dictum, as the court had already decided that the provision had been fully complied with; and those familiar with the reasons which have induced the insertion of this clause in our [* 80] * constitutions will not readily concede that its sole design was to establish a mere rule of order for legislative proceedings, which might be followed or not at discretion. Mr. Chief Justice Thurman, of Ohio, in a case not calling for a discussion of the subject, has considered a statute whose validity was assailed on the ground that it was not passed in the mode prescribed by the constitution. "By the term mode," he says, "I do not mean to include the authority in which the law-making power resides, or the number of votes a bill must receive to become a law. That the power to make laws is vested in the assembly alone, and that no act has any force that was not passed by the number of votes required by the constitution, are nearly, or quite, self-evident propositions. These essentials relate to the authority by which, rather than the mode in which, laws are to be made. Now to secure the careful exercise of this power, and for other good reasons, the constitution prescribes or recognizes certain things to be done in the enactment of laws, which things form a course or mode of legislative procedure. Thus we find, inter alia, the provision that every bill shall be fully and distinctly read on three different days, unless, in case of urgency, three-fourths of the house in which it shall be pending shall dispense with this rule. This is an important provision without doubt, but, nevertheless, there is much reason for saying that it is merely directory in its character, and that its observance by the assembly is secured by their sense of duty and official oaths, and not by any supervisory power of the courts. Any other construction, we incline to think, would lead to very absurd and alarming consequences. If it is in the power of every court (and if one has the power, every one has it) to inquire whether a bill that passed the assembly was fully' and distinctly' read three times in each house, and to hold it invalid if, upon any reading, a word was accidentally omitted, or the reading was indistinct, it would obviously be impossible to know what is the statute law of the State. Now the requisition that bills shall be fully and distinctly read is just as imperative as that requiring them to be read three times; and as both relate to the mode of procedure merely, it would be difficult to find any sufficient reason why a violation of one of 6 6 them would be less fatal to an act than a violation of the other." 1 A requirement that a law shall be read distinctly, whether * mandatory or directory, is, from the very na- [* 81] ture of the case, addressed to the judgment of the legislative body, whose decision as to what reading is sufficiently distinct to be a compliance cannot be subject to review. But in the absence of authority to the contrary, we should not have supposed that the requirement of three successive readings on different days stood upon the same footing. To this extent a definite and certain rule is capable of being, and has been, laid down, which can be literally obeyed; and the legislative body cannot suppose or adjudge it to have been done if the fact is otherwise. The requirement has an important purpose, in making legislators proceed in their action with caution and deliberation; and there cannot often be difficulty in ascertaining from the legislative records themselves if the constitution has been violated in this particular. There is, therefore, no inherent difficulty in the question being reached and passed upon by the courts in the ordinary mode, if it is decided that the constitution intends legislation shall be reached through the three readings, and not otherwise. The opinion above quoted was recognized as law by the Supreme Court of Ohio in a case soon after decided. In that case the court proceed to say: "The . . . provision . . . that no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, is also made a permanent rule in the introduction and passage of bills through the houses. The subject of the bill is required to be clearly expressed in the title for the purpose of advising members of its subject, when voting in cases in which the reading has been dispensed with by a two-thirds vote. The provision that a bill shall contain but one subject was to prevent combinations by which various and distinct matters of legislation should gain a support which they could not if presented separately. 1 Miller v. State, 3 Ohio, N. s. 483. The provision for three readings on separate days does not apply to amendments made in the progress of the bill through the houses.. People v. Wallace, 70 Ill. 680. 2 See People v. Campbell, 3 Gilm. 466; McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 432; Cannon v. Mathes, 8 Heisk. 504; Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 Ill. 297; People v. Starne, 35 Ill. 121; Ryan v. Lynch, 68 Ill. 160. As a rule of proceeding in the General Assembly, it is manifestly an important one. But if it was intended to effect any practical object for the benefit of the people in the examination, construction, or operation of acts passed and published, we are unable to perceive it. The title of an act may indicate to the reader its subject, and under the rule each act would contain one subject. To suppose that for such a purpose the Constitutional Convention adopted the rule under consideration, would impute to them a * most minute provision for a very imperfect heading of the [* 82] chapters of laws and their subdivision. This provision being intended to operate upon bills in their progress through the General Assembly, it must be held to be directory only. It relates to bills, and not to acts. It would be most mischievous in practice to make the validity of every law depend upon the judgment of every judicial tribunal of the State, as to whether an act or a bill contained more than one subject, or whether this one subject was clearly expressed in the title of the act or bill. Such a question would be decided according to the mental precision and mental discipline of each justice of the peace and judge. No practical benefit could arise from such inquiries. We are therefore of opinion that in general the only safeguard against the violation of these rules of the houses is their regard for, and their oath to support, the constitution of the State. We say, in general, the only safeguard; for whether a manifestly gross and fraudulent violation of these rules might authorize the court to pronounce a law unconstitutional, it is unnecessary to determine. It is to be presumed no such case will ever occur."1 1 Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio, N. s. 179. See also the case of Washington v. Murray, 4 Cal. 388, for similar views. In Hill v. Boyland, 40 Miss. 618, a provision requiring of all officers an oath to support the constitution, was held not to invalidate the acts of officials who had neglected to take such an oath. And in McPherson v. Leonard, 29 Md. 377, the provision that the style of all laws shall be, Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland," was held directory. Similar rulings were made in Cape Girardeau v. Riley, 52 Mo. 424; St. Louis v. Foster, 52 Mo. 513; Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268. Directly the opposite has been held. in Nevada. State v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 250. So a requirement that indictments shall conclude "against the peace and dignity of the people of West Virginia," was held in Lemons v. People, 4 W. Va. 755, s. c. 1 Green Cr. R. 666, to be mandatory, and an indictment which complied with it, except in abbreviating the name of the State, was held bad. A statute which is passed in obedience to a constitutional requirement must be held mandatory. State v. Pierce, 35 Wis. 93, 99. If the prevailing doctrine of the courts were in accord with this decision, it might become important to consider whether the object of the clause in question, as here disclosed, was not of such a character as to make the provision mandatory even in a statute. But we shall not enter upon that subject here, as elsewhere we shall have occasion to refer to decisions made by the highest judicial tribunals in nearly all of the States, recognizing similar provisions as mandatory, and to be enforced by the courts. And we concur fully in what was said by Mr. Justice Emmot in speaking of this very provision, that "it will be found upon full consideration to be difficult to treat any constitutional provision as merely directory and not imperative." And with what is said by Mr. Justice Lumpkin, as to the duty of the courts: "It has been suggested that the prohibition in the seventeenth section of the first article of the constitution, Nor shall any law or ordinance pass containing any matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof,' is directory only to the legislative and executive or law-making departments of the government. But we do not so understand it. On the contrary, we consider it as much a matter of judicial cognizance as any other pro- [* 83] vision in that instrument. If the courts would refuse to execute a law suspending the writ of habeas corpus when the public safety did not require it, a law violatory of the freedom of the press, or trial by jury, neither would they enforce a statute which contained matter different from what was expressed in the title thereof." 2 Self-executing Provisions. But although all the provisions of a constitution are to be regarded as mandatory, there are some which, from the nature of the case, are as incapable of compulsory enforcement as are directory provisions in general. The reason is that, while the purpose may be to establish rights or to impose duties, they do not in and of themselves constitute a sufficient rule by means of which such right may be protected or such duty enforced. In such cases, People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 186. 2 Protho v. Orr, 12 Geo. 36. See also Opinions of Judges, 18 Me. 458; Indiana Central Railroad Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 683; People v. Starne, 35 Ill. 121; State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495; Weaver v. Lapsley, 43 Ala. 224; Nougues v. Douglass, 7 Cal. 65. before the constitutional provision can be made effectual, supplemental legislation must be had; and the provision is in its nature mandatory to the legislature to enact the needful legislation, though back of it there lies no authority to enforce the command. Sometimes the constitution in terms requires the legislature to enact laws on a particular subject; and here it is obvious that the requirement has only a moral force: the legislature ought to obey it; but the right intended to be given is only assured when the legislation is voluntarily enacted. Illustrations may be found in constitutional provisions requiring the legislature to provide by law uniform and just rules for the assessment and collection of taxes; these must lie dormant until the legislation is had; they do not displace the law previously in force, though the purpose may be manifest to do away with it by the legislation required. So, however plainly the constitution may recognize the right to appropriate private property for the general benefit, the appropriation cannot be made until the law has pointed out the cases, and given the means by which compensation may be assured. A different illustration is afforded by the new amendments to the federal Constitution. Thus, the fifteenth amendment provides that "the right of citizens of the United States. to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." To this extent it is self-executing, and of its own force it abolishes all distinctions in suffrage based on the particulars enumerated. But when it further provides that "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation,” it indicates the possibility that the rule may not be found sufficiently comprehensive or particular to protect fully this right to equal suffrage, and that legislation may be found necessary for that purpose. Other provisions are fully self-executing, and 1 Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; People v. Lake Co., 33 Cal. 487; Bowie v. Lott, 24 La. Ann. 214. 2 Moore, J.. in Supervisors of Doddridge v. Stout, 9 W. Va. 703, 705; Cahoon v. Commonwealth, 20 Gratt. 733; Lehigh Iron Co. v. Lower Macungie, 81 Penn. St. 482. 3 Lamb v. Lane, 4 Ohio, N. s. 167. See St. Joseph School Board v. Buchanan County, 62 Mo. 444; 4 United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. Rep. 214. Any constitutional provision is self-executing to this extent, that every thing done in violation of it is void. Brien v. Williamson, 8 Miss. 14. |