Beyond Conventional Economics: The Limits of Rational Behaviour in Political Decision MakingEdward Elgar Publishing, 01/01/2006 - 176 páginas Beyond Conventional Economics is a diverse collection of eight essays written in honor of public choice legend Geoffrey Brennan. . . There is something here for everyone. . . Eusepi and Hamlin begin this diverse volume with a well-written, informative, an |
Índice
1 Political dispositions and dispositional politics | 3 |
2 Expressive voting how special interests enlist their victims as political allies | 17 |
3 Who shall keep the keepers themselves? On the moral foundations of the separation of powers | 33 |
4 A bouquet of democracies | 49 |
PART II Searching for stability in democracy | 61 |
5 Subjective evaluation of alternatives in individual voting choice | 63 |
6 Truth justice and democracy | 81 |
7 Errordependent norms | 108 |
8 The world is a table Economic philosophy stated flatly in terms of rows columns and cells | 125 |
Appendix list of major works by Geoffrey Brennan | 145 |
| 149 | |
Outras edições - Ver tudo
Beyond Conventional Economics: The Limits of Rational Behaviour in Political ... Giuseppe Eusepi,Alan P. Hamlin Visualização de excertos - 2006 |
Palavras e frases frequentes
action Alan Hamlin alternatives approval assume attribution bias Brennan and Lomasky Buchanan Cambridge University Press cells choose compound symmetry Condorcet Jury Theorem constitutional court democratic dilemma disapprove dispositions Economic economists election Electoral emerge error-dependent ethical preferences evaluation example expressive voting g₁ Geoffrey Brennan Giuseppe Goodin Gordon Tullock homo economicus independent voters individual institutional interconnected groups interest groups judges justice Kliemt Leviathan liberal Loren Lomasky Majority Rule Theorem methodological individualism moral motivation option order desires ordinal utility Pareto Pareto principle parties person Philip Pettit possible Povilov1 primitive ordering primitive preference ordering probability Public Choice pure rational rational ignorance reference voter result separation of powers simple majority rule social choice society special majority rules statistically independent theory tion truth Tullock utility v₁ votes virtue voter v₁ votes not-ø votes ø voting behaviour voting choice voting order Voting outcome welfare economics welfare function winning side