- they are unwilling themselves. But this cannot alter the case, in the least, when it is remembered, that, according to Calvinism, this moral inability can only be removed by the influence of that grace which God has determined to withhold. The numerous subtilties by which Calvinists have endeavored to reconcile their system with the sincerity of God, have made no advance toward removing the difficulty. It may be shifted from one ground to another, but by no artifice can we reconcile with sincerity the offer of salvation to all men, if it is only possible to a few.

6. The Calvinistic system tends to destroy the distinction between virtue and vice, and to render man an improper subject for future judg ment, and for reward or punishment. Virtue or vice can only exist in man as he is supposed to have the power to do right or wrong, according to his own determination. If, according to the theory of Calvinism, all the actions of men are determined by an absolute and eternal decree of God, so that the virtuous man cannot but be virtuous, and the vicious man cannot but be vicious, virtue and vice, so far as they determine the moral character of men, must be the same. They are both in accordance with, and result from, the will of the Divine sovereign; and flow as impulsively from the eternal decree, which determines the means and the end, as the effect does from the cause. And it necessarily follows, that virtue and vice are essentially the same,

and no man can be look at the solemn

a proper subject of praise or blame. Again; we process of the general judgment; we see all men assembled at the bar of God, and called to account for all their actions here; and then see the reward of eternal life bestowed upon the righteous, and eternal punishment inflicted on the wicked; and we ask the question, why, according to Calvinism, are men called to account, and rewarded or punished for their actions? If all things were unalterably fixed by the eternal decrees, the judgment process is only an empty show, and no man can be a proper subject either of reward or punishment. For what, we would ask, in view of the Calvinistic theory, can the wicked be punished? If it be said, for their sins, we ask, had they the power to avoid them? If it be said, for their unbelief, we ask, in whom were they required to believe? In a Saviour who never designed or came to save them? Surely, it must be evident, that if salvation never was possible for the reprobate, by no process of reasoning can it be shown to be proper to punish them for their failure to attain unto it. We think, therefore, that it is impossible to reconcile the Calvinistic system with the real distinction between virtue and vice, and with the doctrine of future judgment and rewards and punishments.

We have now noticed some of the leading difficulties with which the

systems of Calvinism and Arminianism have been thought respectively to be encumbered; and in conclusion we would say, that, notwithstanding, according to our showing, Calvinism labors under some very serious difficulties, and leads to some revolting consequences, it likewise embodies much evangelical truth; and the most objectionable consequences which have been deduced from the system have not been fairly acknowledged by all its advocates; yet, as we think they necessarily follow, as logical conclusions, it is but fair that they be plainly presented. We now close our discussion of the extent of the atonement; and would present, as the substance of what we have endeavored to establish, the leading position with which we set out, "that the atonement so extends to all men as to render salvation possible for them.”

LECTURE XIX.

THE MORAL AGENCY OF MAN.

THE subject now before us, the moral agency of man, is one of great interest and importance. It has been said by an excellent writer, that "the proper study of mankind is man." If this be true, as it unquestionably is, when the terms are understood to relate to the true character, moral relations, and eternal destiny of man, it is likewise true that no question ever agitated in relation to man can be of greater interest than the one now proposed,- his proper moral agency.

This subject has elicited a large amount of philosophical research from the most acute metaphysicians in every age of the world, from the earliest date of philosophical science to the present day. It has presented an arena on which the master spirits have met, and wielded with their utmost skill the keenest lance of polemic strife; but perhaps the most that has been written on the subject has tended rather to involve the matter in a maze of metaphysical intricacy, than to present the simple truth in a plain light. Could the public mind be disabused respecting the influence of the fine-spun theories, metaphysical reasonings, and endless quibbles of speculative minds, in reference to free will, moral agency, fixed fate, and philosophical necessity, it might be possible, in a small compass, to present a clear and satisfactory view of the subject in hand. As it is, we cannot feel that we have rendered merited justice without some examination of the various conflicting systems, and puzzling sophisms, which have been so ingeniously invented, and so liberally and tenaciously urged. We shall, however, endeavor, in as clear a method as we can, to exhibit and defend what we conceive to be the true philosophical and scriptural view of man's moral agency.

The numerous and formidable disputants on this subject may all be ranged in two grand divisions:- the advocates of free agency, in the proper sense of the term, on one hand, and the defenders of the doctrine of necessity on the other. That we may conduct the investigation in a clear and profitable manner, great care will be requisite, in the outset, that the terms may be clearly defined, and the real points of difference correctly understood.

I. First, then, we inquire, what is implied in the free moral agency of man?

An agent means an actor. A moral agent means an actor whose actions relate to a rule of right and wrong. A free moral agent means an actor whose actions relate to a rule of right and wrong, and who is possessed of liberty or freedom in the performance of his actions.

As regards the simple question of man's agency, we presume there will be no controversy. It is not contended that man is an agent in the sense of absolute independency. In this sense, there is but one agent in the universe, and that is God. He only possesses the power of action, either physical or moral, in an underived and independent sense. Man, and all other created beings, derived this power from the great Creator, and are dependent on him for its continuance. Yet, in the exercise of derived power, they are capable of acting. In this respect, they are contradistinguished from senseless, inanimate matter, which can only move when acted upon by external force. The distinction here presented is so clear and evident, that such as are either destitute of the capacity to perceive it, or of the fairness to acknowledge it, may at once be dismissed from the present investigation.

That man is a moral agent, we think will also be admitted by all who believe in the truth of revelation. The actions of man relate to a rule of right and wrong. He is capable of virtue or vice, and susceptible of blame or praise. This, we believe, all the advocates of necessity, who believe in the Scriptures, readily admit.

The next point in the general definition which we have presented, relates to the freedom or liberty which man possesses in the performance of moral action. Here we find the main point of difference between the defenders of free agency and the advocates of necessity. The former contend, that, in the exercise of his moral agency, man is not under the absolute necessity of acting as he does, but that he might act differently; while the latter contend that all the acts of man are necessary, in such sense that he cannot act differently from what he does. It is true, there is a great difference in the manner in which the advocates of necessity choose to express themselves. Some of them, in words, acknowledge the free moral agency of man, and contend that he possesses freedom in the proper sense of the word. This is the ground assumed by President Edwards, of New Jersey, and his numerous adherents. But by this liberty or freedom they understand that man merely has the power of acting according to his will, or, in other words, that he has the liberty "to do as he pleases." This, they say, is freedom in the highest sense, and the only sense in which man can enjoy it. The definition of liberty as given by Locke, in his famous "Essays on the Human Understand

66

ing," is this:- Liberty is a power to act or not to act, according as the mind directs." Edwards defines it to be, "the power, opportunity, or advantage that one has to do as he pleases." It will readily be perceived, that the meaning of liberty, as given by Locke and Edwards, is the same. On this subject, Edwards borrowed from Locke what the latter had borrowed from Hobbes. It is upon the above definition, with which Edwards sets out, that his entire system is based; and here, we would say, is the commencement of his grand mistake. He has unfortunately fallen into the common error of the fatalists of every school, that of confounding the liberty of the mind with the motion of the body. Indeed, the above is neither a correct definition of mental nor bodily freedom. It is rather a definition of bodily independence. The power "to act as the mind directs," or " to do as we please," can relate only to bodily action. It presupposes a mental act,-a determination of the will, but has nothing to do with the power producing that act or determination. Were we for a moment to suppose the definition of liberty. above given to relate to mental action connected with the will, we could not vindicate the profound and learned Locke and Edwards from the charge of having gravely presented as an important definition nothing but an insignificant truism. For, surely, to say that we may will "as the mind directs," or "as we please," is the same as to say we may will as we will. But that the above definition, even in the mind of Edwards, had nothing to do with our will, the following quotation will evince. What is vulgarly called liberty," says Edwards, "namely, that power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice, is all that is meant by it; without taking into the meaning of the word anything of the cause of that choice, or at all considering how the person came to have such a volition. In whatever manner a person may come by his choice, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion of freedom." From this we may see, that the notion of liberty contended for by Edwards relates to bodily motion, and not to mental action, and is perfectly consistent with the most absolute fatalism.

Again; the definition of liberty as given by Edwards, as it does not properly apply to mental action, so neither does it properly apply to the power of bodily action as possessed by man. If liberty or freedom. means "the power to do as we please," then none but Omnipotence can be free; for who else "can do as they please?" How Edwards could contend for the freedom of man, in his sense of freedom, is difficult to conceive; for surely, a little reflection will show, that, according to that definition, no man can be free. The subject may be illustrated thus: