XLIII. CHAP. epoch marks the change in his fortune. Successful as long as he merely combated governments and their armies, he soon met with reverses when he began to array his legions against the European people. Yet at Berlin Napoleon had one great and generous thought, that of re-erecting and reconstituting Poland. Could he have persevered in it, he might have found at Warsaw what he subsequently found nowhere, a faithful ally and an attached people. Napoleon's first intention at Berlin was no doubt to punish Russia and Prussia by the restoration of Poland. "Let the Poles," wrote he to Murat, who had entered Warsaw, "show a firm resolution to be independent and engage to support the king, whom I shall give them." To reconcile Austria to this change he made offer to it of Silesia in lieu of Gallicia. Determined on this he would grant no terms or armistice to Prussia, and went into winter quarters along the Vistula, intending to continue the conquest of East Prussia and the reduction of the Russians in the spring. The latter gallantly determined not to allow him the repose which he thought requisite. Benningsen with some 80,000 men advanced towards the Vistula, near the close of January 1807, hoping to get between the French corps and raise the siege of Dantzig and Gaudenz. Napoleon roused his army from their winter quarters to meet or rather to intercept him, proceeding from Warsaw in the direction of Konigsberg. Benningsen, well informed, retreated in time, and fought several engagements with the French, until on the 7th of February, both armies were in each other's presence at Eylau. The French were somewhat but not much inferior to the Russians. Benningsen determined to defend the village. And with this view his troops first occupied a hill in advance of Eylau, and then the church and cemetery of the place. In both positions they made a most desperate resistance, far more obstinate than the French had yet encountered, and were not dislodged till 10 at night. XLIII. On the following morning, the 8th, the ground being CHAP. covered with snow, Benningsen massed his forces in front of Eylau and commenced his attack upon the French there. After a murderous cannonade, Napoleon ordered forth two divisions to the attack, but they soon lost all direction amidst a blinding shower of snow. The Russians were preparing to take advantage of this error, which must have resulted in the destruction of the two divisions, when the emperor launched almost all his cavalry under Murat to make a circuit, fall upon the enemy, and disengage the two columns of infantry. Napoleon in one of his letters attributes this operation almost solely to Murat. It was completely successful, and the Russians checked in the midst of their victory. Yet one of their divisions, in Murat's absence nearly became masters of Eylau, and of Napoleon himself, who was in the cemetery. And it was not without the greatest difficulty that they were repulsed. At last the Russians gave up the attempt to force the town, the carnage was immense. "Fancy," wrote Napoleon, " 10,000 corpses in the narrow space of a league square." He owned to 6000 wounded. The Russian loss was no doubt also great. But Benningsen, though he failed to retake Eylau, still claimed the victory. And the French by following him no further, but retiring to winter quarters, gave some colour to his exaggerated boasts. This was the first serious check to the arms of Napoleon;* he called it a victory, and had a right perhaps to do so, but it was no victory for him. An engagement of an entire day with an enemy but little his superior in numbers, maintained by fearful loss on his side, was very different from the previous results of his military genius. His letters indeed record the great * The combat of Maida in Calabria during the previous July, a little before Jena, in which the English overcame Regnier, was also XLIII. CHAP. effect which Eylau had upon him. He called from all sides recruits and reserves,* and laboured to represent the battle in the most favourable light. But in France, where the funds fell prodigiously, as well as in foreign courts, the impression was that the French had at last met their match in the field. A week after the battle Napoleon sent general Bertrand to the King of Prussia to offer terms of peace, and to assure the monarch that he abandoned all idea of reconstituting Poland.† On learning later that Austria had begun to arm, he sent offers of a part of Silesia in order to keep her quiet. When Austria in reply proposed to mediate between France, Russia and the other powers, Napoleon at once accepted (April 16th), which was very different from his language before Eylau. That battle, however, inspirited his enemies as much as it had mitigated his own pretensions. In the several negotiations which took place in the spring of 1807, the Czar could not consent to see his ally, the King of Prussia, deprived of one half of his dominions. The war accordingly recommenced. By the month of June Napoleon had mustered 180,000 men, which the Russians with all their efforts could by no means equal in number. Napoleon took the road from the Vistula to the Niemen. His first encounter with his foe resembled Eylau, far more than it did Austerlitz. On the 10th of June he attacked the Russians in their entrenched camp at Heilsberg, in which enterprise all the daring efforts of generals and soldiers failed. Instead of surmounting its embankments, the French left thousands of dead at their feet. The Russian commander Benningsen, at Heilsberg as at Eylau, showed all the talents, and seemed attended by all the fortune, of a *He demanded of the Senate an anticipated conscription of 80,000 men, only duc in 1808. † Bertrand luissa entendre que, quant à la Pologne, depuis que l'Empereur la connait, il n'y attache aucun prix. Correspondence. great general. But as the overwhelming forces of the French continued to advance, Benningsen's skill and fortune abandoned him. Before such an army and such a general as Napoleon, his better plan would have been to keep on the defensive. But he was always for falling upon single divisions of his enemy, a vain attempt, as the French generals were too wary and experienced to allow themselves to be beyond reach of succour. In an ill-judged sortie of this kind, Benningsen led his whole army across the Alle, and exposed it to the attacks of Napoleon at Friedland on the 14th of June. The battle did not commence till the afternoon, and the field was fiercely contested by the Russians, inferior in number to their foes, and one of their divisions separated from the battle by the river Alle. It was soon evident that they could not sustain the shock, and to avoid destruction the Russian divisions either flung themselves into the Alle, or tried to reach Friedland and its bridge even through the masses of the enemy. Either attempt was fatal to them. The Russians saved their guns by the most desperate efforts, and died rather than surrendered. But they left an immense and signal victory to Napoleon at the very time that he most wanted it. Defeat would have been total destruction to him. Victory gave to him the disposal of Europe. The surrender of Konigsberg followed the defeat, and on the 18th the Russians demanded an armistice. As a condition the French required the surrender of Gaudentz and other Prussian fortresses, so that the suspension of hostilities was not signed till the 22nd. Alexander then proposed a personal interview, which took place on a raft in the Niemen before Tilsit, the 25th of June 1807. Almost the first words of Alexander announced his more than disgust of England, which meant that he was prepared not only to conclude peace, but an active alliance with France. Napoleon CHAP. XLIII. XLIII. CHAP. accepted the offer with eagerness. He could not hope to dominate the world alone, and wanted an ally, which he had never found, or could not keep when found. The ideas of the monarchs were thus in such accord, that from enemies they became more than friends. Alexander and Napoleon took up their joint quarters in Tilsit, freely using each other's articles of toilette, and were inseparable. The King of Prussia was invited to the meeting, but he was not in the secret of the friendship and soon found himself in the way. It was indeed difficult to communicate or render acceptable to the vanquished monarch the harsh terms which the victor was determined to impose upon him. Napoleon took from the King of Prussia half his dominions, and made pecuniary demands almost equal to the other half, whilst the country and its fortresses were to be held till their ransom was paid. In the west Prussia was deprived of all left of the Elbe, which with Hesse was to be formed into the kingdom of Westphalia for Jerome. In the east Frederick William lost his illgotten spoil in Poland, which with its capital Warsaw was added to the dominions of the King of Saxony. Alexander, apparently to avoid this spoliation, seems to have suggested that Jerome should have the duchy of Warsaw, and be declared king of it and of Saxony, the dynasty existing at Dresden being of course provided for elsewhere. This flattering proposal Napoleon declined, and adhered to his first arrangements, alleging that the direct influence of France should not pass the Elbe.* Here, perhaps, may best be mentioned the question which has arisen, of whether Alexander was sincere in his sudden conversion to Napoleonism. The above would lead to the persuasion that he was not. The proposal to place Jerome at Warsaw, another brother in * See Napoleon's Note of July the 4th in his correspondence. |