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III.

concert.

A very pretty musical and slightly dramatic per- CHAP. formance was given, towards the close of the invest- Loretto ment, by the Loretto Convent schoolgirls, with the Convent object of raising a fund for improving the cemetery. No charge was made, but a collection at the end was liberally responded to by a large audience. The opening scene displayed little dots of only three years, singing merrily at "Pussy-cat's tea-party," all looking rosy and hearty, and showing that the state of siege had hitherto had only a beneficial influence with them. Then followed numerous quartet, duet, and solo performances on the piano, with pupils up to eighteen; and afterwards a short operetta. The songs, "From fair Savoy I come," and "Buy a broom," still linger in our ears; and we seem to see again the little Prosch, with bewitching charm of eye and manner, beseeching the audience to purchase her stockin-hand.

band.

In all these performances the band of the Royal Fusilier Scots Fusiliers, as the orchestra, took a prominent part, under the direction of their accomplished bandmaster, Mr Daniels. A favourite, sweetly plaintive air, reported to have been sung as a lullaby by the Boer women when trekking in former troublous times, and since to have been suggested as the National National Anthem of the South African Republic, was often the South played with great effect. A kind and talented musi- Republic. cal friend has from memory furnished us with the following setting:

Hymn of

African

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III.

A certain proportion of the volunteers from the CHAP. Convent and Jail Laagers were allowed to attend the Headquarter Camp entertainments, but always equipped with their arms, ready for action. It formed a curious, weird sort of picture, looking from the stage on the mass of men, women, and children, sitting on benches, surrounded at the back and sides by a deep body of standing figures, conspicuous with rifles and bandoliers, and a background of tents and other martial appearances, with the sentinels' challenges heard every now and then, distant and near, the upturned faces at one moment dark from passing cloud, and the next whitened by the flood of soft light poured down by a South African moon.

attacks

enemy's

Some casualties happened, now and again, with the Losses in patrols and reconnoitring parties; but it was in the on the attacks of which there were three, 6th and 16th positions. January, and 12th February-on the Boer positions, that the greatest loss was experienced. This, of course, was only what might be expected, since the defenders of rugged and naturally strong positions have an enormous advantage over the assailants, who, besides, in this case, were subjected to flank attack, from the reinforcements coming up from the adjoining laagers on either side.

The value of such attacks on distant strongholds, with the certainty, even though successful in temporarily wresting them from the enemy, of losing many men-and those of the most reliable sort, who might be wanted later on-was always questionable;

III.

CHAP. but the purposelessness and inutility of these encounters became more apparent, when it was recognised-by all but a hot-headed few, incapable of correctly forecasting the military situation, or else willing to risk reverse in an anxiety to force events-that the resistance the Boers were capable of offering would be such as to stop Sir George Colley's advance, until reinforcements could reach him from England; and that the General had been over-sanguine in notifying that he would reach Standerton by the 21st January.'

Diversions of such a nature on the approach of a relieving force-in accordance with a desire understood to have been expressed by Sir George Colley, when leaving Pietermaritzburg for the frontier-would have served an intelligible object; but when it became plain after the 7th February, on receipt of the news of Sir George Colley's check on the 28th January, that no relief force could be near, it would have been prudent to have refrained from uselessly engaging the garrison in more resultless actions, causing additional losses to the already, in truth, small enough reliable body of men left to cope with future possible emergencies, and thus avoid the chance of adding another to the frequent disasters-referred

1 See ante, Colonel Bellairs's remarks of Jan. 17, pp. 157, 158. Lieut.Colonel Gildea also, in his report on the Elandsfontein fight, showed how greatly he was impressed with the impracticability of achieving any decided success against the Boers without a sufficient force of cavalry. He said: "The Boers in this instance did not keep up their character for being good shots, though they excelled any previous performance of theirs I have seen in their rapidity of movement and their wonderful power of taking cover; and I am more convinced than ever that no real victory will ever be gained over them without a strong force of cavalry."

to in a previous note-recently incurred, or even then taking place, to British arms in South Africa.

The foregoing reflections are partially illustrated in the failure of an attack on the Red House Laager, on the 12th February-undertaken, it was afterwards whispered, in deference to the expressed opinion of the Administrator, the officer commanding the troops considering that the time for making such an attack or diversion, in the absence of the approach of a relief column, had not arrived, and would serve no purpose.

CHAP.

III.

the 12th

The enemy's positions had been already attacked to Attack of the east and to the west, columns having marched ten February. or eleven miles out for the purpose, with no inconsiderable risk attaching to their return journey-by which time the enemy had concentrated their forces. As an attack was to be adventured, the question arose, in what quarter? Colonel Bellairs was of opinion that a front attack of the Wonderboom position, to the north, would probably entail the loss of a hundred or more men; and even if taken, it would at the end of the day have to be evacuated, when it could again be occupied by the enemy. If that position was to be attacked, he was in favour of a force being sent round by the Derde Poort, to operate to the rear, while an attack in front was threatened or progressing. Officers commanding mounted corps considered-and were no doubt right-that their horses were not in a condition to perform the work which an 1 See ante, p. 3.

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