South (Kokang). Of course, at a time when she was herself engaged in systematic intervention, it was not convenient to adopt the policy of the Monroe Doctrine for Chinese affairs. But recently France, Russia, and Germany have shown a disposition to allow the nibbling process to degenerate into a devouring appetite, and the time has come for England to say: "Stop! We do not regard China as a place for conquest or colonization by any European or other power!" True, the other powers interested in China are not quite ready to accept the present Asiatic status quo: but no doubt after their respective hungers are stilled, they will join the satisfied John Bull in composing an East Asiatic Balance of Power; and will all agree on a scheme of joint intervention in case any state should venture upon disturbing the mutually satisfactory arrangement.

These modern instances confirm the rule that intervention is justified in all cases in which the safety of the intervening state or combination of states demands it; in which the self-preservation of a state whose free development has been wrongfully interfered with warrants it; in which its object is to uphold the independence of a state first attacked, not to destroy the sovereignty of the state against which the intervention is undertaken.

The grounds upon which intervention is ordinarily claimed to be permitted, are referred by Mr. Hall, in his Treatise on International Law, to the following four causes: First: The right of self-preservation;

Second: The right to oppose wrong-doing;

Third: The duty to fulfil engagements;

Fourth Friendship for one of two parties in a state. The first class of interventions: those undertaken to enforce the right of self-preservation have already been discussed. No one seriously denies their legality. The second class, interventions made with the object of enforcing the right to oppose wrong-doing, may be directed either against illegal acts or against immoral acts. It is clear that there can be no efficient international law if no check

or punishment is provided for the commission of acts contrary to law. If a state goes outside the region of legal acts, the outer circle in our imaginary diagram, it infringes upon the rights of other states, and commits, therefore, an illegal intervention. The only remedy against such a wrong is intervention. International society would be in a state of anarchy without this remedy. Interventions directed against immmoral acts of other states stand on a different legal footing. The fundamental idea of international law is that it treats of dealings between state and state, and has nothing to do with the internal composition of states, or with acts done by the individuals of a state and directed against other individuals of the same state. "Tyrannical conduct of a government towards its subjects, massacres and brutality in a civil war, or religious persecution, are acts which have nothing to do directly or indirectly with such relations." (Hall, p. 302). Every state commits, at times, acts which would be located in the disapproved region between the circle of moral acts and that of legal acts; some have sanctioned the institution of slavery within their boundaries; others have outraged the moral sense of humanity by a heartless persecution of a portion of their population. To nations, as well as to men, is directed the admonition, "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her." Interventions undertaken on humanitarian grounds have no standing in international law in its present stage of development. Nevertheless, "intervention for the purpose of checking gross tyranny, or of helping the efforts of a people to free itself is very commonly regarded without disfavor." (Hall, p. 303.) The reason for this is that there is a tendency towards consolidation of individual national interests into the paramount interests of humanity, a development into an organic body of states. Some day when this body reaches an effective organization, it may legislate for all states and enforce its laws by interventions undertaken against a recalcitrant member of the society by a combination of

forces. As long as this organization is not perfected, however, a state intervening in the internal affairs of another on humanitarian grounds can, at most, have the moral satisfaction of knowing that a higher development of international law-such as the future may realize-will some day sanction its act; judged by the standards of international law as it actually is, however, this kind of intervention is outside the law.

The third class of interventions is those undertaken on the ground of a previous treaty engagement. Suppose two states, X and Y, have formed a treaty of alliance; does this circumstance make an intervention on the part of X legal, if state Y is attacked by a third state, A? There are two cases possible: either Y is attacked by A illegally, in which case X has a right to intervene in favor of Y on the general ground that intervention is justified for the purpose of saving the independence of a state whose life is threatenedno treaty engagement is, in this case, necessary-; or Y is attacked by A in consequence of a previous unwarranted intervention by Y in the sovereign rights of A, in which case A's intervention is legal, Y's previous intervention illegal. State X has clearly no right to intervene on the ground of the treaty. The treaty itself can have no legal force, for it would simply be an agreement by two states to commit an illegal act. The agreement of two wrong-doers cannot make that legal which the law forbids. In neither case mentioned could it, therefore, be said that intervention is justified if founded on treaty engagements. The same reasoning applies to the fourth proposed class: interventions in the affairs of a state on the ground of friendship for one of the parties to a civil disturbance. The principle of the independence of states would have to be abandoned, if interference in the domestic affairs of states on such sentimental grounds were for a moment admitted.

Such are the principles governing intervention as derived from universally recognized principles of international law, especially that of the independence of sovereign states.

As long as the independence of states is a principle of international law, it cannot be perceived how the limits of legal intervention can be extended beyond the scope of the selfinterest of the intervening state. If we take care to observe the drift of international law, we shall, indeed, notice a gradual breaking down of the principle of independence, as a result of the growing unification of states into a larger body, the state universal, comprising civilized humanity. When this development is consummated, the single interests will fade away into the general interest, and then there will be room for intervention in the internal arrangements of a state which leads a disorderly and immoral life. But I fear this condition of national life lies still in the far future, somewhere in the neighborhood of the millenium. For our own country the question of intervention is, and will be with increasing force, one of the most important questions to study and reduce to a settled system. In the career of imperialism just begun, in the struggle of opposing interests to be adjusted, in a new life which will necessitate close and constant contact with other nations, it behooves us to face with calm, scientific spirit the question when we meet it: Shall the Republic intervene? This alone will save us from the troubles and misfortunes which are sure to fall to the lot of the individual or nation that allows its existence to be swayed by the breezes of sentiment and passing moods, unsteered by steady, calm thought.

ETHOLOGY: STANDPOINT, METHOD,

TENTATIVE RESULTS.*

By THOMAS P. BAILEY, Jr.

PART I.

A science whose claim to exist is disputed cannot readily be defined. John Stuart Mill predicted ethology some fifty years ago. To him it was to be the "science of the formation of character," or, more shortly, the "science of character." As some thinkers decline to restrict the term "science" to the natural sciences, so called, and as character is developed as well as "formed," we may roughly define ethology as the empirical science of the development and formation of character. However, no science of character worthy of the name can dispense with the insights and criticism of the philosophical disciplines. If Mill and Bain were right in thinking that ethology must underly the scientific study of education, the highest and most rational ideals of the whence and whither of man and the universe must spiritualise the standpoint, method, and conclusions of the science of character. My first duty must, therefore, be to indicate the relation of philosophy to ethology.

If we provisionally characterize education as (1) training for habit, or faculty, (2) nurture for instinct (character-tendency, many-sided interest), and (3) development for aptitude (talent, special powers), we may

*Those interested in the literature of ethology (as I conceive it) will find a partial bibliography and some typical references in a Library bulletin about to be published by the University.