but a speculation never strictly reduced to practice, and, in fact, incapable of being realized." "A deliberative representative assembly carries with it such innumerable inconveniences, and has in its nature so many inherent vices, that, construct it as you please, you will still get further from perfection."

After reading these dogmas on the British constitution, we were somewhat relieved by finding (p. xviii.) that "this part of the work (which in fact constitutes three-fourths of the whole, and to which indeed almost the whole has reference), is to be considered by the reader as purely speculative," not only because Mr. Leckie has a mortal aversion to revolutions, but also, because "if it were adopted new inconveniences might arise;" and for other very cogent reasons. But really we profess not to understand this continual pointing out of evils and deprecating of remedies. It savours of a pusillanimity which is neither fitting nor necessary in a British statesman. If, upon a fair review of our whole condition, a clear balance of real and tangible evils, subversive of, or endangering our liberties, can be shewn to arise out of the present practice of our constitution, we ought never to shew our faces in society, if we cannot muster up nerve enough to advocate their reform. While on the other hand, if the idea of the evils complained of arise, as we suspect, from a superficial view of things that seizes on little insulated objects overlooking the greater, and from a want of understanding the true scope and bearing of the several interests which do really balance the power of the state, and prevent it from being converted to the injury and oppression of the people;-then are the complaints against the power of the House of Commons and its praters no less theoretical, nor a whit less mischievous, than those which are fulminated against the power of the crown; and we fear that Mr. Leckie must be compelled to take his rank among those who are

"Desirous to correct, not knowing how,

With very good design, but little wit,
Blaming or praising things as they think fit."

PRIOR.

In other words, among the theorists he dreads so much, that he dares not even recommend it to us to act upon the axioms he has taken so much pains to lay down, and we to toil through.

Let us then see whether those who have more political courage than Mr. Leckie can find in his arguments any result that may lead to a practical improvement of our government.

The first ninety-three pages of the pamphlet contain what is called a brief survey of parliamentary proceedings from the revolution, in 1688, to 1812. Upon the accuracy of the historical and political knowledge displayed in these pages, it is not our object to expatiate. Enough of them are true to

prove the author's hypothesis that practically speaking, the govern ment of England has been carried on by a king, through the medium of responsible ministers, selected from that party in the state which upholds the sentiments most applicable to the actual condition of foreign and domestic affairs, in the opinion of persons possessing property and education:-that one party becomes distinguished for its political sentiments, not, so much from any conviction of their justness drawn from cool and sober contemplation, but because the candidates for power among the opposite party maintain the contrary opinions;-and that the crown, instead of acting from the independent suggestions of the royal mind, or from a system of policy emanating from its own contemplations, is under the necessity of selecting its ministers from the predominant party in parliament, and of adopting the system of policy which that party espouses.

The mischievous consequences which in various periods of our political history have, in Mr. Leckie's opinion, ensued from this condition of our polity, are to be found in the following

extracts.

"Thus the House of Hanover accepted the crown, as one takes a contract. They literally fulfilled the functions of royalty, and, as strangers, avoided all enterprises which could embroil them with the parliament. Inasmuch as they conducted themselves with moderation, so they never evinced any great zeal in politics: they have thus avoided disputes and troubles with the states, but have abandoned them to their factions and dissensions, without ever exerting that influence which alone resides in the regal authority, either to quash or reconcile them. The spirit of neutrality which they brought with them, and in which they have invariably persevered, has obscured the brilliancy of the throne, while it has tended to weaken the energy of the state: they may almost be said rather to have governed in the name of their ministers, than that ministers have governed in theirs. Princes, who have adopted a similar line of policy, cannot be supposed to have any views of their own of a general and extensive nature; and as a succession of factions must have in many respects opposite views, in vain we seek in Britain for the soul which animates the body, and which constitutes its unity. This order of things from long usage is become so inveterate, that notwithstanding it is the cause of every political reverse we have suffered, and is likely, if permanent, to cause many more, it is considered by the generality of mankind as the peculiar beauty and perfection of the government." (P. 6.)

"A sovereign who reigns half a century without appearing, but through the ministerial veil; who has allowed all the ambitious and factious candidates for power to contend with each other, without ever declaring an opinion of his own, or having any direct communication with his people, secluded like the grand Lama of Thibet

from the beginning to the end of his reign, must inevitably become first the tool of one party and then of another; his name must sanction the most contradictory resolutions, and he must submit ever to become an instrument in the hands of a predominant party.' "The most powerful empire, which a human being can exert over his fellow creatures, is that of opinion; and if a nobleman or even a commoner can find means to gain such an influence, what is to prevent the sovereign from taking the same advantages? Whatever sentiment a sovereign utters is preserved and repeated: such sentiments may be so many appeals to public opinion, and here he must have the advantage over every one. Unconstitutional interferences are unnecessary on his part to gain the public confidence; a sovereign will always reign, if he be the best statesman in the country; and he will have sufficient strength to support such a system of exterior policy, as he deems advantageous. As ministers are considered to be advisers of the sovereign, so they are answerable for his conduct; but as he chooses them, or is supposed to do so, they must either defend his measures, or leave their places. A sovereign who has the address and wisdom to rival even the demagogues in the public opinion, will never be at a loss to find ministers, because his conduct will be wise, and require very little sophistry to defend it: and, acting on the principles here described, he would put an end to the factions which have made Great Britain, in her connection with other states, the weakest government in Europe!" (P. 8.)

"In order to designate a succession of administrations, we apply to each the name of the chief of the party of whom it was composed; and in this country the duration of each ministry is marked by his name, which is affixed to the whole; as the reigns of kings are marked each by their proper name; thus we say the Pitt administration, the Portland, &c. &c. This manner of naming each party serves also to designate their principles, or rather their political conduct, with other nations; and that which has got the reins into their hands decide entirely, for the time being, what are the actual principles which characterise the British government; the king being nothing more than the titular chief." (P. 17.)

Now it appears to us perfectly evident, that so long as parliament is in the main either constituted of, or elected by, the persons of education and property in the country, that is, while it consists of the most enlightened and independent part of the community, the state of things complained of by Mr. Leckie, so far as it is true, is no evil, but a very great advantage, whether considered in connection with our foreign or with our domestic policy. It is bringing to bear upon the political resolutions of the state the moral force, and concentrated wisdom of the nation, informed by repeated discussions carried on with all the acumen which the party feeling and personal ambition of the parliamentary gladiators can bring into exertion. It is resting the foun

dations of our policy upon all the talents and virtue of the community, instead of trusting to the precarious chance of virtue, wisdom, prudence, and fortitude in the mind of an hereditary sovereign, or of his favourite minister. Nor do we think it necessary here to waste the time of our readers, by leading them back to those points of our modern history which would convict of great ignorance or haste that axiom of Mr. Leckie's, that" factions have made Great Britain, in her connection with other states, the weakest government in Europe." Undoubtedly by the discussion that accom-. panies every measure, we lose on one side some of the advantages of secrecy: but we gain on the other so much strength by the conviction, which this publicity impresses upon the leading minds among the people, that all is fair and honest, that we are struggling for national interests, not for the aggrandizement of the family, or the gratification of the personal views of the sovereign; that we may safely say to those who would take advantage of the openness of our proceedings, what an old governor of Bombay said to those who brought him a French spy, taken in the act of inspecting the fortifications." Let the gentleman be taken all round the works, and then sent back to his friends; we are so strong here, that the more our enemies see of us, the less I believe they will like us."

But do we notwithstanding find that the Sovereign is, practically speaking, so complete a cypher in the sum of our body politic? As we think, certainly not. The king of England has, what the king of every limited monarchy must and ought to have, in an enlightened country at least, an influence precisely proportionate with his moral and political virtue;-and we cannot, alas! now incur the imputation of flattery or servility to the source of power and emolument, by advancing, that we need only trace back the history of the last fifty years to prove this assertion. Where the sovereign of England shews his people, that the power and emolument of his station are not valuable to him, as the sources of indulgence in silly, effeminate, or corrupt propensities; or in forming to himself a party distinct from what he believes to be useful to the political welfare of the state; the loyalty of the English people, so far from permitting such a king to be a cypher in the community, is much more likely to endanger their political interests, by affording an undue preponderance to any peculiar or personal wish or prejudice, which may be an exception to his general rule of conduct. He does not, therefore, as Mr. Leckie asserts in one of the extracts we have given, live secluded "like the grand Lama of Thibet, without any communication with his people, first the tool of one party and then of another," unless he has wilfully destroyed his own respectability and weight

in the community. And if he has incurred that misfortune, we suppose that Mr. Leckie himself would not consider it to be a political evil, that he should then be held in the trammels of that party, which has been found most worthy of leading the political councils of the state, by possessing the confidence of the nation. And in no other trammels can the sovereign of England be ever held; for Mr. Leckie is exceedingly mistaken when he asserts, without qualification, that as "the King chooses his ministers, or is supposed to do so, they must either defend his measures or lose their places." This is only true, sub modo-, and the condition is, that the King when he has turned out a ministry obnoxious to him, shall find the nation agreeing in his opinion; unless this should be the case, he is ultimately only loading himself with greater embarrassments. The only act of government for which the agent is not immediately responsible to the people, which can be performed in England, is a change of administration: but even here the responsibility is only removed one step. The ministers who succeed to office do so at their peril, and if the nation have no confidence in their talents and integrity, and do not think them on the whole of the circumstances the most eligible persons for their stations, they become virtually responsible for accepting them, and they would evidently be subjected to very alarming if not overwhelming consequences.

But a wise, a prudent, and a statesman-like sovereign, who sacrifices his own personal pleasures and indulgence, or rather who finds them in exertions to attain the love and forward the interests of his people, needs not to "put an end to the factions," as Mr. Leckie calls them, in order to govern for the people's good, but will conduct himself by their light, and will rejoice that the personal interests of the several parties in the state will afford ful opportunity of investigating the soundness of its policy, and of convincing the governed by the operation of fair argument, publicly and decorously conducted, that their governors require nothing from them which is not called for by their own interests well understood and fully appreciated. The temporary triumph of a party (or if Mr. Leckie pleases, a faction) which never rests upon any thing more than the ebullition of violent and ignorant minds previous to the investigation of facts, is as mere dust in the balance, when opposed to the solid advantages just enumerated; and that mind must be miserably deficient in the firmness of the true English character, which would make such temporary inconvenience the foundation of a permanent change of polity;-which would drain a mild and beneficent river, because it sometimes overflows its banks, or swallows up the bark that is incautiously trusted on its waves.

VOL. IV. NO. VII.

H