VI.

and to the Native Commissioner, residing some miles CHAP. off, at Klipsdam, warning and directing them to concentrate with their men, arms, &c., at the fort. Captain Thompson acted with rapidity and circumspection, and brought his detachment safely in on the following morning. Mr Dahl, through a wrong interpretation of the order delivered, thought he would do better to remain where he was, and, in consequence, was taken prisoner the next day with all his arms and ammunition.

The receipt of the cipher message caused renewed energy to be given day and night towards strengthening the fort—an intrenchment of 25 yards square. A well was also commenced, but the nature of the soil rendered the work very laborious and tedious. All provisions found in the stores and houses in the vicinity were seized for the use of the garrison, as also supplies of forage, vegetables, &c. The Boers were at this time in two laagers-one at Sand Spruit, eight miles distant, and the other at Botha's Farm, six miles. They did not attempt to interrupt these proceedings, perhaps not being then sufficiently organised. On the 11th January the Boer Commandant, Barend Vorster, sent a letter to Captain Brook to the effect that, unless he ceased from further seizures of corn, the property of the Burghers, steps would be taken to stop, what he termed, such unnecessary acts. The following day the Landdrost of the district received at the hands of an armed party a letter from the Boer Government, dated Heidelberg, 6th January, desiring him to surrender his keys, whereupon his

CHAP.
VI.

office and some public moneys were taken forcible possession of.

Skirmish. On the 19th January a mounted patrol-fifteen police under Captain Thompson, and ten volunteers under Conductor Stott of the Commissariat staffwere sent to reconnoitre the Sand Spruit laager. When five miles out, they were suddenly attacked by a greatly superior force. The police, who were in advance, were driven in, leaving one man killed and two wounded in the hands of the enemy. Two others were also wounded. The party then fell back on the camp, the retirement being covered by the volunteers. Several Boers were said to have been hit. The Boer Commandant afterwards sent to inform Captain Brook that he could send a cart, with a flag, of truce, to remove the dead man; that the two wounded prisoners would be properly cared for; and that he, Captain Brook, must keep quiet for the future, or stand the consequences. From this message it would seem as if the Boer Commandant did not at this period desire to make any direct attack on the garrison, provided the latter did not move out.

Loss of cattle and horses.

After this skirmish, however, the enemy's patrols approached nearer. The high ground north of the camp admitted of any number concealing themselves during the night, in readiness to surprise or attack the vedettes and outlying parties proceeding from the camp at daybreak to take up positions for the protection of the cattle and horses when grazing. These outposts were frequently thus driven in, and the

grazing-ground restricted. About the third week in February the police horses and most of the oxen were captured. Our vedettes were surprised and fell back, when, with almost incredible celerity, the oxen were driven off, and some of the horses having been hit by the enemy's fire, the whole stampeded. After this the enemy occupied the ridges of the hills commanding the fort, and closely invested the position, patrolling constantly around out of range. Fire was kept up on the fort during the day.

CHAP.
VI.

works.

About the end of February, the enemy threw up Boer earthworks on commanding sites at 800 yards' distance. These were, with the exception of one on what was called the Signal Kopje, open to the rear, to enable their being fired into from trenches placed on positions further back. In case of serious attack, the defenders were to deliver a rapid fire, and then retire on their second line. The Boers were well aware that, even if we took one of their front positions, we should not be able to continue to hold it, and anticipated inflicting greater loss by falling back and drawing us on.

posting

As soon as it became dark, sentries were pushed Method of out from the fort towards the enemy's positions, sentries. advantage being taken of any slight rise in the ground or other covering offering. This was also the Boer method of guarding against surprise, their sentries lying down in pairs. For night defence the Boers were supplied with elephant guns loaded with loopers, formidable weapons at close quarters.

CHAP.

VI.

Boer can

non.

On the 17th March, two old ship carronades-the one a 6-pounder and the other a 3- or 4-pounderwhich had been discovered on Mr Dahl's premises, were brought into action. The round-shot used, being made of beaten iron, taken from the Ersterling Gold Mining Company's works, must have occasioned considerable labour in their manufacture. Considering the nature of these guns and their projectiles, the Boers served them with fair accuracy, and such concealment that it was found impossible to silence them. Working-parties had to be employed by reliefs through each night to repair the damage done, and render the weak points of the fort safe. Sergeant-Major Freeth of the police was mortally wounded by one of the round-shots the first day the cannons opened; but from then to the close of the siege the garrison were so well kept under cover that, though there were many narrow shaves, no one was seriously injured by them. A man was kept constantly on the look-out. As soon as he saw smoke from the discharge of a gun, he blew a warning note on a railway whistle, when immediately all sought cover. Many casualties would have occurred had not this order been rigidly insisted upon. Latterly, taking cover on such a warning became so much a habit, that, after fighting was over, much laughter was caused when, on a man blowing the whistle, numbers ran for cover.

As Captain Brook was able to keep his men sufficiently sheltered from the Boer fire, he did not carry out an attack, at first projected, on the battery.

VI.

With the object of maturing such a plan, he had CHAP. sent out some of the Bastard Police at night to obtain information of the nature of the position. These men managed to pass through the enemy's lines, and to lie hidden the following day on the range of hills to the south of the fort, taking observations, and then return after dark. The idea was thus formed to pass out similarly a portion of the garrison during the night, and at daybreak to surprise the battery by an attack in front and rear. The main difficulty would have been to have escaped the observation of the enemy's patrols, so constantly moving from one position to another; but it was thought that the sortie could have been successfully accomplished.

At Natives.

The natives of the district were most loyal. the commencement, when the intelligence arrived that hostilities had broken out, Captain Brook had summoned all the chiefs-representing some 50,000 fighting men and had ordered them to keep quiet. They could not, however, understand why they were not allowed to help us in fighting the Boers. Being further informed that the garrison required corn and mealies, supplies were run in by natives at night. Frequent messages passed by their agency to and from Pretoria; once or twice, though, failing through capture. Attempts were also made to communicate with the garrison at Lydenburg, but it was believed without success.

The well was sunk to a depth of 35 feet. Owing Waterto continuous rains it was frequently filled to the

supply.