CHAP. foresaw the result, and divined the trick. They rose in insurrection at Madrid, but were sabred and cannonaded into submission. As for the Spanish King, Queen, and Prince, whilst engaged in their mutual recriminations at Bayonne, they found themselves, one and all, set aside, compelled to abdicate in favour of the French Emperor, and then separate for captivity in different provinces of France. It seems strangely providential, that Napoleon should have taken the means best calculated to rouse the Spaniards to self-exertion and popular resistance. Had he provoked the royal family to flight, or even flung Ferdinand into the arms of the insurrection, the latter would have had a fool and a bigot to direct it, and the French Emperor would not have been chargeable with a mean act of treachery, that filled every Spanish breast with indignation. Alison describes Napoleon's conduct as wise, so far as human policy was considered, but controlled by the superior wisdom of Providence. We can descry much cunning but no wisdom in Napoleon's treatment of the Spanish dynasty and people. His deepest-laid schemes defeated themselves. There are several ways of conquering a country. That hitherto practised by Napoleon, was to beat the armies of the ruling dynasty, and so terrify it into submission. In Spain he chose to begin by sweeping the dynasty away, and leaving only the people to deal with. For the people he had a thorough contempt, and knew but the one way of dealing with them-terror.* The Spanish people were too scattered for this. Madrid is a capital merely in being the residence of the court. In Spain each province has its centre and its character, and there is no one spot, the castigation or annihilation of which would terrify the rest. Napoleon therefore embarked upon an ocean when he invaded the Penin * His correspondence passim. XLIII. sula. He might cut through its waters gallantly, but CHAP. storms and waves rose behind and before him, and even the thunder of cannon could not silence the popular cries. The first military operations of the French in Spain proved how ignorant they and their commander were of the country. Not content with possessing Madrid and the provinces between it and France, they tried to master the capitals of the eastern portion of the kingdom, meeting with desperate resistance at Saragossa and Valencia, the last repelling them altogether. At the same time a large force was poured into Andalusia to capture Cadiz and reduce the province by a mere cavalcade. The Spaniards were not idle. Their Juntas placed several armies on foot, to the equipment of which England equally contributed, and these soon menaced the communications of the French, both between Madrid and Bayonne, and between Andalusia and the Castiles. The Spaniards had, indeed, small chance in the field against the veteran troops and generals of France, and should have carefully avoided, especially at first, any great action. But General Cuesta was too anxious to measure his strength with Marshal Bessières, who totally defeated him in the battle of Rio Seco (July 1808). Castanos was more successful against Dupont in Andalusia. This general had taken and sacked Cordova, but, instead of marching immediately to Cadiz, had lingered in the conquered town, and, threatened in front by Castanos, whilst his communications with Madrid over the Sierra Morena were equally menaced, thought it prudent to retreat. This emboldened the Spaniards, and encouraged them to assume the offensive. Dupont, moreover, divided his forces, and allowed the Spaniards to intervene between his divisions. The result was defeat, and the capitulation of the French at Baylen, about the same time that Bessières triumphed at Rio Seco. This signal advantage in the north of Spain did not compensate for the loss of Andalusia, nor for the complete defeat and expulsion of Junot from Portugal. At the end of July, a British army had landed in that country under Sir Arthur Wellesley, fought the battles of Roliça and Vimiera, and concluded at Cintra the convention by which the French troops were carried in English vessels back to France. If the English felt humiliated by the bridge of gold thus made for the enemy, Napoleon was still more so at the convention of Cintra and the capitulation of Baylen. He at once resolved to put matters to rights in the Peninsula, by repairing thither in person and draughting at the same time such large reinforcements as would overwhelm Spaniards and English. These reinforcements could only be brought from the French army in Germany. The aspect of affairs there was not fully satisfactory. Austria had been awakened from the passive sullenness or discontent by the account of French reverses in Spain. She began to arm, and evidently to prepare for another conflict. Napoleon saw it, expostulated, and received evasive answers. Several months, however, must elapse ere Austria could be ready. And this would suffice for the complete repression of Spanish resistance. It was necessary, however, to keep at least North Germany quiet, an aim to be attained by the continuance of the accord with Russia, entered into at Tilsit. To enforce it the French Emperor invited his Russian brother to a solemn meeting at Erfurt. It took place in September, and was as brilliant as it was, to all appearance, cordial. Napoleon encouraged Russian designs of aggrandisement on the Danube and the Gulf of Finland. Russia approved of the installation of King Joseph at Madrid. The French monarch, to be sure, reiterated his objection to seeing Russia at Constantinople. But he gratified Alexander by concessions to the unfortunate King of Prussia. The French army of The Emperor had, however, but two months, the last of 1808, to coerce Spaniards and English, and saddle the former with the monarchy of Joseph. He had, however, collected the overwhelming force of 300,000 men, a number quite irresistible. The Spanish armies made gallant resistance, here and there, to the host of French soldiers ere they crossed the Ebro. But their efforts were unavailing. Worsted in every battle, the Spaniards were driven from the plains of Castille; and Madrid was once more occupied by the triumphant enemy. After all was over, and Spanish co-operation impossible, an English army under Sir John Moore penetrated into Spain. It was merely to perceive its mistake, and retreat, as best it might, by the northern provinces to the coast. Napoleon in force rushed after it, and outstripping his main body came within a march of Sir John Moore. The latter was in full flight, however. And Napoleon, receiving despatches that the warlike preparations of Austria were already menacing, he paused, abandoned the pursuit of Moore to Soult, and galloped off to reach Paris and prepare for a campaign upon the Danube. Soult pursued Moore to Corunna, where the latter made a stand in CHAP. CHAP. order to render safe the embarkment of his army. On the 16th of January, 1809, took place the battle of Corunna, in which the French were repulsed, and the future embarkation left unmolested. A cannon-shot terminated Moore's career, in the moment of victory. Thus Napoleon, at the commencement of 1809, had redeemed the disgrace and washed away in blood the affronts put upon his arms in Andalusia and Portugal. He still rose superior in the struggle with his archenemy, England. For in truth the war, wherever fought, was between these two rivals. Napoleon and our Tory government did not yield to one another in audacity. His, indeed, could only be accounted for by ambitious aims, verging almost upon insanity, yet England's acts, though springing from the necessities of self-defence, were often as outrageous and indefensible. It was thus that the bombardment of Copenhagen and the carrying off the Danish fleet by the English, struck neutral powers, or would-be neutral ones, with feelings very nearly akin to those excited by the invasion of Spain. The decrees of prohibition and blockade, launched by France and England at each other, were of the same kind. Both made enemies; and both, moreover, by this continued enmity, came to task each other's strength and resources to that degree, that the war became a trial of stamina as well as an interchange of blows. England drew upon its credit and internal wealth, an exhausting process. France, without credit, was obliged to live on the spoils of subject countries, but this indisposed them, and, like all oppression, led to schemes of fierce retaliation. Men to Napoleon were as indispensable as money. In the supply of these, France began to fail. The conscription he was compelled to enforce a year in advance, as well as to trust more and more to foreign auxiliaries, and thus fill his armies either with youth, who wanted vigour and endurance, or with men no longer animated with the zeal and spirit |