I. CHAP. "1. That the Government of this province, as at present constituted, has failed to secure the confidence or the support of its inhabitants. 2. That a representative form of government is desirable, and has become necessary, to ensure the re-establishment of confidence and to secure the support of the inhabitants of the Transvaal." Mr White made an incisive speech, forcibly dilating upon the dangerous condition of the country, and insisting upon the urgency for granting the representative institutions promised at the time of the annexation-three years and eight months before. Although Mr White stood alone in the House in pressing for this immediate change in the form of government, there is little doubt that the feelings of the larger section of the English-speaking population of the Transvaal were up to this period with him in respect to his motion.1 Imprudent reduction force. From the moment the act of annexation was deof military clared irrevocable, and it was determined that the time had not arrived when a representative constitution could be safely granted, it should have been apparent that we could only rule the Transvaal by force, and that consequently a sufficient number of British troops to ensure the stability of the Government was absolutely essential. As has been shown, from whatever side the general situation of the province in 1880 is viewed, everything pointed to this conclusion. After the capture of Sekukuni's stronghold, and 1 See Appendix B. I. until the apprehended danger was past which was CHAP. feared from the national mass meeting-called for the 6th April, but postponed owing to the anticipated change of Ministry in England, and expected rendition of the country through Mr Gladstone's advent to power a considerable body of troops remained detached over the province or massed at Pretoria. Then the forces were reduced, Sir Garnet Wolseley leaving for Natal, and soon after for England. force in the May 1880. The troops left in the Transvaal at this period Military numbered about 3600, consisting of one cavalry Transvaal, regiment, three battalions of infantry, part of a battery of field artillery, one company of engineers, and detachments of the commissariat, transport, ordnance, and hospital corps; in fact, a complete little force of all arms, under the command of MajorGeneral the Hon. H. Clifford until the middle of May, when that officer was relieved by Colonel W. Bellairs. only The troops have tered, no being scat longer for and midable. This force, had it been kept together, or detached within supporting distances, would been formidable, but through being broken up widely scattered, it lost much of its power. As it may be gathered from opinions expressed at other times by Sir Garnet Wolseley, that that general was very averse to, and recognised the imprudence of thus breaking up a regular military force, it can only be inferred that the wishes of the Administrator in that arrangement were deferred to then, as unfortunately they were said to have been later on by Sir George Colley, when he visited the Transvaal in August, Sir George having replaced It is well known that Colonel Bellairs, from the time he arrived in the country, had unceasingly drawn attention to the faulty disposition of the troops, and, while strongly deprecating any reduction, particularly in cavalry and transport services, had pressed for greater concentration; but his well-founded apprehensions were not believed in, owing, it must be supposed, to the nature of the reports which continued to be received at this period by the Imperial Government and Sir George Colley, from the Administrator. It is true that three of the detached military posts-those of Heidelberg, Middleburg, and Lulu Mountains-were given up in August and September; but, as a considerable reduction of the troops -nearly one-half the total strength, one cavalry regiment, one infantry battalion, and a large portion of the transport and branch services-was effected at about the same time, the detached positions,-Standerton, Wakkerstroom, Lydenburg, Marabastadt, and Rustenburg,-which were retained, thus became even more isolated and difficult to communicate with than previously. 1 Colonel Sir G. Pomeroy-Colley, when selected for this civil and military appointment, stood about 245th on the list of colonels. In order to give him supreme military command-Colonel Bellairs being much senior in date of commission-it became necessary to give him temporary higher rank. He was accordingly made Local Major General. I. reduction ill chosen. The time selected to effect this reduction of the CHAP. troops was specially ill chosen-just after the Cape Parliament had rejected the Conference proposals;1 and when the Boer leaders had returned, strengthened by the sympathy they had met with from their fellow-countrymen and well-wishers at the Cape. gerous remained The situation, in regard to the malcontents, had The danin no way altered for the better. If there had been situation no fresh mass meetings or demonstrations in the the same. country, the explanation was simple: it was the cold dry season, when, as customary, it was necessary for the farmers to remain in the distant bushveld, where their cattle could obtain good grazing, and greater warmth and protection than on the highveld. That quiet season over, they, in ordinary course, would return to their homesteads, and, as arranged, assemble at the January meeting, when they might be expected to become as troublesome or more so than before. in system ment. Neither, on our side, had there been any departure No change from the high-handed system of government in vogue, of governor effort made to conciliate the leaders and people, which could at all warrant running the risk of having to encounter insurrection with insufficient means to overcome it. It would surely have been prudentas at the time was forcibly urged by Colonel Bellairs -to have delayed the consideration of reduction until after the January meeting, and the intentions of the leaders had been better ascertained. As it was, the action partook something of the nature of a gambler's 1 See ante, p. 5. CHAP. I. Economy sought for in wrong direction. The troops healthy teric fever. stake on chance-to effect an economy of a few thousands. Economy was sought for in the wrong direction. It would have been better and safely gained by concentrating, instead of unwisely reducing, and yet not then concentrating the remaining troops. The out-stations, being at long distances from headquarters, cost enormously; largely increased commissariat, transport, ordnance, and medical services were necessary; great loss was incurred of stores in transit and on the spot from deterioration, want of cover, supervision, &c.; and excessive destruction of waggons, animals, and transport equipment took place, as only those who have had experience of the roads or tracks of that country at different seasons can possibly understand. To these items for extra expenditure, generally entailed by such outlying, and, to the soldier, more or less unsatisfactory posts, might be added others caused by increased sickness, insubordination, and desertion. But for the occasional appearance of typhoid or but for en enteric fever, the result of drinking water charged with organic matter, generally when on the march, the troops were particularly healthy, as might be expected in such a fine climate as that on the highveld. Continued observation and careful investigation into the origin of each case had enabled BrigadeSurgeon Skeen, the principal medical officer, to arrive at the conclusion that the fever was wholly due to |