to the sea, where they are buried and made stone mummies of, and are for times to come a record of the storm, and of the trees it blew over, so in the wards of insane hospitals may indices to the political storms of the past be found at the present time. The extraordinary influence of conjoined action, of conjoined excitement, or of conjoined depression, is well understood; and that it leads to insanity among many, as if by the continuance of the same powerful influence, is a fact. That such influences may account for epidemics of insanity suggests itself as a probable solution of that psychological difficulty. We know that certain common physical influences powerfully affect the frequency of epileptic fits and paralytic disorders. We know, however, that common mental influences more powerfully affect such nervous disorders as hysteria; and it is to be argued that the same relation of causes to the persons influenced would produce effects corresponding to the symptoms of epidemics of insanity. It is useless to quote the threadbare story of the seven suicides at the Hôtel des Invalides. But we may mention that which occurred at Versailles, where, in 1793, when the population was only 30,000, no less than 1300 suicides occurred, and many others of a similar character are upon record. Three cases of attempted suicide occurred in Sheffield in one day only a few months ago. That such events arise from the causes above alluded to, we are inclined to believe; and that most of the explanations usually offered of such phenomena are unsatisfactory, we confidently

assert.

A more minute analysis of the connection between antecedent facts and consequent mental symptoms, would be ill-suited to the general plan of a work on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity. An assertion that the connection between organized matter and manifestations of mind is simply that of cause and effect, and is in no way different from the relation between any bodily organ and its function, would, in so far as we are concerned, be absolutely untrue. Indeed, we would deny any such relation; and although we have no right to enter upon such a discussion in this place, it is our duty to warn the reader not to expect in all cases to be able to detect disorganization of brain, accompanied by symptoms of insanity, and to expect to meet with well-marked cases of insanity where no dis

Art. "Suicide," Dict. des Sciences Med.'-Burrow's Commentaries, p. 438. † See Echo' for May last.

organization of structure is observable. Nor are we to expect to find that there is an invariable proportion between the capacity of the cranium and the amount of mental endowment. It is not so in the race, nor in the individual. This is proved by the researches of Virey, Parchappe, Desmoulins, and others. Nor, where it does occur, are we to look for a traceable proportion between the two classes of phenomena. Many die insane, the insanity simply having been functional derangement through the sympathy of living parts. No trace of structural decay is observable as a post-mortem symptom. Enough, however, has been said concerning the causes of insanity.

CHAPTER III.

OF UNSOUNDNESS OF MIND.

BEFORE it is possible clearly to understand the meaning of the term unsoundness of mind it is, perhaps, necessary to understand what is meant by the term sanity. A deviation can only be appreciated when that from which it is a deviation is known. Now, we say that a person who conducts himself in every respect like his neighbours is sane. A man who is aware of his position, who is conscious of the significance of the objects which surround him, who has certain ends in view, and whose conduct is influenced by his desire to attain those ends a man who in all these things resembles the ordinary people of the class he lives amongst, may be regarded as sane. Any judgment upon a question of sanity or insanity must be made upon the ground of experience, and our experience of the ordinary conduct of the bulk of mankind must guide us in determining the questions which arise as to sanity or insanity of individuals. Thus, before the time of Galileo, had a man believed that the earth went round the sun, and had that belief been founded upon no evidence, but arisen as delusions generally do, the experience of the conduct of belief of the bulk of mankind would have led to the conclusion that this man was mad, and it would have been right. For it was not merely the ordinary belief of mankind that the sun went round the earth, which has since been found to be an error; but it was the belief of mankind that it is usual for ordinary men to be induced to change a belief from one tenet to another, not arbitrarily, but upon some ground; and if no such reason as would influence the minds of ordinary men exists, then the test of our experience would lead us to determine that this man's conduct was not that of other men. As, therefore, we give the name of sane to the set of circumstances which constitute the conduct of the latter, we give the name of insane to the set of circumstances which constitute the conduct of the former. This man would not have been called mad because he believed the truth, but because he believed a thing which he had every reason not to

believe. A belief in a truth may be a delusion.

a prejudice in the flesh.

A delusion is just

It has been said that by madness "a lawyer means conduct of a certain character, a physician means a certain disease one of the effects of which is to produce such conduct."* And it has been argued that these two different definitions may have caused the widely different conclusions at which the members of those two professions have arrived. But, perhaps, there is more ingenuity than truth in this description. Medical men infer the existence of disease from symptoms. Some of the most important symptoms which are indicative of the presence of mental disease are to be found in the acts and words of an individual. Even at the present time the greatest difficulty would be felt by the most accomplished expert in determinating the presence of mental disease without the cognizance of these facts, and a diagnosis would be impossible under such circumstances unless he had the advantage of viewing the expression which has resulted from the acts and thoughts of the individual, just as a certain precipitate results from certain kinds of chemical action. A face is a history. Seeing, then, that medical men infer the presence of the disease which they call madness from conduct of a certain character, and that lawyers, according to Mr. Fitzjames Stephens, mean by madness "conduct of a certain character," although they really mean the something which underlies that conduct, the distinction drawn is rather apparent than real. The cause of the difference of opinion which has been described would more probably be found in other circumstances. That lawyers have been too apt to regard insanity as one simple disease, and the fact that thinking thus, and having as they believed found a good legal test for the irresponsibility of those who laboured under it, they applied this test to other diseases as distinct from that to which it was in the first instance applicable, as toothache is from lock-jaw, may to some extent account for the slow progress which that profession has made towards a correct scientific knowledge of this most intricate subject. But lawyers are most conservative of law. When the judges were asked whether capital punishment should be abandoned for the theft of the amount of five shillings they all said "No." We laugh at them now, and yet in other things the judges of the present day are possibly quite as conservative. As a rule, perhaps, the opinion.

*Fitzjames Stephens' Criminal Law of England,' p. 87.

of a man who has worked long and successfully under a certain system is almost valueless with regard to its faults or merits. Reformers are either men who have suffered under a system, or boys. These tendencies may have led to the tardiness of the legal profession to acknowledge more than one kind of insanity, and to a refusal, by its members, to acknowledge a test—which may with reason have been applied to the determination of the responsibility and capacity of those persons who laboured under one phase of this disease-as utterly inapplicable to many persons who were affected with other kinds of insanity.

But, as we have seen, medical men are not blameless. Physicians with the amplest opportunities for observation have neglected to become thoroughly acquainted with the disease which it was their duty to treat. It is only in recent times that the pathology of insanity has occupied the attention of those who have the means of becoming acquainted with it. Should those careful researches which are at present being prosecuted in our large hospitals for the insane make the progress that the zeal of those conducting them gives us a right to expect, we may hope for better things in future from medical witnesses, and, as a direct consequence, we may expect a more intelligent recognition of undoubted scientific results upon the part of the legal profession. As yet, however, the knowledge of the pathological changes which take place in various kinds of mental disease is very limited. And some anomalies have arisen in the progress of the research which would seem to indicate results which would scarcely have been anticipated; we refer to the frequent discovery of structural changes in the brain which have given rise to no derangement of the functions of that organ, and in other cases the observation of disturbed functions without the discovery of much of any organic changes.

Some classification of the various kinds of mental disease is

absolutely necessary. And it is of more importance to those persons who look at insanity from the legal than to those who look at it from the medical point of view. However, there are very many occasions upon which medical men are called upon to give evidence as to the soundness or unsoundness of mind, and for those who are so called to bear testimony such a classification will not be without its value. Those occasions are likely to increase rather than to diminish in number, for a large section of the medical profession