more ardent, was in advance upon the Aube. On the 29th, Napoleon attacked the Prussian general at Brienne, and drove him from the town after a sharp contest. The success was unfortunate, for it drew Schwarzenberg from his passive attitude, compelled him to come to the succour of Blücher, and Napoleon thus found himself with some 30,000 men in the presence of an enemy of triple that force. Still, rather than retreat, he accepted battle, and fought it with the utmost gallantry, at La Rothière, on the 1st of February.* At the close of the engagement the French maintained their ground, but were glad to retreat upon Troyes, during the night, leaving many cannon behind them, and thus confessing they had been worsted. This battle had a marked effect upon the Congress which opened a few days later at Chatillon. Although the allies had invaded France, in consequence of the non-acceptance by Napoleon of the terms offered at Frankfort, still it was their, and especially Austria's, desire that negotiations should remain open. Caulaincourt had come with the intention of proceeding to Manheim, the place at first fixed for the Congress, but Metternich sent him word that they must await Lord Castlereagh's presence. Chatillon was then named as the place of meeting. Thither went Caulaincourt in the first days of February with instructions from his master to hold by the Frankfort proposition, and insist on the frontier of the Rhine. Lord Castlereagh, on the other hand, emboldened by the attitude of both Wellington and the allies on the soil of France, as well as by the Dutch revolution, came to insist on France being made to withdraw within the limits of 1790. Between such * "Napoleon led on his young guards himself to wrest the village of La Rothière from the gallant corps of Sacken. Their repeated efforts were ineffectual. Napoleon set his life upon a die, exposed CHAP. XLIII. XLIII. CHAP. conflicting sentiments there was little chance of agreement. And, in fact, everything depended upon the war. This was evident, when after the battle of La Rothière Napoleon sent Caulaincourt carte blanche to do or sign anything which might arrest the progress of the enemy, avoid another battle, and preserve the capital. Such instructions were too vague for Caulaincourt to act upon. He sent back to the Emperor for clearer and more decisive ones. But he was then deeply engaged in an attempt to retrieve his losses at La Rothière. Immediately after that engagement the allied armies had separated, the Austrians to pursue a leisurely advance down the left bank of the Seine, whilst the Russians and Prussians under Blücher undertook to penetrate to Paris by the Marne. Napoleon, who had retired to Nogent, was thus between his foes, a position of which he did not fail to take immediate advantage. He marched at once to pounce upon his prey, and the consequence of Blücher's rashness was, that the French Emperor came upon a corps of 6,000 Russians under Olsufief at ChampAubert on the 9th of February. Completely destroying them, he reached Sacken, who was in advance with 20,000 men at Montmirail, on the 11th, and defeated him. York, with a still greater number, had got as far as Château-Thierry. He was attacked and defeated on the 12th, as was the rest of Blücher's army on the 14th at Vauchamps. Thus caught and crushed in detail, Blücher's force was reduced so considerably that he declared it impossible for him to keep the field unless reinforced by the divisions of Bülow and Winzingerode, which were in the north with Bernadotte. The result of Blücher's defeat was that the Austrian and English ministers compelled Alexander to treat once more. They resolved to meet the chief objections of Caulaincourt by submitting to him a full treaty, and moreover granting an immediate armistice, if he would accept the frontier of 1790. After the victory of Vau XLIII. champs, Napoleon had retrograded to Meaux, for the СНАР. sole purpose, however, of finding a good road to march upon the Austrians. Their advancing troops had reached Fontainebleau with the view to unite again with Blücher; Schwarzenberg had crossed the Seine at Nogent and Montereau. On the 16th, Napoleon left Meaux, met the Austrians at Guignes, and in a sharp engagement flung them back upon the Seine. It was only at this moment that he learned the intention of the allies to renew negotiations. An aide-de-camp from Schwarzenberg came with the offer of an armistice. If the allies had been depressed by the late events, Napoleon had been proportionately elated. So that, instead of at once accepting the armistice, he wrote a private letter to the Emperor of Austria, declaring himself ready to treat, but no longer on the basis of the old frontier of France. At the same time he withdrew from Caulaincourt the carte blanche he had given him. This vigorous resolve he followed up on the 18th by attacking the advanced corps of Schwarzenberg that occupied the heights in front of the bridge of Montercau. They were insufficient in number, and were completely defeated, the French cavalry not only routing them, but traversing and winning the bridge in a rapid charge which prevented the enemy from even blowing up the arch in their possession. Notwithstanding this success, which threw the enemy into full retreat, Napoleon was not satisfied: he hoped, at least, to have captured or destroyed one of the divisions. And he threw the blame upon his lieutenants, especially upon Victor, whom he deprived of his command. He did not pardon the old veteran the crime of taking a night's rest. Yet Victor had fought bravely at Montereau, and lost there his sonin-law General Chateau. The Emperor after a time relenting restored him to a command. At Troyes, whence he drove the retreating Austrians on the 23rd, Napoleon was first made aware CHAP. of the active efforts of the Bourbon partisans to raise the standard of the old dynasty. Its princes were already on French soil, behind the English and Austrian camps, if not in them, whilst in Paris eminent persons met to consider what best could be done to save France from being occupied and dismembered, or unworthily disposed of, in case of the complete triumph of the allies. Alexander had whispered to a French general (Reynier) his desire to place Bernadotte on the throne of France. The Bourbons were preferable to this proposal, and even to the regency of Maria Louisa, an Austrian princess. So thought Prince Talleyrand, and his friend the Duke d'Alberg, the latter going so far as to despatch an emissary, M. de Vitrolles, to the headquarters of the allies to acquaint them with the destitute state of Paris, the facility of carrying it by a coup de main, and the advantages of superseding the Bonapartes by the Bourbons. The same hopes and feelings were prevalent in the provinces, notably at Troyes, where, during the recent stay of the allied sovereigns, several nobles of the locality had presented petitions to them in favour of a restoration. Alexander had chidden the petitioners as premature. And so, indeed, it proved, for on the French reoccupying Troyes, the Chevalier Gouault, the chief of the petitioners, was arrested and shot. Just before entering Troyes on the 23rd, as the Austrians withdrew, the Prince of Lichtenstein arrived from Schwarzenberg with renewed offers of an armistice, the terms of which were to be arranged at Lusigny. The Emperor Alexander and Blücher were both indignant at the retreat of the Austrians, and at their renewed offers to treat. Prince Schwarzenberg had promised Blücher to fight a battle with their united forces, and so repair the disaster of the Prussians. But since the defeat of the latter and the affair of Montereau, the Austrian commander declined an engagement. Had Napoleon chosen the moment to meet the Austrian demand, he might have separated them altogether from the Russo-Prussians. Instead of such politic conduct, he still denied to Caulaincourt the power of accepting the frontier of 1790; and at Lusigny his aide-de-camp, Count Flahault, insisted on the retention of Antwerp. The opportunity which Napoleon neglected was seized with alacrity and address by Lord Castlereagh. He saw that the Austrians, left to themselves, would hesitate and defer advancing, Blücher being the general for a bold and forward movement. He therefore laboured to reinforce Blücher, so as to place him once more at the head of a formidable and effective army. His lordship took upon himself to order that the corps of Bülow and of Wizingerode should quit Bernadotte's army, hasten to Soissons to join Blücher, and raise his army to 100,000 men. The difficulty was to do this without offending Bernadotte, but Lord Castlereagh undertook it. His subsidies at the time fed Bernadotte's troops, and by giving him English, Dutch, and Hanoverian soldiers, to the amount of the two divisions. abstracted, he succeeded in satisfying the Swede. After having thus conferred the greatest obligation on Blücher and Alexander, the English minister proposed to gratify to the fullest the desire of Austria to treat, and offer the last chance of accommodation to Napoleon. He therefore proposed, in continuing the conferences at Chatillon, to put the question categorically to the French plenipotentiary of accepting or rejecting the frontier of 1790: in case of his accepting, submit to peace; in that of his rejection, manfully and in concert carry the war to the gates of Paris. To even this Alexander reluctantly consented. He was for pushing the war to extremity. And whilst Lord Castlereagh demurred, Alexander found himself backed by higher * Souvenirs de Caulaincourt. CHAP. |