the law of Scotland and of England in the English and Connecticut cases would create the rights respectively. Such a right as that to recover against the husband for goods sold to the wife is a commonlaw right, and would be regarded in Connecticut as an ordinary compensatory cause of action; suit would therefore be allowed upon it, though the right arose in England. In the English case, however, the statutory obligation of alimentation is not enforceable outside the state that creates it; just as enforcement in another state is refused in the case of a filiation order in bastardy,67 or of an order, under the French statute, that a father-in-law contribute to the support of his son-in-law.68 Furthermore, the English father not being subject to the jurisdiction of the Scotch law, it could not exterritorially impose an obligation upon him.69 For both reasons the English court was right in refusing recovery.

PROPERTY

I. In Willys-Overland Co. v. Chapman 70 it appeared that the claimant company had leased an automobile in California; the lease called for periodic payments and provided that if all terms were performed the lessee could buy the car for five dollars at the expiration of the lease. The court properly held this to be in fact a conditional sale. No record of the sale was made, but the law of California did not require a record. The lessee took the car to Texas and there sold it for value without notice. The court held that since the lease had not been recorded under the Texan law the sale in Texas passed an indefeasible title. The court agreed that the generally accepted doctrine was otherwise, but found the law of Texas to be settled in this way.7 71

In Willys-Overland Co. v. Evans 72 an automobile was purchased in Missouri, and a chattel mortgage taken back and recorded, then the car was taken to a garage in Kansas for repairs. The workman claimed a lien under the Kansan law, and this claim was allowed. The court did not deny the binding effect of the chattel mortgage,

67 Graham v. Monsergh, 22 Vt. 543 (1850).

68 De Brimont v. Penniman, 10 Blatch. (U. S.) 436 (1873).

69 Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch (U. S.) 241, 279, per Marshall, C. J.

70 206 S. W. (Texas Civ. App.) 978 (1918).

See to the same effect Chambers v. Consolidated Garage Co., 210 S. W. (Texas

Civ. App.) 565 (1919).

72 180 Pac. (Kan.) 235 (1919).

but held that under the law of Kansas the lien had priority over all other interests in the car.

This is a neat example of the settled principles involved. The car when brought into Kansas came with its title preserved as it had been in Missouri; Kansas did not and should not attempt to alter the title. But when an interest-affecting act, like work on the car, happened in Kansas, the law of Kansas had power to affect the title in any way thereby, and thus to create a new legal interest in the car.

II. The question, what law determines the valid exercise of a power, is one of great difficulty, on which the authorities are not in accord. Especially the question whether a will disposing of the residue shall be taken as an exercise of a power to appoint by will has led to much discussion. In Sewall v. Wilmer 73 the Massachusetts court held that the question is one of interpreting the intention of the donor, and is therefore to be governed by the legal meaning of the term at his domicil. The case has been severely criticized,74 but it has been often followed.75 In a recent case the Supreme Court of Rhode Island has applied it to interesting facts.76 A power to appoint by will was created by a settlement made while the settlor was domiciled in Massachusetts; he afterwards became domiciled in Rhode Island. The donee made a will in which he did not mention the power; but the will contained a residuary clause which according to the Massachusetts law constituted an appointment. The court held that an appointment had been made.

In an English case, In re Lewal's Settlement Trusts,77 the same result was reached. In an English settlement a power to appoint by will was given to a Frenchwoman. The woman died married, and under age, leaving a will by which her husband was made universal legatee. By the French law she was incapable, because of her youth, of passing by will more than one half her estate. The court held that as to the half which she could pass the appointment was governed by the English act, which provided that a residuary 73 132 Mass. 131 (1882).

74 STORY, CONFlict of Laws, 8 ed., 552; Professor Gray also criticized the case in in his lectures on Powers.

75 Lane v. Lane, 4 Pennew. (Del.) 368, 55 Atl. 184 (1903). In re New York L. & T. Co., 209 N. Y. 585, 103 N. E. 315 (1913); Cotting v. De Sartiges, 17 R. I. 668, 24 Atl. 530 (1892); Farnum v. Pennsylvania Co., 87 N. J. Eq. 108, 99 Atl. 145 (1916). 76 Harlow 7. Duryea, 107 Atl. (R. I.) 98 (1919). 77 [1918] 2 Ch. 391.

clause should be an exercise of the power of appointment; as to the other half, the power remained unexercised. Peterson, J., said that the statutory provision

"amounted to a provision that every general power of appointment by will should be read as a power to appoint by a will which referred to the power or to the property subject to the power, or disposed of the personal estate of the appointer in general words."

In other words, it is a question of interpreting the word "appoint" according to the meaning it has at the settlor's domicil. The English authority has been quite unsettled on this point. This decision seems likely to bring it into accord with the Massachusetts doctrine. III. A question of the interpretation of an ordinary written instrument is a very difficult one. In Curtis v. Curtis 78 a trust settlement had provided for payment to the beneficiary of such part of the income as the trustees should think proper should be paid to the beneficiary; and at her death the remainder should pass to the settlors. The question was, whether that part of the income which had not been paid over belonged to the beneficiary or to the settlors. One of the settlors was domiciled in New Jersey at the time of the settlement, the other in New York. The court said that if both had been domiciled in New Jersey the law of that state must have furnished the rule for the interpretation; but as one was from New York, the further facts that the situs of the property, the residence of the beneficiary, and the residence of the eventual trustees were all in New York, caused the New York law to prevail in the interpretation.79

IV. Mention must be made of a notable article by Professor Barbour on "The Extra-Territorial Effect of the Equitable Decree." 80

INHERITANCE

I. Whether a will calls for election between its provisions and the general law of inheritance is a question that can be solved in at least three ways. In Staigg v. Atkinson 81 it was treated as probably a question involving the meaning of the will, to be settled therefore according to the law of the testator's domicil at the time he made the will. Two recent cases have adopted respectively the other two

78 184 N. Y. App. Div. 274, 173 N. Y. Supp. 103 (1918).

79 Comment on this case may be found in 32 HARV. L. REV. 729.

80

17 MICH. L. Rev. 527.

81

144

Mass. 564, 12 N. E. 354 (1887).

solutions. In re Ogilvie 82 involved a devise of Paraguayan land to charity by an English testatrix. By the Paraguayan law only one-fifth could be devised away from her next of kin, who had been otherwise provided for in the will. The court said that by the settled English law the next of kin were put to their election; the land was theirs unless they declined to take it, but if they did not, English law would refuse to give effect to the provisions of the will.

In Perry v. Wilson 83 the question was whether the widow of an Oklahoma man, who had made her a legatee in his will, could claim dower in Kentucky land; the Oklahoma law did not put her to her election, the Kentucky law did. It was urged that the question was one of the intention of the testator; but the court held her bound to elect under the Kentucky law. It is "only by virtue of the laws of this state," the court said,

"that a widow of an owner of land in this state, who dies a citizen and resident of another state, is entitled to dower in such lands; and, under such circumstances, she should only have dower in lands situated in this state, under the terms and conditions prescribed by the laws of this state."

This confusion of authority is caused by the fact, clearly brought out in these cases, that either the law of the land or of the legacy may withhold its property, irrespective of the provisions of the other law; or in both states the matter may be left to the intention of the testator. We must therefore look for a continuance of such apparent contradiction in the cases.

II. Doctrines of equitable conversion frequently complicate the question, what law governs a legacy. In re Lyne's Settlement Trusts 84 presented such a difficulty. An Englishwoman while in France made a holograph will, valid in France, and therefore by Lord Kingsdown's Act valid in England as to personalty, though not as to land. In this will she disposed of her reversion after her father's death in a marriage settlement of personal property in the hands of English trustees. By the settlement the trustees had full right to invest in land, and had power to sell such land at discretion, subject to the consent of the father during his life. It was held that the disposition was a valid one; that the entire trust must be treated

82 [1918] 1 Ch. 492.

183 Ky. 155, 208 S. W. 776 (1919). 84 [1919] 1 Ch. 80.

as personalty, though the land while in the hands of the trustees was immovable.

In Norris v. Loyd 85 the will of a Californian had devised Iowa iand to his executor, to sell it and divide the proceeds between his children. At the request of the children, the executor conveyed the land to them. A California court held this reconversion invalid, and decreed a disposition of the land as personalty. The Iowa court, however, neglecting the California decision on the authority of the case of Clarke v. Clarke, held that the land remained such until and unless sold, and made a decree according to the law of Iowa.

Both decisions seem sound. The validity and effect of the will in the Iowa case depend upon the subject of its operation, which here was land; while in the English case the subject of the legacy was the entire estate, a movable estate in its creation, and not some particular investment which formed part of it, and it was therefore properly held to fall within the provisions of Lord Kingsdown's Act.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF ASSETS

I. In Campbell v. Tousey 86 the old Supreme Court of New York held that action could be brought in New York against a foreign executor who was found there. Though opposed to the great weight of authority, this doctrine has been embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure.87 Relying upon this provision, certain creditors of one Gates, deceased, brought in New York a suit against a foreign executor to reach assets of the estate in New York, there being no administrator in that state. The suit was first brought in a federal court, and was dismissed by Judge Learned Hand for lack of jurisdiction, notwithstanding the Code.88 The creditors thereupon instituted a similar suit in the state courts. In the Supreme Court, Special Term, Judge Bijur allowed the bill to lie,89 and this judgment was affirmed in the Appellate Division. The principal argument against the jurisdiction appears to have been the difficulty of enforcing any judgment that might be rendered for the plaintiff. 85 168 N. W. (Ia.) 556 (1918). 86 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 64 (1827).

87 N. Y. Co. CIV. PROC. § 1836 a.

Thorburn v. Gates, 225 Fed. 613 (1915); 230 Fed. 922 (1916).

89 Thorburn v. Gates, 103 N. Y. Misc. 292, 171 N. Y. Supp. 198 (1918).

Thorburn v. Gates, 184 N. Y. App. Div. 443, 171 N. Y. Supp. 568 (1918).