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It was regarded in law as a

-"informatus continuo per nuntios tunc præsentes, "cessit officio regali, et omni jure regio sibi compe"tenti, coram notario, abrenunciavit, et regni regimine se dimisit."

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It is in relation to the last passage that the record of the case now under consideration becomes voluntary illustrative and instructive. There the words are, in resignation. one place, "de regimine regni sui se demisit," and in another place "de regimine regni Angliæ se demisit." It is clear, therefore, that, whatever may have been the nature of the event in fact, it was in law regarded, fourteen years afterwards, as a voluntary resignation or abdication. It could, indeed, hardly have been regarded otherwise, as the proclamation on the accession of Edward III. was to the same effect. The French words in which the proclamation was made. in the City of London, were that Edward II. " de sa "bone volunte, et de commun conseil et assent des "Prelatz, Countes, et Barons, et autres nobles, et "tote la communalte du Roialme, seu est ouste del

"demise."

governement du Roialme." 1 In the writs of pro

clamation sent to the Sheriffs and others it was also recited in Latin that Edward II. "spontanea volun"tate se amovit a regimine dicti regni."2 From this it is plain (though, indeed, there could hardly have been a doubt on the subject) that an abdication is a demise.

Original The original meaning of the expression "Demise of the meaning of "King" has, perhaps, almost passed out of recollection. It is now regarded as the legal mode of describing the death of the sovereign. It may therefore be of some interest to observe that Edward II. is supposed to have done pre

1 Rot. Claus., 1 Ed. III., part 1, m. 28. The proclamation has been printed, not quite correctly, in Rymer's Fœdera.

2 Rot. Claus., 1 Ed. III., part 1, m. 28, not printed by Rymer.

cisely what every other sovereign of England is supposed to do at the end of his reign. "Il se demyst." He divested himself of the government of his realm. Il se demyst is a form of words in common use throughout the Year Books to signify that the person "divested "himself" of any particular estate which he might have held. It is not restricted to the meaning of granting an estate for life or years to another, but applies to any interest to which the holder could disentitle himself. It is thus, though a hard and cruel, and even ironical phrase as applied to Edward II., a not ungraceful euphemism as applied to most of our sovereigns.

Bench in

ster Hall by

A case of some interest in relation to the mode of Contempt: A Justice dealing with contempt of court occurs in Trinity Term of the (No. 51). It is an instance of the light thrown by King's reports upon records, and of the light thrown back by sulted in records upon reports. Sir Robert de Scardeburgh had Westminbrought an action against one Sir William Botevileyn, a woman. and his wife Margery, by writ of Trespass. Some curious technical points arose upon that writ. Before the cause was decided, however, Scardeburgh with other Justices of the King's Bench was proceeding up Westminster Hall to his Court, when Botevileyn's wife assailed him with opprobrious words, and said that he had brought the writ of Trespass against her without just cause.

attachment

and her

Upon this both Botevileyn and his wife were attached Immediate by Bill to answer Scardeburgh as to the trespass com- of the mitted by speaking the words. Thus much we know offender from the record. Fitzherbert, in his Abridgment, has husband by made some confusion between the original action by Bill, withwrit, and Scardeburgh's proceeding by bill, for he has placed the two under the head of Writ. an error in two MSS. of one of the two

1 Fitz., Briefe, 281.

There is also reports of the

out Writ.

Dilatory

exception

proceedings by bill, in which occurs the word bref, though the word bille is correctly used a few lines afterwards. In the other report the word bille is used correctly throughout.

A comparison of the reports of the original action with the reports and the record of the proceedings following the words used against Scardeburgh reveals the following facts. A Justice of the King's Bench, having a complaint against another subject, for injuries done to himself as a fellow fellow subject, because his house had been burnt and his hedges broken down, proceeded in one of the ordinary ways by suing an original writ of Trespass out of the Chancery returnable in the King's Bench. When, however, his complaint was that he had been insulted in his capacity of Judge, while about to take his seat, there was a summary process of attachment, without any original writ whatever, upon a bill issuing out of the Court of which he was a Justice.1 In some respects the matter was still regarded as one between party and party, because both the offender and her husband were attached to answer Scardeburgh as to a plea ("de placito") why she had done as alleged, and because Scardeburgh claimed damages. But in one very important respect it was dif ferent, because the contempt against the King (in the person of one of his Justices) was made a prominent feature of the bill. It seems clear also from a passage in the reports which will be noticed below that there was little or no delay in the preparation of the bill, and that Botevileyn and his wife were practically attached on the spot.

Botevileyn, on behalf of himself and Margery, adto the Bill: mitted the trespass, but it was pleaded on behalf of Margery, who declined to be bound by Botevileyn's plea,

issue

whether

The proceeding by bill without writ was not, however, restricted to

cases of this kind, as is shown by the records, even at this early period.

had was sole,

that she was wrongly named, in the bill, wife of Bote- the woman vileyn, as she was in fact feme sole because she been divorced. Scardeburgh denied the divorce, issue was joined on that question of fact.

as having and been

divorced.

circum

and refused

only because the

issue was not within

their

Both the reports here introduce a curious piece of A jury de information, which it would be impossible for the record stantibus to make known to us. Scardeburgh prayed that an was prayed, inquest might be taken immediately, because the words had been spoken in the presence of the Justices them selves. The meaning appears to be that a jury to inform the Court formally of the fact of the contempt, should be at once made up de circumstantibus, without sending any jury-process to the Sheriff. There seems every reason to believe that this would actually have been done, had the issue joined been one upon which a jury could give a verdict. Willoughby, the Chief Justice, distinctly gave as the reason against it that the issue joined was not on the trespass or point of the bill.

cognisance.

certificate

was not

After this both reports agree in a remarkable error, Bishop's which is that jury-process was sent to the Sheriff. As a that the matter of fact no such process did issue, because there woman was nothing in dispute of which a jury could have divorced. any cognisance. The question of the divorce had to be and was settled by the certificate of the Bishop of Rochester, who certified that there had been no such divorce.

confesses

committed

of the

Scardeburgh now prayed judgment against Botevileyn The woman and his wife. The Court, however, seems to have hesi- the trestated for a considerable time, and there were several pass, and is adjournments. The Judges may, perhaps, have been in to the doubt whether they should consider the fact of the alleged custody trespass as not denied by Margery (though it had been Marshal, admitted on her behalf by her husband) when she had but is let chosen an issue on a wholly different question. At last mainprise. Margery, who had been out on mainprise, was brought to the bar by the Marshal, and confessed the trespass. She was re-committed to the custody of the Marshal,

out on

U 50018.

d

The Court would not punish for

until

legally informed

but was again let out on mainprise to appear on a day given. Nothing more has been found in relation to the case, and the lady was probably not further punished for her little outburst of temper.

The most noteworthy feature of these proceedings is the evident principle on which the Court acted, that contempt before anything could be done in relation to the contempt they must be informed of the fact in a legal manner. Once duly informed they could give judgment of the fact. and commit to prison, but they could not or would not regard an act done in their own presence as being within their own knowledge, unless they had the confession of the doer actual or implied, or the verdict of a jury. The pleading of a divorce by Botevileyn's wife and the joinder of issue thereon had the effect of keeping the information as to the trespass or contempt from the Court until a question which was in no way connected Iwith it had been decided. The matter would otherwise have been settled quickly and effectively.

It could, nevertheless, pro

ceed more expeditiously than in an ordinary action.

The Court clearly had the power of proceeding more expeditiously when contempt against itself was in question than when an ordinary action by original writ had to be brought before it. There seems, however, to be but little doubt that it did not act in so summary a manner in early as in more recent times, even when the contempt was in the presence of the Justices. Some kind of formal proceeding had to be instituted,1 the most rapid of which was a bill drawn immediately, upon which the offender could be attached on the spot. A jury of the by-standers could be sworn, and upon their finding a judgment of imprisonment might follow. But, of course, even the proceeding by bill was subject

1 Mr. Solly Flood has collected a number of instances from the year 38 Henry III. to the year 9 Henry V., and printed them in a Schedule at the end of his "Story of Prince

Henry of Monmouth and Chief Justice Gascoign" (Royal Historical Society, 1885). They include several in which a jury of the bystanders was sworn on the spot,

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