INTRODUCTION. ON TASTE. ΟΝ N a fuperficial view, we may feem to differ very widely from each other in our reasonings, and no lefs in our pleasures: but notwithftanding this difference, which I think to be rather apparent than real, it is probable that the ftandard both of reason and tafte is the fame in all human creatures. For if there were not fome principles of judgment as well as of fentiment common to all mankind, no hold could poffibly be taken either on their reafon or their paffions, fufficient to maintain the ordinary correfpondence of life. It appears indeed to be generally acknowledged, that with regard to truth and falfehood there is fomething fixed. We find people in their disputes continually appealing to certain tefts and standards, which are allowed on all fides, and are supposed to be established in our common nature. But there is not the fame obvious concurrence in any uniform or fettled principles which relate to taste. tafte. It is even commonly fuppofed that this delicate and aërial faculty, which feems too volatile to endure even the chains of a definition, cannot be properly tried by any teft, nor regulated by any standard. There is fo continual a call for the exercife of the reafoning faculty, and it is fo much ftrengthened by perpetual contention, that certain maxims of right reason feem to be tacitly fettled amongst the moft ignorant. The learned have improved on this rude science, and reduced thofe maxims into a fyftem. If taste has not been fo happily cultivated, it was not that the subject was barren, but that the labourers were few or negligent; for to fay the truth, there are not the fame interefting motives to impel us to fix the one, which urge us to afcertain the other. And after all, if men differ in their opinion concerning fuch matters, their difference is not attended with the fame important confequences; elfe I make no doubt but that the logick of tafte, if I may be allowed the expreflion, might very poffibly be as well digested, and we might come to discuss matters of this nature with as much certainty, as those which feem more immediately within the province of mere reafon. And indeed, it is very neceffary, at the entrance into fuch an inquiry as our prefent, to make this point as clear as poffible; for if tafte has no fixed principles, if the imagination is not affected according to fome invariable and certain |