recovered a nominal judgment against the old corporation under such circumstances. De Haven, J., speaking for the whole court, said: published for more than half a century and which contain all important decisions, not only of the Court of Cassation, which corresponds to our Court "We think upon this state of facts a court of of Appeals, but of the Cours d' Appel, corresponding equity will regard the defendant as a mere continu- to our intermediate Appellate Courts, and even of ation of the former corporation under a different the lower courts. In all these reports the grounds name, and will hold it liable for the indebtedness on which the decisions are based are stated often of the Esperanza Company (the old corporation) at considerable length, although generally the opinat least to the extent of the value of the property which it received from it without consideration, and under the circumstances stated. Nominally, the two corporations may be different, but as viewed in equity, they are the same, and the plaintiff is not prevented from asserting such identity in fact." The same principle was applied by the Nebraska court in Reed Bros. Co. v. First National Bank of Weeping Water (46 Neb. 168), to a case in which an insolvent copartnership dissolved and organized as a corporation, the partners transferring the property held by them to the new corporation. In a suit brought directly against the corporation for an obligation of the partnership, the defense was interposed that the debt sued upon was not that of the corporation. But the court held that under the circumstances, the corporation was properly sued as such, having impliedly assumed the liabilities of the copartnership, being a mere continuation thereof under a different name and by a different form of person (9). GLENDA BURKE SLAYMAKER. Indianapolis, Ind., July, 1902. THE CONDITION OF AMERICAN JURIS- To the Editor of the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL: But Judge Rose's assumptions are entirely erroneous. He states that in France there are only two publications treating of court matters, and that decisions of reported cases are found in neither. He seems to be entirely unacquainted with publications like Dalloz, Merlin and others, which have been (9) See, also, Benesh et al. v. Mill Owners' Mutual Fire Ins. Co. of Iowa, 103 Ia., 465, 469; Grand River College v. Robertson, 67 Mo. App., 329, 337; Austin v. Tecumseh Nat'l Bank, 49 Neb., 412, 419; Calumet Paper Co. v. Investment Co., 96 Ia., 147, 151; San Francisco, etc., R. Co. v. Bee et al., 48 Cal., 398, 402. ions are shorter than those delivered by other courts, as each argument is stated in a separate paragraph. This form, while it shortens the decision, makes it often very hard reading, and it is not followed by the German courts, the decisions of which are regularly reported and which are in form exactly like our own. No lawyer of standing in any of these countries will advise his client without carefully looking up what is technically called the "jurisprudence," to wit, the decided cases. Every text writer devotes considerable space to them. I have before me the book on Life Insurance, by Couteau, the leading French authority on the subject. It is in two volumes, and the second volume, nearly 600 pages in length, is taken up with the discussion of the cases, of which many hundred are cited and discussed. While it is true that as long as a point is not absolutely settled by decisions of the highest court the lower courts consider themselves at liberty to follow their own interpretation, they follow the jurisprudence of the highest court when it has become what is technically called "constant," namely, well settled. There may not be an absolute legal obligation to do so (although in some countries, as in Austria, the Supreme Court is given by statute the right to declare that its decision shall be binding on the lower courts in analogous cases), but, as a matter of fact, it is done and often more loyally than here, where, as we all know, a decision of the highest court is often so distinguished and limited by the lower courts as to practically annul it. It is, of course, not denied that in Continental Europe generally the study and practice of law is based to a much greater extent than in this country on philosophical and scientific principles, and that it has not degenerated into a search for a case in point. But it might well be maintained that this is due more to the training of the prospective lawyers in the universities than to any inherent difference between the two systems of law. The same difference Our text-books exists between the text writers. are mostly merely compilations of cases. If we had more men like Bishop, Bigelow, Thayer or Morawetz, who consider the decided cases as material from which to deduce the underlying principles, matters would improve. This is the spirit in which the Roman law has been treated by its modern expositors. Nothing can be more erroneous than the characterization of the Corpus Juris as a modern code or to contrast its so-called systematic arrangement with the crudeness of the English common law. It is absolutely deficient in form, system or physician for, say seventy-five dollars, a case worth logical arrangement and its most important part is a thousand, and the physician takes one-half the merely a discussion of concrete cases in considering settlement for his services. The injury which is which it is difficult to decide what is more striking: inflicted upon poor people by this practice is beyond the ingenuity and acumen with which a case is discomputation or comprehension. cussed in all its bearings and ramifications or the utter absence of any attempt to lay down general or abstract principles or rules. "Let the cobbler stick to his last." This is an adage that is almost as old as the world itself. The legal profession to-day is invaded by hordes of half-educated undertakers, real estate agents, clergymen and doctors; its sacred functions are impaired, and matters involving large financial interests are handled by persons ignorant of legal principles, and the result is a frightful increase of litigation, and financial disaster to the parties interested. The undertaker or church sexton writes the last will and testament of his acquaintances. And this conduct is invariaby followed by a long and protracted contest in the courts. The family is oftentimes almost wholly disinherited, and the church and so-called charitable (?) associations successfully defend their rights in a great majority of cases, sometimes to the almost utter destitution of the family. The ignorant real estate agent and curb-stone broker draws a deed, which calls for a perfect knowledge of the law of real property; he forgets to insert incumbrances, betterments, assessments, and the purchaser, after receiving the deed from the registry, ascertains for the first time that his deed is a "quit-claim" instead of a "warranty." The inherent weakness of individuals to save a lawyer's fee and the natural desire to employ incompetent and cheap labor is the cause of much litigation. Another new character of the present day is the lawyer-doctor. The doctor without patients is obliged to live on accident lawsuits. The patient consults him in his professional capacity; he learns that the man was injured in a street railway accident, and then the ignorant patient is greeted with this salutation: "Don't go to an attorney; he will take it all. I will look after your interests." The result is that the railway company settles with the What would the medical profession say if attorneys and counselors-at-law attempted to set broken limbs? The medical profession would indignantly repel such invasion. Bar associations in our country have been exceedingly lax in protecting the interests of attorneys-at-law; a law should be enacted prohibiting all persons, except duly authorized attorneys-at-law, from drawing wills, deeds, appearing in probate or other courts; in short, from doing any work which properly comes within the province of a lawyer. The dignity and honor of our profession demands vigorous action, and the emoluments which accrue from the honorable practice of the law ought not to be allowed to drop into these disreputable channels, where the above-described "harpies ” _have been hitherto fattening upon the life blood of the poor, struggling and respectable attorney. The strenuous life has become so intensified that the legal profession is no longer free from the taint of the commercial touch. How to make money out of legal business, and how to get legal business, out of which money can be made, are questions uppermost in the minds of many a practicing attorney to-day. The questions themselves are not new. But the answers to them, as they appear in actual practice, if not new, too frequently reflect no credit on the bar. And the struggle for actual existence in these hurrying, bustling times, makes some excuse for the prac tice plausible, if not justifiable. The disposition, for instance, to go after business, to solicit individuals, firms and corporations, for litigated matters is one of the "commercial" features of the profession which is widespread, is accepted as inevitable under existing conditions, and is tolerated by members of the profession, who are regarded as both able and "reputable." Nor is this the only form of "commercialism" in the law which is growing and adds little to the due administration of justice. The disposition to take up. on contingent fees, cases which have no legal against municipal and other corporations, is an evil merit whatever, particularly cases of personal injury of no small proportions. Of course, the strenuous condition of the world at the present time tends to drive every one into the business of making money. It is unfortunate for the legal profession that this is so. For it is no mere trade, nor is it an avenue that leads, or should lead, to great wealth. There is, or at least there should be, some attempt to exalt this honorable profession out of the scramble for mere pelf. This does not mean that the lawyer should not receive his just and fair compensation for services rendered. His is a laborious life, if his professional duties are fitly discharged, and he is entitled to his reward in dollars and cents as much as the member of any other walk in life. Our contention is not for gratuitous services by any means. floor to ceiling permits of the distribution of the many books in narrow tiers of shelves; otherwise the space would not be sufficient for one-half the number, and as it is, the room is wholly unfit and inadequate for the purpose required. From this room, Professor Morse, the inventor of the telegraph, transmitted the first official telegram. A wire had been laid from Washington When, however, the profession is employed for the sole purposes of a money-making institution, it ceases to meet the lofty aims for which it was designed, tends to lose the respect of those whose opinions to Baltimore, and the young inventor, surrounded are worth having, forgets the behests of justice, by a group of prominent men, manipulated the denies to the public the right of property under the instrument which conveyed the news to Baltilaw, if not of liberty also, and makes of the due more of the election of President Polk, in 1844. A administration of the law the merest mockery. nephew of the famous inventor, Mr. W. H. Morse, is one of the assistant librarians to-day, and an efficient, faithful custodian of this valuable public A graduate of Yale, property of our government. well versed in library work from long experience, courteous and painstaking, he occupies a position not easily filled by another man. Bench and bar and bar associations can do much to create a healthy public opinion which will discourage and denounce this nefarious business. So-called 66 reputable" lawyers should be brought promptly to book for such questionable practices. And persistence in commercialism," which, of course, should be first specifically defined, should be sufficient to warrant disbarment. The justification for this radical course is found in the fact that a multiplicity of suits devoid of merit, often having but a plaintiff in name, only have, or should have, no place in the halls of our courts. It is possible to weed them out by some such method as is here outlined. Milwaukee, Wis., 1902. DUANE MOWRY. THE LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. Few visitors at Washington realize that in a poorly lighted and ventilated part of the capitol building, in that section midway of the senate and the house wings, is a room containing one of the most valuable and complete law libraries in exist ence. The law library referred to is that of the Supreme Court of the United States, more commonly referred to as the law library of congress. The history of this fine collection of books of legal lore is interesting, as well as is that of the old room now used as a library. The Supreme Court library to-day contains about 140,000 volumes. Its value, as set by conservative judges, is not far from $400,000. The library contains two sets of all State reports, two sets of English reports, and as high as five and six duplicate United States reports. There are also many valuable text-books and treaties upon the different subjects of the law not now obtainable, and of almost priceless value. The law library was formerly a part of the congressional library and occupied that part of the capitol building known as the old library. In the Thirteenth congress, October 21st of the year 1814, a resolution was offered in congress to purchase the law library of the late President JefferBy special act, January 30, 1815, congress voted for the purchase of the Jefferson library at the figure set by the administrators, $23.950, “to be paid in treasury notes of the issue ordered by the law of March 4, 1814." son. In the Twenty-second congress, July 13, 1832, an act was passed for the purpose of increasing and improving the law library at large, and near the Supreme Court, but stipulating that it should continue a part of the congressional library, subject to the same regulations and rules. An appropriation was made of $5,000 a year for the purchase of books for the library of congress, and an additional $1,000 for the law library, for the term of five years, the selection of books for the law library to be under the direction of the chief The room now occupied as a library, while small, justice. In the Thirty-eighth congress the appro From Mr. Morse, the assistant in charge of the library, I have gained much that will no doubt be of interest to those of the legal fraternity who appreciate the value of those old volumes containing laws and opinions upon the same as handed down by one generation to another. priation for the law library was increased to $2,000 per year. In the Thirty-ninth congress an act was passed for the purchase of the library of the late James Petigru, and carrying an appropriation of $5,000 for the purpose. From time to time the library has been increased by the addition of valuable works and the purchase of private libraries, until to-day it is, as before stated, one of great value and numbers. In the year 1802, 1 learn from the records, that the salary of the chief of law librarians was two dollars per day; less than that received to-day by many of the sweepers about the building. The librarian was required to give bond in such sum as shall seem proper to the president of the senate and speaker of the house." From 1870 to 1897, the salary of the chief was $1,500. In this year the new congressional library was completed and fit for occupancy. Mr. Thomas H. Clark was appointed chief at a salary of $2,000 per annum. This was increased in 1900 to $2,500. The salary of the librarian of congress, under whom is the assistant in charge of the law library proper, is now $5,000. It is very apparent that a new building, separate and distinct from the capitol, is necessary for the use of the Supreme Court and the law library will naturally follow that body in its location. A site opposite the congressional library has been talked of, and it is a matter of but a few years at least, when another beautiful edifice will be added to the number of capitol buildings at Washington, for the occupancy of the Supreme Court and its library. The formation of new committees, as times and events in our history necessitate, is fast utilizing the room space of the great building, and the rooms in the part known as the terrace are unsatisfactory and will sooner or later be used for other purposes than as committee rooms. The erection of a modern structure in harmony with the dignity of the highest tribunal of our government, the Supreme Court of the United States, with commodious quarters for the valuable library so essential to its existence, seems proper and consistent, for, as time advances and with it the growth of our nation, the necessity of such a building is apparent. Washington, D. C. FRED T. LINCOLN. Requiring a horseshoer to practice the business of horseshoeing for four years, and submit to an examination by a board of examiners, and pay a license fee for the privilege of exercising his calling, is held, in Bessette v. People (Ill. [56 L. R. A. 558]), not to be within the police power of the State. PERJURY TOO COMMON. "Swearing falsely is as common among a certain class of people as their opportunity to swear before a Court," said his honor. "The mothers of these children have not told the truth. Perjury is becoming altogether too common. I have seldom had the opportunity to try a case in which there has been no perjury." Judge Horton is represented as giving expression to the above, by the Chicago American of August 2d, while presiding in the juvenile court. If the judge speaks truly, and his veracity can not be questioned, this is a grave matter, and those who have An the power should make an effort to correct it. oath is to call God to witness the truth of what we say, therefore one must believe in God before he can have any conception of the sancitity of an oath, and what are we doing as a nation to make our children believe in God? Rather are we not doing much to belittle that faith? Have we not eliminated God and everything that counts for Him from our national educational system? This very fact is an object lesson. If God is so necessary that justice may prevail between man and man, why exclude Him from our educational system? It is not more necessary for the safety of the republic that our citizens can read and write than it is that our citizens may realize the sacredness and sanctity of an oath. Ignorance of letters would never disrupt the nation, but perjury most certainly will. But, it is said, let the parents attend to this matter. Now, the fact, is the parents do not, and probably will not. Is the State, then, to remain indifferent to the remedy, and do nothing but complain of usual perjury by its public officials? Is not the very existence of a juvenile court a severe stricture on our system of national education? Are we not merely experimenters with expediencies bcause we are unwilling to recognize an essential and a fundamental truth? One of the resolutions adopted at the convention in Minneapolis of the National Education Association, last July, reads as follows: "We regard true education as inseperable from morality, and believe the public school the recognized agency to make this relation binding. We urge public school authorities of the country, teachers and parents to give strict attention to moral instructions in our schools as the true foundation of character and citizenship. Every consideration of good public policy and healthful social conditions point to the necessity of such instructions." This is certainly a confession of failure in our public school system, but it took seventy-five years of Catholic agitation before our public school authorities became aware of the fact, and unless we are greatly mistaken it will take many years more experimenting with morality before anything practical is done. We take the above from the Monthly Calendar of St. Mary's Church, which is published by the author ity of Rev. E. A. Murphy, pastor. It is, perhaps, not technically correct to say perjury is too common, for strictly speaking, there should be no such thing as perjury. It ought to be made odious. A person who commits perjury should be treated worse than a horse thief. If perjury is allowed to go unpunished, nobody's life or property is safe. It is seldom a person guilty of perjury is ever convicted.- Chicago Legal News. CONCERNING SOLICITORS' GOWNS. The following account of proceedings in the County Court of Brentford on the 11th inst., is given by the Daily Mail: During the hearing of judgment summonses before his honor Judge Shortt, K. C., a solicitor, a stranger to the court, rose, ungowned, and said that he was for the plaintiff in the case under consideration. For a few moments the judge gazed at him in silence, and then inquired, "Who and what are you?" "I am a solicitor, sir," replied the lawyer in a tone of surprise. "Oh, next case; this is struck out," remarked the judge. For a few seconds the solicitor stood stupefied, and then ejaculated, "What is that for?" Don't interrupt the business of the court," said not be restrained from prosecuting certain actions at his honor. It being privately explained to the solicitor that his honor made it a practice never to hear counsel or solicitors unless they were fully gowned, he exclaimed, “It is very hard.” "What is that you say?" demanded the judge; "you had better be very careful; I can send you to prison." law now pending in the courts of the State of Maryland against the committee of the person and estate of the alleged bankrupt, wherein the sum of $800 belonging to the estate of the alleged bankrupt has been attached. The committee, Abraham H. Eisenberg, who was appointed by order of the Supreme Court of this State on the 23d day of July, 1902, filed the petition The solicitor rose and walked out of court, say-in bankruptcy on behalf of the lunatic, and an ex ing in an audible "aside" as he went, "I should like to see you do it." parte adjudication made in the ordinary course, but now the attaching creditors appear specially and The judge, with outstretched hand, called out, claim that the court did not have jurisdiction to "Usher arrest that man." Immediately two officers sprang forward to do his bidding, and in a few moments the solicitor, who had by this time left the court, was brought back. entertain the petition and make the adjudication. The question presented is apparently a novel one. no authorities having been found which pass upon it No direct provisions were made in the act for proceedings by or against lunatics excepting under section 8, where it is provided that the death or As the officers were removing the solicitor to insanity of a bankrupt shall not abate the proceedanother part of the building, he exclaimed: "I anings, but the same shall be conducted and concluded "Don't hurt him, but take him to some room where he can think it over," said the judge. "I did not know the practice of this court," owes debts, except a corporation, shall be entitled to faltered the solicitor. "It is very easy to learn, and you should have donc so." retorted the judge, adding impressively: "As long as I am here everyone shall keep order, from the highest counsel to the lowest litigant." "I am very sorry," said the lawyer. "You don't appear to be very sincere in your apologies; perhaps you had better be kept in custody a little longer," retorted the judge. the benefits of the act as a voluntary bankrupt, and such general language would seemingly include the case of a lunatic, but a later section, section 59a, provides that any qualified person may file a petition to be adjudged a voluntary bankrupt, and the broad language of the earlier section is thus limited in a manner which would apparently exclude a lunatic, who manifestly is not qualified to perform the duties and assume the burdens and obligations which ac |