did not obtain the assent of the court. The majority of the court expressed the opinion which, however, was obiter in those cases that the introduction of imported liquors into a State, and their sale in the original packages as imported, could not be forbidden, because to do so would be to forbid what Congress, in its regulation of commerce, and in the levy of imposts, had permitted; 2 but it was conceded by all, that when the original package was broken up for use or for retail by the importer, and also when the commodity had passed from his hands into the hands of a purchaser, it ceased to be an import, or a part of foreign commerce, and thereby became subject to the laws of the State, and might be taxed for State purposes, and the sale regulated by the State like any other property.3 It was also decided, in these cases, that the power of Congress to regulate commerce between the States did

1 Bode v. State, 7 Gill, 326; Bancroft v. Dumas, 21 Vt. 456; Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 449; License Cases, 5 How. 504; Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657; Goddard v. Jacksonville, 15 Ill. 59; Kettering v. Jacksonville, 50 Ill. 39; State v. Allmond, 2 Houst. 612. That such laws may be applied to corporations chartered to manufacture liquors, as well as to others, see Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors, 115 Mass. 153.

2 Taney, Ch. J., 5 How. 574; MeLean, J., 5 How. 589; Catron, J., 5 How. 608. And see Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328, 335. Bradford v. Stevens, 10 Gray, 379; State v. Robinson, 49 Me. 285.

8 Daniel, J., held that the right to regulate was not excluded, even while the packages remained in the hands of the importer unbroken (p. 612). See also the views of Grier, J. (p. 631).

not exclude regulations by the States, except so far as they might come in conflict with those established by Congress; and that, consequently, as Congress had not undertaken to regulate commerce in liquors between the States, a law of New Hampshire could not be held void which punished the sale, in that State, of gin purchased in Boston and sold in New Hampshire, notwithstanding the sale was in the cask in which it was imported, but by one not licensed by the selectmen.1

It would seem, from the views expressed by the several members of the court in these cases, that the State laws known as Prohibitory Liquor Laws, the purpose of which is to prevent altogether the manufacture and sale of intoxicating [* 583] drinks as a beverage, so far as legislation can accomplish that object, cannot be held void as in conflict with the power of Congress to regulate commerce, and to levy imposts and duties. And in several cases it has been held that the fact that such laws may tend to prevent or may absolutely preclude the fulfilment of contracts previously made, is no objection to their validity.2 Any change in the police laws, or indeed in any other laws, might have a like consequence.

The same laws have also been sustained, when the question of conflict with State constitutions, or with general fundamental principles, has been raised. They are looked upon as police regulations established by the legislature for the prevention of intemperance, pauperism, and crime, and for the abatement of nuisances. It has also been held competent to declare the liquor

1 See also Bode v. State, 7 Gill, 326; Jones v. People, 14 Ill. 196; State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 202; Commonwealth v. Clapp, 5 Gray, 97; Metropolitan Board v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657.

2 People v. Hawley, 3 Mich. 330; Reynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 179.

8 Commonwealth v. Kendall, 12 Cush. 414; Commonwealth v. Clapp, 5 Gray, 97; Commonwealth v. Howe, 13 Gray, 26; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 202; One House v. State, 4 Greene (Iowa), 172; Zumhoff v. State, 4 Greene (Iowa), 526; State v. Donehey, 8 Iowa, 396; State v. Wheeler,

25 Conn. 290; Reynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 179; Oviatt v. Pond, 29 Conn. 479; People v. Hawley, 3 Mich. 330; People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244; Jones v. People, 14 Ill. 196; State v. Prescott, 27 Vt. 194; Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328; Gill v. Parker, 31 Vt. 610. Compare Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501; Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 484; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378. In Reynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 179, the State law forbidding suits for the price of liquors sold out of the State, to evade the State law, was sustained and applied, notwithstanding the contract was valid where made. The general rule is, however,

kept for sale a nuisance, and to provide legal process for its condemnation and destruction, and to seize and condemn the building occupied as a dram shop on the same ground. And it is only where, in framing such legislation, care has not been taken to observe those principles of protection which surround the persons and dwellings of individuals, securing them against unreasonable searches and seizures, and giving them a right to trial before condemnation, that the courts have felt at liberty to declare that it exceeded the proper province of police regulation.2 Perhaps there is no instance in which the power of the legislature to make such regulations as may destroy the value of property, without compensation to the owner, appears in a more striking light

than in the case of these statutes. The trade in alcoholic [* 584] drinks being lawful, and the * capital employed in it being fully protected by law, the legislature then steps in, and, by an enactment based on general reasons of public utility, annihilates the traffic, destroys altogether the employment, and reduces to a nominal value the property on hand. Even the keeping of that, for the purposes of sale, becomes a criminal offence; and, without any change whatever in his own conduct or employment, the merchant of yesterday becomes the criminal of to-day, and the very building in which he lives and conducts the business which to that moment was lawful becomes the subject of legal proceedings, if the statute shall so declare, and liable to be proceeded against for a forfeiture.3 A statute which can do this that if the contract is valid where made, it is valid everywhere. See Sortwell v. Hughes, 1 Curtis, 245; Adams v. Coulliard, 102 Mass. 167; Hill v. Spear, 50 N. H. 253; Kling v. Fries, 33 Mich. 275; Roethke v. Philip Best Brewing Co., 33 Mich. 340; Webber v. Donnelly, 33 Mich. 469.

1 One House v. State, 4 Greene (Iowa), 172. See also Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328; Oviatt v. Pond, 29 Conn. 479; State v. Robinson, 33 Maine, 568; License Cases, 5 How. 589. But see Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378; Welch v. Stowell, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 332. A statute providing for the appointment of guardians for drunkards is competent

under the police power, and its operation would not be an unlawful deprivation of property. Devin v. Scott, 34 Ind. 67.

2 Hibbard v. People, 4 Mich. 125; Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1. But see Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 484; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378.

8 In a number of the States statutes have recently been passed to make the owners of premises on which traffic in intoxicating liquors is carried on responsible for all damages occasioned by such traffic. It is believed to be entirely competent for the legislature to pass such statutes, but whether they can apply in cases where leases had previously been made, must be a serious question.

must be justified upon the highest reasons of public benefit; but, whether satisfactory or not, the reasons address themselves exclusively to the legislative wisdom.

Taxing Forbidden Occupations. Within the last two or three years, new questions have arisen in regard to these laws, and other State regulations, arising out of the imposition of burdens on various occupations by Congress, with a view to raising revenue for the national government. These burdens are imposed in the form of what are called license fees; and it has been claimed that, when the party paid the fee, he was thereby licensed to carry on the business, despite the regulations which the State government might make upon the subject. This view, however, has not been taken by the courts, who have regarded the congressional legislation imposing a license fee as only a species of taxation, without the payment of which the business could not lawfully be carried on, but which, nevertheless, did not propose to make any business lawful which was not lawful before, or to relieve it from any burdens or restrictions imposed by the regulations of the State. The licenses give no authority, and are mere receipts for taxes.1

Other Regulations affecting Commerce. Numerous other illustrations might be given of the power in the States to make regulations affecting commerce, which are sustainable as regulations of police. Among these, quarantine regulations and health laws of every description will readily suggest themselves, and these are or may be sometimes carried to the extent of ordering the destruction of private property when infected with disease or otherwise dangerous.2 These regulations* have generally [* 585]

1 License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462; Purvear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475; Commonwealth v. Holbrook, 10 Allen, 200; Block v. Jacksonville, 36 Ill. 301. A State may tax a business notwithstanding the State constitution forbids its being licensed. Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 654. As to when license fees are taxes, see ante, p. *201 and note.

2 See remarks of Grier, J., in License Cases, 5 How. 632; Meeker v. Van Rensselaer, 15 Wend. 397. A liquor law may annul a previous

license, and not be invalid on that ground. See ante, p. *283, note. Under the police power, the dealing in liquors even for lawful purposes may be restricted to persons approved for moral character. In re Ruth, 32 Iowa, 250.

It is usual, either by general law or by municipal charters, to confer very extensive powers upon local boards of health, under which, when acting in good faith, they may justify themselves in taking possession of, purifying, or even destroying, the buildings or other property of the

passed unchallenged. The right to pass inspection laws, and to levy duties so far as may be necessary to render them effectual, is also undoubted, and is expressly recognized by the Constitution. But certain powers which still more directly affect commerce may sometimes be exercised where the purpose is not to interfere with congressional legislation, but merely to regulate the times and manner of transacting business with a view to facilitate trade, secure order, and prevent confusion.

An act of the State of New York declared that the harbormasters appointed under the State laws should have authority to regulate and station all ships and vessels in the stream of the East and North rivers, within the limits of the city of New York, and the wharves thereof, and to remove from time to time such vessels as were not employed in receiving and discharging their cargoes, to make room for such others as required to be more immediately accommodated, for the purpose of receiving and discharging

citizen, when the public health or comfort demands such strong measures. See Harrison v. Baltimore, 1 Gill, 264; Van Wormer v. Albany, 15 Wend. 262; Coe v. Shultz, 47 Barb. 64.

They may forbid offensive trades being carried on in populous districts. Ex parte Shrader, 33 Cal. 279; Metropolitan Board v. Heister, 37 N. Y. 661; Live Stock, &c. Association v. Crescent City, &c. Co., 16 Wall. 31; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 402; Coe v. Shultz, 47 Barb. 64; Ashbrook v. Commonwealth, 1 Bush, 139; Taunton v. Taylor, 116 Mass. 254; Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 95; Potter's Dwarris on Stat. 458. That the business is lawful in itself, and proper to be carried on somewhere, is no objection to the regulation. Watertown v. Mayo, 109 Mass. 315.

If they forbid the keeping of swine in certain parts of a city, their regulations will be presumed reasonable and needful. Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass. 221, citing with approval Pierce v. Bartrum, Cowp. 269. And though they cannot be vested with authority to decide finally upon one's

right to property when they proceed to interfere with it as constituting a danger to health, yet they are vested with quasi judicial power in deciding upon what constitutes a nuisance, and all presumptions favor their action. See Van Wormer v. Albany, 15 Wend. 262; Kennedy v. Phelps, 10 La. Ann. 227; Metropolitan Board v. Heister, 37 N. Y. 661. And they may unquestionably be vested with very large power to establish pesthouses, and make very stringent regulations to prevent the spread of contagious diseases. As to the power of the public authorities to establish a public slaughter-house, or to require all slaughtering of beasts to be done at one establishment, see Milwaukee v. Gross, 21 Wis. 241; Live Stock, &c. Association v. Crescent City, &c. Co., 16 Wall. 31. Compare as to right to establish monopolies, Gale v. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344.

A regulation forbidding the growing of rice within a city, on the ground of injurious effect upon health, was held valid in Green v. Savannah, 6 Geo. 1.

1 Art. 1, § 10, clause 2.