The Imperial Government would certainly not have sanctioned such a risky reduction, but that they had been led astray, through receiving what they deemed reliable reports, satisfying them that all danger was past, and no further fear need be entertained of insurrection,

CHAP.

I.

departure

Dragoon

By October the regiment was on its way to India. Effect of Its departure-announced far and wide by advertise- of King's ments of the sale of its horses, &c.,-could not have Guards. failed to attract great attention, and have deeply influenced the disaffected Boers in all their subsequent movements and decisions.

A mounted troop of the Transport Service Corps followed, but, together with a detachment of the King's Dragoon Guards, were detained in Natal, awaiting transport to proceed to their depots in England, when, hostilities breaking out, they were immediately remounted, at some trouble and expense, and utilised by Sir George Colley at Laing's Nek, in the January following.

infantry.

The only remaining mounted military force left in Mounted the Transvaal consisted of about one hundred men, taken from the two infantry battalions. This body was used, partly to furnish escorts to Government officials engaged in visiting or collecting taxes in the native districts, and partly in look-out parties to check desertion. A proposal made by Colonel Bellairs, on the removal of the King's Dragoon Guards, to largely increase the number of mounted infantry, profiting by the horses and saddlery of the departing regiment for that purpose, was not entertained, the

CHAP. political outlook being considered such as not to warrant such an expenditure.

I.

Inopportune mo

ment chosen to offer assistance to Cape Government.

Three hundred armed men thus drawn away.

As if to show yet further how little apprehensive they were of any disturbance taking place, the local government took this inopportune time,-the close of October-soon after the loss of the cavalry regiment, with a reduction of the total military force by nearly one-half,-to offer assistance to the Cape Government-then prosecuting a war against the Basutos-by raising and equipping, in Pretoria, a mounted volunteer corps of 300 men, under Commandant Ferriera, C.M.G., a volunteer officer who had greatly distinguished himself in previous border warfare. As the Government had no ordnance stores available for this purpose, the consent of Sir George Colley was obtained for the required rifles, &c., to be supplied from the military store.1 Two fieldguns were also issued from the local government

stores.

Thus, 300 more armed men-of the material best adapted to act as a mounted levy in the coming struggle together with an experienced commander, whose knowledge of the country and people would have proved most valuable, were lost; drawn away to take part in a native war with which the province

1 The rifles intended to replace those supplied to Ferriera's Horse— urgently demanded by the officer commanding the troops in the Transvaal in October-were, apparently, only sent from Pietermaritzburg in the early part of December. The delay was fatal, and they failed to reach their destination. See paragraph 4 of Sir George Colley's letter to Sir Owen Lanyon, in Blue-book [c.-2783], February 1881. Enclosure 3 to No. 14.

I.

had no concern whatever, and from the results of CHAP. which it had nothing to fear.

force in

When November arrived - prior to the develop- Military ment of the Bezuidenhout affair-the military forces Transvaal, were thus spread over the country, viz. :

Pretoria (199 miles from Newcastle).-Headquarters and

five companies of 2d battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers; mounted troop of do.; four guns, N battery, 5th brigade, Royal Artillery; one company Royal Engineers. Rustenburg (67 miles from Pretoria).-Two companies of 2d battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers.

Marabastadt (165 miles from Pretoria).-Two companies of 94th Regiment.

Lydenberg (188 miles from Pretoria).—Headquarters and two companies of 94th Regiment.

Wakkerstroom (162 miles from Pretoria; 33 miles from Newcastle). One company of 94th Regiment; mounted troop of do.

Standerton (114 miles from Pretoria; 85 miles from Newcastle).—One company of 94th Regiment.

November 1880.

Natal.

In Natal there were two infantry battalions-the Force in 58th Regiment, recently withdrawn from the Transvaal, and the 3d battalion 60th Rifles-two guns, Royal Artillery, one company Royal Engineers, and one company of the 94th Regiment, the last being stationed at Newcastle, the nearest military post to the Transvaal border.

transport

The transport service in the Transvaal having been Insufficient reduced, there were no longer the same means for for mobilmobilising the whole of the troops as previously.

1 See ante, pp. 26-28.

isation.

I.

CHAP. Transport was only kept up for mobilising a small column at Pretoria, one company at Rustenburg, and one company at Marabastadt. The remaining outlying garrisons were now regarded as stationary posts. The strange belief entertained by the governing entertained powers would appear to have been, that the presence

False im

pression

by Govern

ment of of a British detachment, however small, - even of

moral

effect of detached posts.

Detached

posts in Kafir

wars.

Altered

conditions require

changes

infantry alone though surrounded by an armed mounted population,-should suffice to overawe and control the district in which it was placed-no matter how distant from support-and so prevent any thought of insurrection.

In the Kafir wars of 1851-53, and 1877-78, small infantry posts, separated by only a short march, were usefully employed, and suited to the character of the operations necessary to subdue the enemy; but here, in the Transvaal, were isolated, weak infantry detachments, from 70 to 200 miles apart, without cavalry support or transport, in the midst of an armed disaffected white people, and in a country where the rivers and streams, at certain seasons, become impassable for days or even weeks together. Was it supposed that, because such posts might serve to keep in check a native population, they would equally answer the same purpose with the Boers? It would seem so.

Each war that we have undertaken of late years in South Africa has necessitated complete change in in tactics. tactics and mode of operations, to meet the altered circumstances which arose in each case. has happened in New Zealand and Indian campaigns.

The same

I.

No army but that of England has had so frequently CHAP. to adapt itself to sudden change-to re-educate itself -at short notice, for the ever-varying localities of hostilities.

The Kafir war of 1877-78, on the Cape eastern frontier, partook mainly of the character of bushfighting the natives taking to the dense bush and forests, and having to be driven out by skirmishing parties. Then followed the Zulu war, when we became the defending, the natives the assailing party -we in square or laager formations, awaiting the enemy's onslaught. In the Sekukuni operations, this latter method was reversed, we having to attack the natives, hidden behind their strong rocky fastnesses.

The Boer hostilities introduced a different element from our previous experiences in warfare-an enemy wholly mounted, with the hunter's training and eye for cover and distance. As shown, we neglected to provide an adequate mounted force to meet this new contingency, with the result that the detached garrisons in the Transvaal were reduced to act chiefly on the defensive; while the general officer on the Natal border, not having the patience to await his cavalry reinforcements, then on their way from England and India, suffered defeat for the want of them.

zuidenhout

It was during the early part of the month of The BeNovember that the proceedings taken by the Govern- affair. ment in the Bezuidenhout affair-which had been going on for some weeks-culminated in a crisis and

1 See ante, pp. 39-41.