XLIII. Spain, as well as to subject the West of Germany to CHAP. the French emperor, could not have been the advice of a well-wisher, but only of one not displeased to see ambition rush into the impossible and the exorbitant. Although the subsequent motive with Alexander for remaining attached to Napoleon, was no doubt their joint plan for dividing the East, this could not have been the first impulse. The desire of extricating himself from a position of humiliation and defeat, by representing the new alliance as in accordance with his interests and his predilections, was probably the prime inducement. But from first to last, there was too much utter selfishness in the calculations of the two monarchs to render it possible to give either of them credit for a nobler sentiment. On one point Napoleon, as was usual with him when released from the active duties of war, seemed altogether mad. This monomania was to acquire maritime power and possessions, and to push his conquests over the world's hemisphere to India. For this purpose he was not only to keep the southern shore of the Baltic, but the Atlantic ones of Portugal and Spain. To the coast of Dalmatia already acquired he was to add Greece, the Morea and the islands with Egypt, as if he could possibly keep or make use of such territories, were they in his power. For this dream of Oriental dominion, Napoleon gave up to Russia the far more feasible conquest of the Danubian Principalities, and North Turkey, with the exception of Constantinople. It proved indeed eventually that Russia was no more able to conquer even the Danubian Principalities than Napoleon was to land soldiers in Egypt. So that the two mighty potentates, with Europe at their feet, were indulging in an Arabian Nights' dream about the Levant and Asia, with no more reality in them, than in the stories of Scheherezade. What was most marvellous in this carving and apportioning of the Ottoman territories, was that the CHAP. Ottomans had been the zealous and faithful allies of France during the late eventful years, England and its protection having been spurned by the Grand Seignior; and when a British fleet forced its way into the Sea of Marmora, to remonstrate, it found Napoleon's envoy, General Sebastiani, completely master there, and not only dictating Turkish replies but pointing Turkish cannon. The reward which Napoleon destined for the Turks in return for such conduct was the conquest and division of their empire by him and Russia. The pretext given for this treachery was, that Sultan Selim had perished in a popular tumult. But surely there was something more to be considered in Turkey than the ephemeral life of a sultan. The rest of Europe was as cavalierly treated by the two potentates at Tilsit. Not only did Alexander receive for himself a portion, a small portion certainly, of the Prussian dominions in Poland, but he accepted Finland, the most essential part of the Swedish monarchy, that monarchy which, like Prussia, had been Alexander's faithful ally against France. Moreover all powers were to be awed into open war with England. Russia promised this for itself in case England should refuse its mock mediation. Such powers as Denmark were to be compelled to declare war against Great Britain, and on refusal France and Russia were to declare war against them. In joining this insolent scheme of forcing their vindictive policy upon all other powers,. Russia did not see or foresee that Napoleon was really forcing the same upon the cabinet of St. Petersburg, and that on the first symptoms of its wincing or proving reluctant, Russia would be menaced by French legions, just as little Denmark was. Notwithstanding Napoleon's declaration that French influence should terminate at the Elbe, he erected Dantzic into a republic, dependent evidently upon France, thus rendering himself as much master even of the Vistula as he was already of the Elbe and the Rhine. If the minor powers of Oldenburg and Mecklenburg were restored, it was only on the condition that their ports should be garrisoned by French in order to enforce the active English blockade. Portugal was at the same time summoned to close its ports against the arch enemy Great Britain, and in the prevision of its refusal, a French army was immediately ordered to be assembled at Bayonne. It may be questioned whether Napoleon had reached the zenith of his power and glory in 1807 after Tilsit, or two years later, when, after having overcome Austria in the field of Wagram, he took for his empress the daughter of the Cæsar. We are inclined to consider 1807 as forming the culminating point of his career, his hold over the continent becoming after that period, despite of Wagram, insecure by the gradually increasing estrangement of Russia, and the open resistance of the Peninsula, where English courage and resources enabled Spanish nationality to hold its ground against the French. In 1807 also Napoleon completed the edifice of his internal government. The foundation and the walls were indeed of simple construction, that of absolute power and centralized despotism. The peculiarity, if there was any, lay in the exorbitant cost of the decoration. On this his efforts were chiefly lavished; nor did he seem to care from what school or what epoch his ornaments were borrowed. Thus there was the semblance of a constitution, it being thought decorous to preserve the ghost at least of that modern requirement. There was a Senate, which obsequiously registered imperial decrees for the levy of men and money. There was a legislative assembly, which was forbidden to discuss legislative measures. There was still in 1807 a body called the tribunate, but as it criticised his acts, and as critics were held in horror by the emperor, the tribunate was suppressed, CHAP. XLIII. CHAP. and its members consigned to the same mutism as the legislative corps. The political drama in France being thus confined to pantomime, it was necessary to supply the want of words and of action by dresses and decorations. For this purpose Napoleon deemed that an aristocracy was required. The French indeed would not feed, much less respect an aristocracy of and on their own soil. A noblesse then of either the middle ages, or of the Versailles epoch being impossible, the emperor went back to the days of Charlemagne, and resuscitated the grand dignitaries and feudal dukes of ten centuries previous, their titles taken and revenues derived from foreign and subject lands. Italy furnished some halfdozen, Germany as many more. By the side of these grand dukes, half barbaric, half Byzantine, some offices were taken from the middle ages. One of Napoleon's young brothers who had never wielded a sword, had that of Constable thrust upon his hands, and Louis Buonaparte was to have figured in the character of Duguesclin. The efforts to found a patriciate were not confined to the Byzantine model, or to that of Charlemagne. An imperial decree declared such titles to be hereditary, and gave the founder or the wearer the right to create a majorat, that is, to entail a certain amount of property upon the title. Nothing so glaringly offensive to French prejudice could be imagined. But the entails were built on the quicksands of foreign conquest, and people consoled themselves for what was unequal and unjust by the conviction that it was also ephemeral. That the revolution might be represented, there was a grand elector in memory of Siéyès, and a most fit personage was found to accept the empty title, being no other than the cynic Talleyrand, whose destiny it tecras to survive and to bury all the friends, the policies, or the dynasties and constitutions that he had served of or known. Then there were chancellor and treasurer, each and all with an "Arch" before their titles, their persons empurpled and embroidered and befeathered, far surpassing the aspirations of any noble of the old courts. Kings too formed portions of the imperial circle. Louis had long been King of Holland, a king with enough of the republican in him to kick against imperialism. Joseph was for the moment King of Naples, out of which realm he had expelled the Bourbons. Jerome was enthroned at Cassel. All of these, however, sovereigns and dignitaries, were mere pillars hanging from the roof of the edifice, and leaning upon no foundation whatever in the soil to support it. It is with regret that we speak thus slightingly of Napoleon in his greatness, for he himself was a great man. Neither can we attribute altogether to his character the institution or the crime of tyranny. The freedom of which he had deprived France was worse than anarchy, it was misery and bloodshed. By concentrating power in his own hands, he had not only restored peace to the country, but in a great degree prosperity too. It is no wonder therefore that a soldier little read in historical or political science, should make the mistake of considering his dictatorial rule as the best not only for France but for all subject countries; and indeed it may be admitted, that absolute power wielded by a first-rate intellect, succeeding to an epoch of great freedom, in which ideas have been largely ventilated, national defects and aspirations and tendencies fully made known, can by taking for its mission the realisation of these ideas and hopes, do more for a people, and for an age and their requirements, than a constitutional executive could do. The mistake lies in supposing that There were six Grand Dignitaries, or functionary Grandeeships, borrowed from the old German empire; The Grand Elector; two Archchancellors, one of the Empire, one of the State, an Arch Treasurer, CHAP. XLIII |