XLIII. of the French revolutionary soldiers. He contrived, CHAP. however, to keep up his numerical force, and to count a million of armed men under his banners. What added to Napoleon's embarrassments was the distance between him and his real enemies. He had to reduce or to awe the powers holding the extremities of Europe-England, Russia, Spain, and Turkey. In embracing Russia at Tilsit, and promising the spoils of Turkey, he had naturally alienated the latter. And thus, whilst endeavouring to close against England the frozen ports of the Baltic, he opened to them the more important ones of the Levant. Tilsit, which, according to Napoleon's views, was to exclude the English from any footing on the Continent, gave them, on the contrary, the most favourable chances of interference and resistance; whilst the vain attempts to close the ports of Spain and Portugal against British vessels resulted in opening to them all those of the New World beyond the Atlantic. Whilst the French Emperor was dispersing the Spaniards and pursuing the English, the Conferences of Erfurt were bearing their natural fruit. That meeting of the two autocrats was neither more nor less than a joint conspiracy against the rest of the world. It was a pact to rivet the chains on the portion already conquered or attached. Russia, after appropriating Finland, was to go to Stockholm on one side, and the Danube on the other. Napoleon was to crush Spain, and then proceed to take his share of the Ottoman empire. The Turks soon got wind of the spoliation reserved for them, and concluded peace with England in January 1809. Austria was no less threatened. With Russia grasping the Principalities and extending to the Danube, eastward of Hungary, and France advancing from Dalmatia, south of it, Austria would soon have been an enclave, an isolated spot in the midst of the allied empires. It precipitated its armaments accordingly, encouraged as CHAP. well as warned by the events of Spain. After Erfurt, Napoleon had summoned the court of Vienna to acknowledge Joseph King of Spain. "We will do so," was the reply, "when you inform us what ye, Russia and France, have resolved together at Erfurt." Exceedingly displeased at having to provide for another and an immediate campaign against Austria, whilst his veteran legions were still employed in Spain, Napoleon sought to pacify the Austrian court. He offered, in concert with Alexander, to guarantee to Austria its present possessions. But as, in the letter making this offer, no mention was made of Erfurt, or of Russian designs in the Principalities, Austria felt that the allied emperors had secretly agreed upon some enterprise inimical to her, which they durst not divulge, and Austria was right. Napoleon was very indignant at such a suspicion. He had no idea that any power or prince had a right to object to his overweening aggression or ambitious designs, and so blinded was he by anger, that he actually considered England and Austria as criminal in opposing him. "The history of my relations with the House of Austria," wrote he, "is simply that of the Wolf and the Lamb." * He meant himself for the Lamb, and poor, shattered, reduced Austria as the Wolf. The Austrians, with much more justice, looked upon Napoleon as the Wolf, who was certain to devour them when Spanish resistance was overcome. Many causes, too, encouraged them. England was ready with its subsidies, and they had strong proofs that Alexander, notwithstanding his apparently close alliance with the French, was still fearful of their supremacy, and anxious to shake it off. To these feelings towards France, manifested in the highest quarters, was to be added the leaning of popular opinion in Germany. Prussian statesmen and men of letters were sowing the seeds of that uprising against *Letter to the King of Wurtemburg, about this time. the French which came at last. 1803 saw the birth of the Tugendbund, that secret opposition of German nationality against French, and it was the urgent advice of Stein and Scharnhorst to the King to take advantage of Napoleon's absence in Spain, and join Austria in a thoroughly German uprising against France. The King of Prussia, however, put trust neither in his people, nor in Austria. He persisted in hoping everything from Russia, and refused to move without the assent and support of Alexander.* In 1809, indeed, Austria was premature in either counting on popular insurrection, or royal or imperial defection. Prince Schwarzenberg at St. Petersburg pressed the Czar in vain, and told Alexander, "If you wait and stand by to see Austria crushed once more, it will have no other resource than to throw itself altogether into the arms of France, and then where will you be?"† The French and Austrians both took the field in April. 120,000 soldiers were with the Archduke Charles upon the Inn and the Isar. The French, he learned, were collected under two of their marshals, one at Augsburg, the other at Ratisbon. The Archduke advanced to interpose his army between them, but in the meantime Napoleon had given orders for concentrating his forces at Abendsburg, a central point between the two cities. Had the Archduke been well informed, he would have exerted himself, and probably succeeded in hindering the concentration. But, uncertain where he might find the French, his own army was scattered. Napoleon attacked one portion of it before Abendsburg on the 20th, defeated it, and drove it back upon Landshut. It proved to be the left of the Archduke's army, who had then to defend himself with his centre and right before Ratisbon. Napoleon attacked him there, that is, at the village of Eckmühl, on the 22nd, and gained a complete * Stein's Letters. VOL. V. † Mémoires d'un Homme d'Etat. M СНАР. XLIII. XLIII. CHAP. victory, driving the Austrian force into Ratisbon, from which they soon retreated across the Danube into Bohemia. The peculiarity of this brief campaign, as disastrous, though not so dishonourable, as Ulm, was German fighting against German, a great portion of Napoleon's force consisting of Bavarians, Wurtemburgers, and others, who gallantly and mainly contributed to the defeat of the Austrians. Pausing a moment to decide whether he should pursue the Archduke into Bohemia, or continue his march down the right bank of the Danube to Vienna, he took the latter course. By so doing he intervened between the Austrians in Bohemia and those on the Italian frontier. The Archduke John had there defeated Prince Eugène Beauharnais upon the Tagliamento, but was interrupted in his career of victory by tidings of what had occurred near Ratisbon. He hastened to the aid of his relative, but was too late even to save Vienna, before which the French soon appeared, forcing their way into the unfortified suburbs, and bombarding the inner city to compel it to surrender. Napoleon was besought not to shower his projectiles upon the Burg or Palace, where the princess Maria Louisa still remained. But though the enemy's capital was occupied, the campaign was far from terminated. The Archduke John undertook to march round through Hungary to a junction with the Archduke Charles. The Tyrolese in insurrection had swept the Bavarians from their valleys, and defied the flying divisions of the French. The Austrian commander-in-chief, with the Emperor Ferdinand, occupied the Marchfeld, a high plain, which extends from the Danube at Vienna, north into Moravia, and the difficulty for Napoleon was to cross the Danube and find footing on its northern bank to engage the enemy. In the previous campaign, the French succeeded in getting possession of the bridge over the Danube. But this was not to be done twice; it was now broken. Napoleon had to replace it by bridges of boats between the islands of the Danube and either shore. This was first attempted at Nussdorf, higher up the stream than Vienna, but failed. The large island of Lobau, lower down the river, was found more practicable. A boat bridge, with difficulty moored in the rapid current, connected the southern bank with the island, a lesser bridge or bridges were required to connect it with the northern bank. The greater part of the Austrian army was higher up the river, its commander expecting the army of the Archduke John. Instead of their reinforcements joining the Austrians, tidings were brought there of the French crossing the Danube on the 20th of May. The Archduke Charles instantly marched to attack them before all had passed. Not more than 30,000 French occupied the villages of Aspern and Essling, under Lannes and Massena, the garden walls and cemetery offering facilities of defence. Attacked on the 21st by far superior forces, Lannes contrived to maintain his ground in Essling, whilst Massena, after an equally stubborn resistance, was driven from Aspern. But the next morning the French had brought over a larger proportion of their army, which then numbered 60,000 or 70,000 men. The Archduke again attacked them with from 80,000 to 100,000 men. The battle which ensued on the 22nd was perhaps the fiercest of the war. There was no manœuvring, and generalship was out of the question. It was a struggle of infantry soldiers for the two villages, and of cavalry for the ground that lay between. Through this intervening ground Napoleon indeed made one of his usual attempts to break into the enemy's centre, by directing upon it all the force that he could muster. He was at first successful, the Austrians yielding before it; but, equal to the great occasion, the Archduke Charles brought in person fresh troops to the combat, and succeeded, though not without the most arduous efforts, in arresting the CHAP. XLIII. |