tutional creation? And, on the other hand, from the language applied to inferior courts, are we not equally justified in considering their establishment as dependent upon the legislature, who may, from time to time, ordain them, as the public good requires? Can any other meaning be applied to the words "from time to time ?" And nothing can be more important on this subject, than that the legislature should have power, from time to time, to create, to annul, or to modify the courts, as the public good may require; not merely to-day, but forever; and whenever a change of circumstances may suggest the propriety of a different organization. On this point, there is great force in the remark of the gentleman from Georgia, that among the enumerated powers given to Congress, while there is no mention made of the supreme court, the power of establishing inferior courts is expressly given. Why this difference, but that the supreme court was considered by the framers of the constitution, as established by the constitution; while they considered the inferior courts as dependent upon the will of the legislature.

We find the phrase, from time to time, in another part of the constitution. The third section of the second article says, the President shall, from time to time, give to the Congress information of the state of the union. That is, he shall occasionally, as he sees fit, give such information. So shall Congress occasionally, as they see fit, establish, annul, or regulate inferior courts, accordingly as the public welfare requires.

The arguments of gentlemen go upon a mistaken principle. They express the liveliest sympathy and commiseration for this poor, this weak department of our government. They tell us, the judges have a vested right to their offices, a right not now derived from the law, but from the constitution; and they assimilate their case to that of a public debt; to the right of a corporation; a turnpike company, or a toll-bridge.

But is not all this reasoning predicated on the principle, that the courts are established, not for the public benefit, but for the emolument of the judges; not to administer justice, but for their personal aggrandizement. I believe that a government ought to proceed upon different principles. It ought to establish only those institutions which the good of the community requires; when that good ceases to need them, they ought to be put down, and of consequence, the judges should hold their appointments so long and no longer, than the public welfare requires.

If the arguments now urged be correct, that a court once established cannot be vacated, we are led into the greatest absurdities. Congress might deem it expedient to establish a court for particular purposes. limited as to its objects or duration. For instance. the United States has taken possession of the Mississippi territory, rightfully or not, I will not pretend to say. This territory has been, heretofore, in the hands of various masters, viz. France, England, Spain and Georgia; and it is now possessed by the United States. All these governments, except the United States, made certain grants of lands in the territory, and certain settlers spread their conflicting patents over the country. These different titles will open a wide field for litigation, which will require able tribunals to decide upon. Suppose then Congress should establish special tribunals, to continue for three, four or five years, to settle these claims. Judges would be appointed. They would be the judges of an inferior court. If the construction of the constitution now contended for be established, what would the judges say, when the period, for which they were appointed, expired? Would they not say, we belong to inferior courts? Would they not laugh at you, when you told them their term of office was out? Would they not say, in the language of the gentleman from New York, though the law that creates us is temporary, we are in by the constitution? Have we not heard this doc-

trine supported in the memorable case of the mandamus, lately before the supreme court? Was it not there said, that though the law had a right to establish the office of a justice of the peace, yet it had not a right to abridge its duration to five years; that it was right in making the justices, but unconstitutional in limiting their periods of office; that being a judicial officer, he had a right to hold his office during life, (or what is about the same thing,) during good behaviour, in despite of the law which created him, and in the very act of creation, limiting his official life to five

years.

I may notice another case, more likely to happen, to show the absurdity of this construction. Congress have assumed jurisdiction over the Mississippi territory, and have established a court composed of three judges, which court is as much an inferior court, as the circuit or district courts. Of this jurisdiction, Georgia denies the validity. The contest is in a train of settlement. Suppose it shall turn out that the United States are convinced of the injustice of their claim, relinquish it, and restore the territory to Georgia, what becomes of the judges? Their offices, their duties are gone! Yet they will tell you, we are vested with certain constitutional rights of which you cannot deprive us. It is true the territory is no longer yours. You have no jurisdiction, and we have no power; yet we are judges by the constitution. We hold our offices during good behaviour, and we will behave well as long as you will let us. Is not this a strange situation? You have judges in a territory over which you have no jurisdiction; and you have officers which are perfect sinecures, pensioners for life. Such an absurdity, I am sure the constitution never meant to justify. It is an absurdity equally repugnant to the letter and the genius of the constitution.

Suppose another case. Suppose, what I trust will never happen, a war should take place. Suppose that a part of the United States should be conquered, and

that we should be compelled to cede it to a foreign nation. In this district your jurisdiction is gone; your power is gone; the office of a judge is destroyed, and yet the officer holds his appointment for life: this case may be considered as inapplicable to the United States. It may be said, that we have no right to cede a state, or a part of a state. But I believe a different sentiment has been entertained, and perhaps in this House.

But suppose this event to occur in relation to territory not attached to a state. Suppose the government should find it necessary to establish an inferior court in an island of Lake Superior. Suppose it should be the fortune of war to place in the possession of the enemy, one of the states; and the question shall be, will you give up this territory in the frozen regions of the lakes, or suffer the state to remain in the possession of the enemy, you being unable to take it from him? If you give up the territory, your court is annihilated, yet the judges claim a tenure in their offices for life; and this in a country that no longer belongs to you-does not such a result strike every mind as absurd? Is it not apparent, that whatever claim such men might have upon the generosity of the government, they can have no claim to offices that do not exist. Nay, further; it might, upon the construction now contended for, be insisted, that the constitution forbids you to make a peace upon those terms; that by ceding an inconsiderable territory which you did not want to secure a whole state, you would abolish the office of a judge, which the legislature had there erected; that this would be an express violation of your constitution; and therefore you must leave a whole state in the possession of the enemy, unless this judge would give you leave to make terms by resigning his office.

I believe, sir, that we should not differ much, if we came to a proper understanding of the true principle on which this question depends. If we establish the principle, that from the nature and essence of the pub

lic institutions, they are made for the good of the people, and not for that of the individual who administers them, we shall experience no difficulty. Gentlemen, in speaking of a judge, had emphatically called it his office. But it is not his office, but the office of the people. He is only the person appointed to perform certain services required by the public good, and when those services are no longer necessary for that public good, his duties are at an end, his service may be dispensed with, and he ought to retire to private life.

The case had been assimilated to a bridge. But he who builds a bridge does a public good, that entitles him to a growing remuneration forever. But here the good is temporary. The truth is, the judge is more like the man who collects the toll, and who receives the promise of an annual payment, as long as he discharges his duties faithfully. But a flood comes, and sweeps away the bridge; will the toll gatherer, like the judge, contend, that though the bridge is gone, and the owner ruined, that he shall notwithstanding receive his compensation for life, though he cannot continue those services for which his annual stipend was to be the compensation and reward.

But it would seem, that the argument urged on this occasion, and the general course of our legislation had been grounded more on the convenience and emoluments of those appointed to office, than on grounds of public utility. First, we appointed six judges of the supreme court, divided the United States into three circuits, two judges to ride each circuit, in which, with the district judge, to form a court. The law fixed the duties and the compensation, and gentlemen of the first character were ready to accept the places. The salaries, indeed, had been thought high; in some parts of the union they were thought enormous. But a little time passed before they complained of the hardships of their duties; and the law was altered, not so much for public good, as for their personal convenience. Where two judges