contrary, we deem it a good and valid lien, and, as it stood upon the records, was constructive notice to all subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers. The judgment is reversed.

All the justices concurring.

SAWYER et al., Respondents, v. RECTOR, Appellant.

1. Bankruptcy-Discharge, Effect of- Fraud of Bankrupt— Want of Notice to Creditors.

To an action for indebtedness the defendant pleaded and proved a discharge in bankruptcy, founded upon his petition filed after the existence of the debt provable in bankruptcy. Held, under the U. S. R. S. §§ 5117-5120, that the discharge was a full and complete bar to the action, though it was found that the defendant willfully omitted from his list of creditors the names of the plaintiffs; that he knowingly and willfully concealed their names from the marshal, that notice might not be given them, in order that he might be adjudged a bankrupt, and procure his discharge; that the plaintiffs had no knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings until nearly three years after the granting of the discharge.

2. Same-Collateral Attack.

In such case the discharge cannot be attacked collaterally. It must be contested in the court granting it, in an application to annul on the grounds of fraud, or by a direct proceeding in some other court having jurisdiction.

3. Nature of Bankruptcy Proceedings.

Proceedings in bankruptcy relate to the estate of the debtor and its application to the payment of his debts, and are in the nature of proceedings in rem. The petition, schedule, and inventory required to be filed are only incidents in the course to be pursued in bringing his estate into court for adjudication.

4. Object of the Law.

The real object of the bankrupt law is to relieve the debtor from the burden of his debts when he surrenders his estate to the assignee for the benefit of his creditors.

5. Jurisdiction of Courts of Bankruptcy.

Whether a district court of the United States, acting as a court of bankruptcy, is one of general or limited jurisdiction, not determined; but, if it is of limited and special jurisdiction, the sufficiency of the proof upon which the court took its action is not open to collateral inquiry. (Argued May 20, 1887; reversed May 26; opinion filed February 23, 1888.)

Appeal from the district court of Cass county; Hon. Wм. B. MCCONNELL, Judge.

Action by Samuel A. Sawyer, David L. Wallace, and Thomas Miller, partners under the name of Sawyer, Wallace & Co., against the defendant to recover for services and money advanced. The defendant set up a discharge in bankruptcy. The plaintiffs had judgment, and the defendant appealed.

Miller & Greene and J. R. Gamble, for appellant.

Under the provisions of the bankrupt law, and in view of the findings of the trial court, we contend it had no authority to declare that the plaintiffs' claim is exempted from the operation of the defendant's discharge. It could only be impeached in the court where granted, for the reason that the ground upon which it is sought to avoid the discharge is one of those specified in section 5110 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. It is well established that the United States courts have exclusive jurisdiction in all cases where the discharge is attacked upon the grounds specified in that section. Way v. Howe, 108 Mass. 502; Burpee v. Sparhawk, Id. 111; Benedict v. Smith, 48 Mich. 593, 12 N. W. Rep. 866; Black v. Blazo, 117 Mass. 17; Corey v. Ripley, 57 Me. 69; Bailey v. Carruthers, 71 Me. 172; Ocean Nat. Bank v. Olcott, 46 N. Y. 12; Rayl v. Latham, 27 Ohio St. 452; Milhans v. Awardi, 51 Ala. 594; Poillon v. Lawrence, 77 N. Y. 207; Hudson v. Bingham, 12 Amer. Law Reg. 637; Reed v. Bullington, 49 Miss. 223; Payne v. Able, 7 Bush, 341; Bump, Bankruptcy, (10th Ed.) 773.

This construction is in perfect accord with the settled law in relation to judgments as it has been announced by the highest courts of this country. Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290; D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165; Webster v. Reid, Id. 437; Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cr. 481; Bicknell v..Field, 8 Paige, 440.

If the notice required by section 3109, referred to in the thirteenth finding of fact, has been duly published, the discharge will bar the debt, although the name of the creditor was not

placed on the schedule, or any notice given to him. Symonds v. Barnes, 39 Me. 191; Randall v. Sutton, 2 Houst. 510; Knab v. Hayes, 71 N. C. 109; Stern v. Nussbaum, 47 How. Pr. 489; In re Archenbrann, 7 C. L. N. 99; Blum v. Ricks, 39 Tex. 112; Hood v. Spencer, 4 McLean, 168; Pattison v. Wilbur, 10 R. I. 448; Burnside v. Brigham, 49 Mass. 75; Thurmond v. Andrews, 10 Bush, 400; Thomas v. Jones, 39 Wis. 124; Heard v. Arnold, 56 Ga. 570; Jones v. Knox, 51 Ala. 367; Thornton v. Hogan, 63 Mo. 143, (3 Cent. L. J. 719;) Bump, Bankruptcy, (10th Ed.) 750; Allen v. Thompson, 10 Fed. Rep. 116.

This notice is the one that must be duly published in order to give the district court jurisdiction over the creditors who are not notified personally. See Pattison v. Wilbur and Thurmond v. Andrews, supra.

All proceedings under the bankruptcy act were in the nature of proceedings in rem, hence the broad jurisdictional effect of the publication of these notices. See Waples, Proc. in Rem. 110, 111; Michaels v. Post, 21 Wall. 391; Rayl v. Latham, 27 Ohio St. 452; Shawhan v. Wherritt, 7 How. 627; Benedict v. Smith, 48 Mich. 593, 12 N. W. Rep. 866.

Stone & Newman, for respondent.

While the discharge may be valid as to other creditors, it is invalid as to creditors whose names are fraudulently omitted from the schedules, and the provisions of the law for setting aside the discharge altogether do not prevent such creditors from showing that it is invalid as to them in any tribunal where other creditors are not concerned. Bump, Bankruptcy, (7th Ed.) 643; Poillon v. Lawrence, 77 N. Y. 207; Batcheldor v. Lowe, 43 Vt. 662; Burnside v. Brigham, 8 Metc. (Mass.) 49; Knab v. Hayes, 71 N. C. 109; Downer v. Dana, 22 Vt. 337; Lamb v. Brown, 12 N. B. R. 522; Platt v. Parker, 13 N. B. R. 14; Barnes v. Moore, 2 N. B. R. 573; Magoner v. Warfield, 3 G. Greene, 293; Mitchel v. Singletary, 19 Ohio, 291; Hubbard v. Cramp, 11 Paige, 341; Platt v. Parker, 4 Hun, 135; S. C. 6 Thomp. & C. 377; Michaels v. Post, 21 Wall. 398; Bump, Bankruptcy, § 5119.

The provisions of section 5120, Rev. St. U. S., apply only to cases where the discharge was fraudulently obtained upon the grounds specified in section 5110, which grounds relate to the validity of the discharge itself, and have no reference to the question whether a particular debt is discharged, or a particular debtor barred from maintaining suit upon his claim against the bankrupt.

Section 5110 nowhere, even by implication, specifies a fraudulent omission of creditors from schedules, or fraudulent concealment from the creditors of the fact that proceedings are pending, as a ground for invalidating the discharge.

This is not a case coming within the provisions of that section. See Poillon v. Lawrence, supra.

The bankrupt act is intended to deprive creditors of all remedy for the recovery of their debts, and should be strictly construed, and not extended beyond a fair and legitimate meaning of the terms used by congress. Salters v. Tobias, 3 Paige, 338.

The district court of the United States had no jurisdiction of the persons of respondents in the bankruptcy proceedings of appellant.

The position of appellant is that, the record being silent as to the facts which gave jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court, such jurisdiction will be presumed.

It is true that a superior court of general jurisdiction, proceeding within the general scope of its powers, is presumed to act rightly, but is the district court of the United States, acting as a court of bankruptcy, a superior court of general jurisdiction? In Ex parte Smith, 94 U. S. 455, it is held that "the facts upon which the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States rests must in some form appear in the record of all suits prosecuted before them. To this rule there are no exceptions."

The powers of the bankruptcy courts are derived wholly from the statutes of the United States, are special and summary, and not exercised or brought into action according to the course of the common law.

It is conceded that if the notice required by the Revised StatV.5DAK.-8

utes, § 5019, had been duly published, and proof of such publication had appeared in the record of bankruptcy proceedings, the discharge would have been a bar to the debt of plaintiffs, if otherwise properly granted, and had been without fraud on the part of appellant.

It is by this notice that bankruptcy courts obtained jurisdiction of the persons of creditors who were not personally served with the notice required by section 5019. Pattison v. Wilson, 10 R. I. 448.

The distinction in the presumption of law, when applied to proceedings in courts of general jurisdiction acting within the scope of their general powers, and when applied to those proceedings had under special statutory authority, is stated in Gulpin v. Paige, 18 Wall. 350. See, also, Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall. 328; Morse v. Fowler, 5 Fost. (N. H.) 302; McNinn v. Wheeler, 27 Cal. 30; Ricketson v. Richardson, 26 Cal. 149; Jordan v. Giblin, 12 Cal. 100; Oakley v. Aspinwall, 4 N. Y. 513; Wells, Jurisdiction, 36; Freeman, Judgments, 122-124, 127, 133.

The claim of respondents against appellant was property. If the position of appellant be correct, the plaintiffs have been deprived of this property without notice, and without opportunity to be heard, and by the judgment of a court of special and limited jurisdiction proceeding under statutory authority, and in a manner unknown to the common law.

The discharge of appellant, if obtained without the notice provided by law to the respondents, cannot affect their rights, or bar their recovery in this action.

Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183, 192; Harris v. Hardeman, 14 How. 14; Boswell's Lessees v. Otis, 9 How. 336.

The provisions of section 5119, R. S. of U. S., that the certificate of discharge shall be conclusive evidence in favor of the bankrupt of the fact of the regularity of his discharge, cannot have the effect of dispensing with the notice to creditors required by the statute. It relates simply to the mode of proof of the discharge, and not to its effect when proved.

The provision simply substitutes the certificate of discharge