XLV. CHAP. weakness, of confidence and of trouble, which attested at once blindness of intellect and presentiment of misfortune.* If Charles and Polignac had allowed themselves to be persuaded by Ravez and other courtiers that a Royalist majority or their power could easily be resuscitated, they found themselves grievously mistaken. The choice of candidates for the Presidency sufficiently showed this. The address declared it. That document proclaimed the existence of "great disquietude." The country, it declared, was in presence of an administration which was actuated by a distrust of its sentiments and its reason. The people considered such an administration as inimical to it, and moreover as a menace to its liberties. It was impossible for the King to participate in the distrustful sentiments of such a ministry. He must know that France did not desire anarchy, no more than it would suffer despotism. The address ended by plainly saying that the King would at once put an end to this state of things by dismissing his ministry. M. Guizot styles this language of the address as modest in its pride, and tender in its frankness. Modesty and tenderness are not its attributes. A more decided slap in the face, deserved or not, was never given by parliament to monarch. Charles certainly deserved the rebuff. But as certainly it was calculated to irritate, not reclaim him. Unfortunately for Charles the Tenth, the ministers whom he had chosen were totally without oratorical powers, and unable, although three or four of them spoke, to make anything like a parliamentary defence. They had a fair ground to stand upon in alleging that the administration had committed no act, and that it was condemned upon suppositions which would be found to be calumnies. But ministers were unable to say even this. Polignac himself was a helpless mute. Yet most moderate men, Martignac * Guizot's Mémoires. amongst them, tried to soften the harshness of the address by an amendment. The Chamber rejected this, and voted it, as it stood, finally, on March 15, by 221 votes against 181. Charles consented to receive the injurious address, which was read to him, not without emotion, by Royer Collard. To the demand of changing his politics and his ministers, the King replied that his resolves were immutable; and summoning his ministers, he informed them of his intention to dissolve the Chamber. As Chabrol and Courvoisier protested against such a course, the Chamber was merely prorogued, and the question of dissolution adjourned. In this, and in his subsequent acts, it is evident that Charles was his own minister, the prime adviser and originator of the policy to defy the parliament and the country. If he chose and held by Polignac, it was that the latter obeyed the royal impulse, instead of giving it. Prince Polign.c was a dreamer, only half awake and half alive He looked upon the counter-revolution, upon the path of which he was entering, as something quite accordant with the Charter, and which Providence could not but sanction as a devout proceeding. But whatever the King advised, Polignac was prepared implicitly to follow. This is quite evident in Prince Polignac's Études, and in the conversation he had with Lamartine, when he endeavoured to persuade that young diplomatist to accept the post of Foreign Minister. But, although so insensible to political danger, Polignac was unfortunately very sensible to personal rivalry. He disliked and dreaded Villèle. That statesman came to town. with the hope of directing Royalty in a safer path than it seemed disposed to follow. Polignac displayed strong aversion to him. Yet when it appeared that as soon as the decision was taken to dissolve the Chamber, Chabrol, Courvoisier, and perhaps Guernon de Ranville, would resign, the thoughts of several ministers turned to Villèle. CHAP. XLV. CHAP. XL V. He was for a dissolution and for turning it to the best account, so that his entrance into the ministry with Peyronnet was mooted. But Peyronnet repudiated Villèle as decidedly as Polignac. And that statesman, who saw the monarchy on the brink of the precipice to which he had contributed to steer it, withdrew in disappointment and despair. Chabrol and Courvoisier resigned, Guernon de Ranville was induced to remain. Peyronnet was appointed to the Home Department. Chantelauze, a friend of the Duc d'Angoulême, with the Baron Cappelle, afterwards joined the Cabinet. In April M. de Bourmont embarked upon his expedition against Algeria, begging of his colleagues to await his return at least ere they provoked civil war. The Dey had given frequent cause of umbrage to France, of which since its defeat in 1814 and 1815 Orientals and Barbaresques made too little count. The French government wished to protect the Papal flag from the Algerian corsairs, and the latter did not understand the grounds of this. The French Consul had at last an altercation with the Dey, who struck him with his fan. It was a fair casus belli. When Ambassador in London, Prince Polignac had represented the necessity of taking revenge, but accompanied it by the assurance that he would not make conquests or seek territorial advantages. Summoned to renew this promise as Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris, Prince Polignac hesitated and was evasive in his replies, whilst his Marine Minister, D'Haussez, was insolent. Prince Polignac had at first announced the project of employing the Pasha of Egypt to reduce the Dey; but many objections were made to the plan, and Bourmont's idea of winning glory at Algiers in order to reconcile the French to absolute government was caught at and adopted. It was no difficult achievement with an army of 40,000 men and a formidable fleet. Landing at some short distance from Algiers, the French were attacked by the Dey's army, not inconsiderable, but of course no match for their opponents. The Algerians were defeated. Algiers was then invested. The fort of the Emperor, on the apex or summit of the town, was battered, and was about to be the object of an assault, when the Dey's officers blew it up. This but the more effectually opened the town to the French, who found ample treasure in the Dey's coffers. That potentate was allowed to retire with his family, and Algiers became French. This was achieved early in July. Meantime the Royal Ordonnance dissolving the Chambers appeared. Never did general election under worse auspices for the Crown take place. And yet the electors formed the wealth and education of the kingdom. Had the Monarch shown either moderation or sense, he could not but have had a majority amongst such a class. But the King in a proclamation pronounced the late address of the Chamber repudiating Polignac as a personal insult to himself, which he was determined not to overlook. At the same time the ministerial press and some functionaries spoke plainer. They pleaded that the King had by the 14th article of the Charter a full right to make use of extraordinary measures to save the State, even by decreeing a change in the electoral law. Others pointed to a conflict as the likeliest result of their policy, and the Crown was said to be prepared for this trial of force, and assured of victory. This language, instead of intimidating the electors, irritated and provoked them. The opposition members were everywhere returned, the ministerialists losing some fifty. The Liberal majority of 221 became 270. To this had abutted the boasts and efforts of De Peyronnet. To meet such a Chamber with his present ministers and with the only language that they could use was merely to provoke an address stronger in censure than that of the 221. It was sure, however, to be respectful CHAP. XLV. CHAP. to the Monarch, who had but to abandon his ministers in order to be reconciled to his parliament. There was nothing humiliating in this, if Charles would have considered himself a constitutional King. If any one would endeavour to represent to himself what Charles the Tenth really aimed at, and what were the counterdesigns of the parliamentary majority, no very great chasm would be found between them. The King had abandoned the Jesuits. He still wished to give the clergy influence, and desired to see the old historical noblesse resume its splendour and its station. There was nothing very despotic in this, nor did Charles the Tenth look to make himself a despot. He was much more afraid of what the Liberals meditated towards him than bent upon any project of his own. Unfortunately he had the Revolution ever before his eyes. He looked upon the Chamber as a Convention, and its orators as so many Vergniauds and Robespierres, who, if they were not crushed, would abolish the monarchy and send its present occupant to the scaffold. "I had rather mount on horseback and fight than mount the scaffold there [pointing to the Place Louis Quinze] as my brother did." All this was mere phantasmagoriathe ravings of a mind steeped in the past, and unable to extricate itself therefrom so as to take an active and just view of the present. His family was worse than himself; his niece and daughter-in-law imbued with the same silly sentiments, that the Liberal politicians were Mirabeau and Barrère, Danton and Robespierre. When the King appointed Martignac, the Duchesse d'Angoulême exclaimed that he had descended the first step of his throne. Those unfortunate Bourbons were in fact stricken with insanity, and petrified into obtuseness by the spectre of the past. All this time what did the Liberals, even the extreme ones, desire? We can now judge from the letters of Lafayette written at the time. The principle of election in |