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superiority and numerous additional advantages which he had seized in Germany and elsewhere subsequent to the peace, Bonaparte replied, that it was quite in the power of England to participate in these advantages. Russia and Prussia did so. Prussia acquired territory and why should not Hanover, if England would as cordially unite with France?-he meant, "become its satellite." To this Lord Whitworth observed, "that the ambition of his British majesty was to preserve what was his own, and not to rob the property of other sovereigns." Notwithstanding the indefeasible pride and independent bearing of the English, peace might for a time have been preserved, had George the Third been as absolute as Bonaparte. But the forms and necessities of parliamentary government shocked the First Consul, whilst they held out a dangerous subject of comparison and of envy to the French, who were totally deprived of such liberties. The mistrust of France, showed first by the Grenvilles and by the followers of Pitt more ardent than himself, forced Addington not only to take but to avow certain precautionary measures of armament and defence. Although Bonaparte had done, as was announced, the same in his Exposé to his legislature, he was deeply offended with the display of English distrust, and which, coupled with the retention of Egypt and Malta, he denounced as war. The English, however, withdrew from Egypt; and Malta they had a fair excuse for not evacuating, in the fact that there was no independent power or force to which they could deliver it.

A circumstance worthy of note was, that when England signed the treaty of Amiens, she considered Russia an independent power anxious to preserve the monarchs of Piedmont as well as Naples in their dominions, and prepared to withstand French encroachments either in Germany or in the Mediterranean. In this it was soon perceived she had made a great mistake. Russia not only abandoned Piedmont, but ended, instead of tempering

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French dictation, by joining in the First Consul's partition of Germany. To give Malta to the Russians, or accept its mediation, was consequently felt to be giving up all to France under the name of Russia. This increased the difficulties of peaceful arrangement; and perhaps what most shook the English government from entertaining belief of it, was the discovery that the commercial agents sent by the French government to Dublin and other ports, had instructions and views similar to those of Sebastiani, to espy out English weaknesses, and to report all that might serve future invasion or attack.

The determination of the English government not to evacuate Malta, and at the same time to prepare for the contingency of war, aroused all the irrepressible ire of Bonaparte. Towards the close of February, 1803, the First Consul invited the English ambassador, Lord Whitworth, to a private interview at the Tuileries. In the altercation which was about to ensue, Bonaparte had this great advantage, that he was observing the treaty of Amiens to the letter whilst totally disturbing the balance of the arrangements. Thus after recapitulating his formal acts in execution of the treaty, he asked whether it was the intention of England to evacuate Malta or not? And whether there was to be war or peace? Without waiting for a reply, he launched forth into a burst of passion, which he terminated by saying that he had rather see the English in possession of Montmartre than Malta. "A fearful word," exclaims M. Thiers, "but too terribly realised to the misfortune of our country."

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Lord Whitworth explained, that much of what the First Consul complained, such as the virulence of journalism and the vivacity of popular debates, was but the inevitable consequence of English liberty. English generosity at the same time could not allow the French exiled princes to starve, or those French who had served England in war to go without reward. As to Malta,

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his lordship observed, it would have been long since CHAP. vacated, but for the report of Sebastiani, and of the changes which had been violently made in Europe. "You speak of the Italian republic, of the kingdom of Etruria, of Piedmont, of Switzerland," observed Bonaparte. "In all those what is there that you must not have expected?"

Lord Whitworth here no doubt shook his head.

"And Sebastiani's report, which has so alarmed you on this subject. I will speak plainly," said the First Consul. "I confess that I did, and do think of Egypt. It must be mine one day or other, as the Turkish empire cannot last. But I would not provoke war by attacking Egypt at present, nor do I desire war with you at all, for I have no means of striking at you but by a flotilla of invasion, of which I admit and fully discern all the difficulties and dangers. If you provoke me, however, to this invasion, I will attempt it, and to it will devote all the power I possess. How much better far that the two countries should unite for the subjugation of the world."

That the First Consul at this interview was the man of passion, rather than of policy, is plain enough. For the avowal of his ulterior designs upon Egypt was alone quite sufficient to deter the English government from granting the first and chief demand of France, the evacuation of Malta. If such language used to Lord Whitworth indisposed the English government to peace, the address of the First Consul presented to the legislative body immediately after alarmed and incensed Parliament and the nation. He described English parties, as some of them inclined to peace, but others actuated by mere hatred to France. He must therefore have 500,000 men ready to avenge the republic. As to England, it could find no allies in Europe, and was quite unable single-handed to enter upon a war with France.

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A royal message to the British parliament was the too natural answer. Increase of army and navy was voted, and Fox himself joined in approving them. This retaliation produced a more violent altercation with the British envoy, whom the First Consul assailed at his levee, March 14, in the following words :— "You are determined to go to war. After fighting ten years, are we to fight ten years more? The English government talks of my armaments. Where are they? I have not a vessel in my ports. Let treaties be henceforth covered with a black crape, since you will not keep them. You may destroy France, but you cannot intimidate her." In closing this speech, the violent gestures of the First Consul made the ambassador think that personal violence was intended, and the diplomatist put his hand to his sword.

The anger of the First Consul was sincere. He really desired peace, not with the hope of English amity, but to have time and make preparation for meeting his arch-enemy on England's own element, the ocean. His restless aggression in Italy and elsewhere first disturbed the treaty he had concluded, and finally his temper broke it. Two months, however, still elapsed before war broke out. During these, Talleyrand certainly laboured his utmost to preserve peace. Everything turned upon Malta. To give it up to the Maltese or to the knights. was illusory, to Prussia or Austria equally so. The same might be said of Russia, but Russia declined taking it. England offered to give up Malta in ten years, provided the island of Lampedousa was then to be assigned to her. After passionately rejecting such a compromise, the First Consul at the last moment offered to leave Malta in English possession if he were allowed to keep Tarentum and Otranto, with the positions which he held in the kingdom of Naples at the time of the signature of the treaty of Amiens.

*

* Letters of May 18. Napoleon Correspondence.

But

This certainly might have prolonged the peace.
Lord Whitworth had no longer the powers requisite to
entertain a new proposition. He took his departure,
and war was declared.*

From the middle of May, 1803, when hostilities were renewed between England and France, Bonaparte confined his military efforts during two years to the heights and the port of Boulogne. There he collected gradually more than 150,000 men, with light boats to transport them, their horses, and their artillery. The English made many but unsuccessful attempts to destroy the fleet of transports. But, on the other hand, the French commander would not trust his embarkations to the sea till he was the assured master of the channel.

What most prominently and seriously occupied the last months of 1803 and the commencement of 1804, was the conspiracy which the emigrant and violent partisans of the House of Bourbon had prepared. George Cadoudal, the Breton and the Chouan, who had failed in the terrible enterprise of the infernal machine, conceived a new plan. This was to attack, in company with some score of desperadoes, the carriage of the First Consul between the Tuileries and his country residence. He generally had but a guard of twenty horsemen, whom George thought to easily overpower, and then achieve Lis purpose of killing Bonaparte. This scheme of assasination, Louis the Eighteenth repudiated and condemned, but the Count d'Artois was weak enough to countenance it, as a feat of war, and not an attempt to murder.

It was part of the scheme of George that the prince should sanction it by his presence. Whilst Cadoudal was thus to make away with the First Consul, General Pichegru, who had escaped from the place of his deportation, came with him to Paris, to take advantage of the deed, and turn it to the profit of the Bourbons.

For Lord Whitworth's orders, government, see Castlereagh Corand the determination of the British respondence, vol. v.

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