I. position, jail, and public buildings; Captain Fulls, CHAP. of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, who, together with Major Clarke-Special Commissioner-Captain Raaf, and twenty volunteers, held the public buildings, had been killed, and several men wounded. This intelligence was supplemented, from Boer sources, by the further information that the public buildings had been taken, together with their defenders. the Bronk Spruit But the morning of the 21st December brought still News of more gloomy news into Pretoria, spreading dismay and horst consternation through the town, and intensifying the disaster. already growing ill-feeling against the Boers-the intelligence that the headquarters detachment of the 94th Regiment had been surprised the previous day, when on the march about 37 miles off, every officer and man having been killed, wounded, or taken prisoner. It had been calculated that Lieut.-Colonel Anstruther, having at length been able to cross the Oliphant, might reach Botha's Pass, a dangerous defile, 16 to 20 miles from Pretoria, on the 21st; so, accordingly, Lieut.-Colonel Gildea had been instructed by Colonel Bellairs to proceed in that direction at an early hour that day, with the double object of bringing in forage from a farmhouse nine miles away-the same one mentioned hereafter as visited by Captain Burr on the 5th January—and, with the mounted men, feeling for or giving assistance to the 94th detachment in the neighbourhood of Botha's Pass. For this purpose, a company of infantry, with a Krupp gun carried on a waggon, and I. CHAP. all the available mounted men-sixty-moved off at two o'clock. The morning was dark; they had proceeded only about two miles out when two weary, footsore men, both slightly wounded, were discovered in the hands of the advanced scouts, thrown out for the protection of the town. These were Conductor Egerton of the Commissariat and Transport Department, and Sergeant Bradley of the 94th Regiment, who, allowed by the Boers, had left the fatal ground of Bronkhorst Spruit soon after the conflict, and for eleven long hours had trudged through the dark night to Pretoria, there to tell the sad tale of disaster. They were at once mounted on horses, and by four o'clock Mr Egerton was making his report to Colonel Bellairs, and delivering an urgent message for surgical help. Arrangements were quickly made. A civil practitioner, Dr Harvey Crow, was engaged to go out and remain with such of the wounded as would not be able to be moved; and this gentleman, in company with Surgeon-Major Comerford-who was to return some hospital orderlies, and two ambulances, were soon on the road to render the assistance asked for. The Rev. Father Meyer also accompanied the party. 73 CHAPTER II. THE BRONKHORST SPRUIT DISASTER.1 CHAP. The Lyden burg de tachment Pretoria. THE circumstances which led to and attended the despatch of the order for calling in the greater portion of the Lydenburg detachment of the 94th Regiment to Pretoria have been already alluded ordered to to.2 This means for concentrating more troops at Pretoria did not recommend itself as the best to the officer commanding the troops, and it was not his intention to have interfered with the Lydenburg garrison; but such was that officer's anxiety to obtain additional troops for the formation of a field column, that he at once acquiesced in Sir Owen Lanyon's proposal, and promptly took steps to give effect to it. The orders reached Lieut.-Colonel Anstruther at Nature of 10.30 A.M. on the 27th November. Among other tions sent. 1 Several more or less unreliable accounts, purporting to describe the Bronkhorst Spruit affair, have appeared at different times; but we have not met with any so correctly, clearly, and intelligently written as that which was given some months later-1st June 1881-in the ‘Natal Witness.' Full official reports will be found in Blue-book (c.-2866), pp. 130-149. 2 See ante, pp. 53-56. instruc II. deficient of mobilising. CHAP. things for his guidance, he was therein informed that his withdrawal from Lydenburg was to be considered as only a temporary measure; that he should march without delay; and that the senior commissariat officer was by the same messenger-sending instructions regarding transport and other arrangements. Lydenburg The power of rapidly mobilising the outlying garrimeans for sons—so necessary in the circumstances in which the troops were placed, in a country where transport is invariably a standing difficulty-had, from motives of false economy, been withdrawn in September, notwithstanding that Colonel Bellairs had deprecated such action, and had urged the expediency of waiting at least a few months, until after the mass meeting -then called for January-had taken place. The Lydenburg garrison was thenceforward to be regarded as stationary, and a very small amount of transport, only adequate for local camp purposes, was allowed to remain. Now that the garrison was urgently required to march, the troops became wholly dependent upon the people they were supposed to hold in check for the transport required to enable them to move. Difficulty in hiring Tenders for the supply of waggons for the march transport. were called for, and the commissariat officer either went himself, or sent to the farmers in the neighbourhood, to endeavour to obtain the number wanted. Great reluctance was exhibited to furnish them, and they were only eventually obtained at high rates of hiring, and by guaranteeing their owners against loss through action of an enemy or swollen rivers, at high valuations-waggons at £150, and oxen at £10 CHAP. each. II. quantity port re the com officer. In the written instruction relating to transport- Excessive sent by the Assistant Commissary-General of Trans- of transport at Pretoria to Deputy-Assistant Commissary- quired by General Carter at Lydenburg-it was intimated that manding on no account should more than a dozen waggons accompany the troops, but that fewer should suffice. The officer commanding, however, demanded twentysix ox-waggons, in addition to an ox-waggon, two mulewaggons, a water-cart, and an ox-ambulance already in possession. Mr Carter objected that this number was largely in excess of that allowed by regulation, and the instructions he had received. Lieut.-Colonel Anstruther, nevertheless, overruled the objection, ordered Mr Carter to furnish that number of waggons, and said that he himself would take all responsibility. Two additional waggons were later on requisitioned for the conveyance of fuel, and even two more on the eve of departure, but could not be obtained. An oxwaggon was also hired for the regimental canteen. tachment denburg. Finally, the detachment-consisting of nine officers, The de254 non-commissioned officers and men, three women, leaves Lyand two children-moved off on the morning of the 5th December, taking with it a convoy of thirty oxwaggons, two mule-waggons, one water-cart, and one ox - ambulance, with probably about sixty native drivers and foreloopers. Eight days had been consumed in collecting the hired transport. It is reasonable to believe that, had it been only sought to meet the legitimate requirements of the detachment on the |