A.

The affidavit of Francis Troutman.

This affiant states that, as the agent and attorney of Francis Giltner, of Carroll county, Kentucky, he proceeded to the town of Marshall, in the County of Calhoun, and State of Michigan, and in company with the deputy sheriff and three Kentuckians, on the morning of the 27th January, went to a house in which they found six fugitive slaves, the property of Giltner. The slaves were directed to accompany us to the office of a magistrate; some of them were preparing to obey the summons, but before affiant could get them started, he was surrounded by a mob, which, by its violent threats, menaces, and assaults, prevented the removal of the slaves to the office of the magistrate. Affiant directed the sheriff, time after time, to discharge his duty, and he as often made an effort to do so, but so great was the excitement and violence of the mob that the officer was afraid to seize the slaves. Resolutions were offered by some of the most influential citizens of the town, which were calculated greatly to excite and encourage the negroes and abolition rabble, who constituted a part of the mob.

The negroes engaged in the mob were estimated at from forty to fifty, many of whom are fugitive slaves from Kentucky, as affiant was informed and believes. The number of persons engaged in the mob were variously estimated at from two to three hundred. All the resolutions offered by those engaged in the mob were sustained by general acclamation; many of the mob pledged their lives to sustain them, and at the same time had guns, clubs, and other weapons in their hands, with which to execute their purposes. Affiant contended for some hours with the mob, and still insisted on taking the slaves before the magistrate for trial; but the influential men of the mob told affiant that there was no need of a trial, and that any further attempt to remove the slaves would jeopard the lives of all who might make the attempt, and they were determined to prevent affiant from removing the slaves from town, even if he proved his right to do so; they stated, further, that public sentiment was opposed to southerners reclaiming fugitive slaves; and that although the law was in our favor, yet public sentiment must and should supersede the law in this and similar cases. Affiant then called upon some of the most active members of the mob to give him their names, and inform him if they considered themselves responsible for their words and actions on that occasion; they promptly gave their names to affiant, and he was told to write them in capital letters and bear them back to Kentucky, the land of slavery, as an evidence of their determination to persist in the defence of a precedent already established. The following resolution was then offered: Resolved, That these Kentuckians shall not remove from this place these (naming the slaves) by moral, physical, or legal force. It was carried by general acclamation. Affiant then directed the sheriff to summon those leading men of this mob to assist in keeping the peace; he did so, but they refused their aid, and affiant understood them to say that they would assist in preventing the arrest of the slaves. A consultation was then held by eight or ten of the mob, out some distance from the main crowd, as to whether affiant might take them before the magistrate; the decision was in the negative, and the following resolution was then offered: Resolved,

That these Kentuckians shall leave the town in two hours; (some penalty in the event of a failure was attached, which affiant does not recollect.) It was sustained by the unanimous vote of the mob.

A warrant for trespass was then issued and served upon the sheriff, affiant and company; we stood trial; the magistrate, who was an abolitionist, fined us $100. A warrant was then taken out against affiant for drawing a pistol upon a negro, and telling him to stand back, when said negro was making an attempt to force himself upon affiant and into the house where affiant had the slaves. On trial affiant proved his agency, and that the slaves were the property of Giltner, for whom he was acting as agent, yet the court recognised this affiant to appear at the next circuit court for trial.

Many were the insults offered affiant by the leading men of the mob, who informed him at the same time, that it was just such treatment as a Kentuckian deserves when attempting to recapture a slave, and that they intended to make an example of him, that others might take warning. That there had been attempts by slaveholders to reclaim slaves in their town, but that they had always been repulsed, and always shall be. The insults offered this affiant, as a private individual, were treated with a veto of silent contempt; but such as were offered him as a Kentuckian, during the time of the mob and the progress of two days' trial which succeeded, were resented in such a manner as this affiant believed the honor, dignity and independence of a Kentuckian demanded.

Given under my hand this 15th day of February, 1847.

FRANKLIN COUNTY, set:

F. TROUTMAN.

. Personally before the undersigned, a justice of the peace for said county, this day came the above named Francis Troutman, who made oath, in due form of law, to the truth of the statements as set forth in the foregoing affidavit.

Given under my hand this 15th day of February, 1847.

H. WINGATE, J. P.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, Frankfort, Ky., December 11, 1847.

SIR: The last General Assembly adopted the annexed report and resolu tions in reference to certain proceedings had in a meeting of the people of Trimble and Carroll counties in this State, which I now have the honor to forward, agreeably to the directions of the legislature.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. D. REED,

Secretary of State.

To Hon. JOSEPH R. UNDERWOOD.

WM. OWSLEY,

Governor

These proceedings disclose a state of things affecting deeply the relations of the States to each other, and to their common Union under the constitution; and the rights and duties of both are essentially involved. What laws may be and ought to be adopted by Congress, for the protection of slave-owners in reclaiming their fugitive slaves escaping into non slaveholding States, depends upon the provisions of the federal constitution, and the laws of Congress made for their enforcement, as well as upon the laws of the non slaveholding States, that may in anywise affect or interfere with the remedies which the citizens of the slaveholding States supposed were to be found in and were affected by them. The second resolution urges upon Congress the "importance of passing such laws as will fully enable the citizens of Kentucky, and the other slave States, to reclaim those slaves that may run away to the free or non-slaveholding States of the Union; that they declare by the said laws the severest penalty for their violation that the constitution of the United States will tolerate." This plainly expresses a fearful truth that the laws now in force are inadequate to reinedy the evil; or, that the non-slaveholding States will not recognise and enforce them according to the obligation which it was intended they should impose on the parties to the federal compact.

That compact originated in the interest, and was intended for the mutual security of all its members. It was adopted by wise and practical statesmen, in a mutual spirit of concession, of compromise, and of justice, and the abiding guarantee for its harmony and preservation, and perpetuity, inust be GOOD FAITH. When that ceases to operate on the confederate States, these guarantees will loose the sustaining breath of their life. They will be appealed to in vain, when there is a reluctance or aversion to observe and enforce them. There were some elements of discord arising from dissimilarity of sectional feeling more than sectional interest, to be adjusted by those who framed the federal compact. But the great and wise men upon whom the task devolved did not look upon these elements as theoretical philosophers, or speculative legislators. Nor did they suffer sectional prejudice, much less sectional bigotry, to control their counsels. All the different parties had their peculiar rights, and it was the object of all to respect and secure them in subservience to the common desire-mutual security-as one people involved in a common destiny. The slaveholding States, at that time the strongest portion, but, from obvious causes, likely to have a peculiar position, would not have entered into the confederacy without express recognition of their institutions, and without what they suppose some practical guaranty of their rights to use and enjoy them, capable of enforcement. Whilst they reserved to themselves the right of determining their own policy in reference to slaveTy, they claimed the right in the constitution of prohibiting Congress from interfering with them. Nay, more-that Congress should protect them against the interference of others, both against foreign powers and against the legislation of their confederate members. The latter entered into a constitutional pledge to give to the slaveholding States the full dominion and control over their slaves escaping into their territory, with express stipulations to deliver up to their masters or owners such fugitives as might effect their escape into a free territory.

The clause of the constitution more immediately involved in the subjectmatter of this report, is as follows: See 4th article of the constitution, sec

Mon 1:

2. "A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the Executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime."

3d clause. "No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.”

The latter clause becomes especially important in the consideration of this subject; whilst the first will show in what point of view the States from which fugitives may have gone, had a right to regard them. In both, the character of the person fleeing must be referred to the understanding and laws of the State having the original right and jurisdiction over him.

For many years the clause immediately under consideration had a selfsufficing efficacy; having all the incidents and advantages conceded to it of an extradition treaty. The common practice of the times was an honest and imposing commentary on the intention and object of the provision. A slave escaping into a non-slaveholding State could be pursued, and, in general, could be as easily apprehended there as in the State from which he had made his escape. It was not uncommon, as your committee have been informed, for judges to remand to a slave State, to be tried, a person of color, an issue involving his freedom; and State courts, and judicial and ministerial officers of non slaveholding States, were in the constant habit of using, as a matter of recognised obligation, their power and agency in bringing about the delivery of a fugitive slave to his pursuing master. The right of the owner to apprehend, where the slave could be identified as a fugitive, was not disputed, much less impeded by State laws or the violence of irresponsible mobs. The paramount authority of the constitution, and its active energy, were acknowledged by common consent. It executed its provisions by the active co-operation of State authority, in the fulfilment of what they then recognised as a constitutional duty. The duty to "deliver up" seemed to be regarded as equal to the right of the owner to demand his escaping servant. The term "deliver up" had a meaning so pregnant and obvious that it carried with it all the obligations, by common consent, growing out of its use; as it imparted a conceded right, so it was regarded as containing a perfect obligation. The dictate of good faith found in the non-slaveholding States no disposition to evade or deny its obligations. The framers of the constitution were then the living and honest expounders of its meaning and active operation. The jealousy of political interest was then not strong enough for hostile and unconstitutional legislation. Your committee are not informed that there was, in the early days of this government, any real occasion calling for remedial legislation on the part of Congress, for the purpose of enforcing the provis ions of the clause of the constitution last referred to. How long it would have continued to execute itself, must now be a matter of conjecture; and in the end it may be regarded as unfortunate that Congress ever undertook to assume any legislation on the subject, as there are many reasons to suppose that the States might have gone or in the spirit of concurrent duties, to discharge their obligations under the constitution. Until 1793, and for many years afterwards, such had been the tendency of events. The

clause of the constitution relative to persons escaping from service had never been brought to an actual test for its enforcement.

It appears from statements now before the committee, "that in the year 1791, the governor of Pennsylvania, under the provision of the constitution relative to fugitives from justice, made a demand on the governor of Virginia for the surrender and delivery of three persons who had been indicted in Pennsylvania for kidnapping a negro, and carrying him into Virginia. The governor of Virginia hesitated as to the course to be pursued, and referred the matter to the attorney general of the State, who advised that the demand ought not to be complied with. Upon this refusal, the governor of Pennsylvania addressed a communication to Congress through the President. The President accordingly laid the proceedings before Congress, and their deliberations finally resulted in the act of 1793, which was passed without opposition and is as follows:

AN ACT respecting fugitives from justice, and persons escaping from the service of their

masters.

SECTION 1. Be it enacted, &c., That whenever the executive authority of any State in the Union, or of either of the Territories northwest or south of the river Ohio, shall demand any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any such State or Territory to which such persons shall have fled, and shall, moreover, produce the copy of an indictment found, or an affidavit made, before a magistrate of any State or Territory as aforesaid, charging the person so demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the State or Territory to which such person shall have fled, to cause him or her to be arrested and secured, and notice of the arrest to be given to the executive authority making such demand, or to the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be de. livered to such agent when he shall appear. But if no agent shall appear within six months from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged. And all costs or expenses incurred in the apprehending, securing, and transmitting such fugitive to the State or Territory making such demand, shall be paid by such State or Territory.

SEC. 2. That any agent appointed as aforesaid, who shall receive the fugitive into his custody, shall be empowered to transmit him or her to the State or Territory from which he or she has fled. And if any person or persons shall, by force, set at liberty or rescue the fugitive from such agent while transporting, as aforesaid, the person or persons so offending shall, on conviction, be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars, and be imprisoned not exceeding one year.

SEC. 3. That when a person held to labor in any of the United States, or in either of the Territories northwest or south of the river Ohio, under the laws thereof, shall escape into any other of the said States or Territories, the person to whom such labor or service may be due, his agent or attorney, is hereby empowered to seize or arrest such fugitive from labor, and to take him or her before any judge of the circuit or district courts of the United States residing or being within the State, or before any migistrate of a county, city, or town corporate, wherein such seizure or arrest shall be