Imagens das páginas
PDF
ePub

and are only a collection of bloody edicts. Would any man contend that because he had the privilege of acting according to such a system of laws, thus arbitrarily imposed upon him, he was therefore in the enjoyment of freedom in the most rational sense? Far from it. And why? Simply because the oppressed subject would require an agency in making those laws. So long as this is denied him, and he feels upon his neck the galling yoke of tyranny, in vain might you endeavor to solace him by enlarging upon his exalted privilege of obeying the law. You might assure him that no natural force could constrain him to go contrary to the law, and that, consequently, he is possessed of freedom in the proper sense, but all would be in vain. He would only feel that you were mocking at his chains! We would now appeal to the candid mind to determine if this is not precisely the kind of moral freedom which President Edwards allows to man, on account of which he strongly pleads that he is properly a free agent and justly accountable? Most unquestionably it is. He contends that man is a free moral agent because he may do as he wills, when his will is as unalterably fixed by necessity as the pillars of heaven. Such liberty as the above can no more render its possessor a free, accountable moral agent, than that possessed by a block or a stone. Indeed, there is no difference between the liberty attributed to man by the learned President of Princeton College, and that possessed by a block of marble as it falls to the earth when let loose from the top of a tower. We may call the man free, because he may act according to his will or inclination, while that will is determined by necessity; but has not the marble precisely the same freedom? It has perfect liberty to fall; it is not constrained by natural force to move in any other direction. If it falls necessarily, even so, on the principle of Edwards, man acts necessarily. If it be said that the marble cannot avoid falling as it does, even so man cannot avoid acting according to his will, just as he does. If it be said that he has no disposition, and makes no effort to act contrary to his will, even so the marble has no inclination to fall in any other direction than it does. The marble moves freely, because it has no inclination to move otherwise; but it moves necessarily, because irresistibly impelled by the law of gravitation. Just so man acts freely, because he acts according to his will; but he acts necessarily, because he can no more change his will than he can make a world. And thus it is plain, that, although necessitarians may say they believe in free agency, and man's accountability, it is a freedom just such as pertains to lifeless matter. If, according to Edwards, man is free, and justly accountable for his actions merely because he acts according to his own will, when he has no control over that will, upon the same principle the maniac would be a free, accountable agent. If, in a paroxysm of madness, he murders his

father, he acts according to his will. It is a voluntary act, and necessitarians cannot excuse him because his will was not under his own control; for, in the view of their system, it was as much so as the will of any man in any case possibly can be. The truth is, it is an abuse of language to call that freedom which binds fast in the chains of necessity. Acting voluntarily amounts to no liberty at all, if I cannot possibly act otherwise than I do. The question is, not whether I have a will, or whether I may act according to my will, but, what determines the will? This is the point to be settled in the question of free agency. It is admitted that the will controls the actions; but who controls the will? As the will controls the actions, it necessarily follows that whoever controls the will must be accountable for the actions. Whoever controls the will must be the proper author of all that necessarily results from it; and consequently should be held accountable for the same. But man, say necessitarians, has no control whatever over his will. It is fixed by necessity just as it is, so that it could no more be otherwise than the effect could cease to result from the cause. According to this, we may talk as we may about free agency, the liberty of the will, accountability, &c., but man, after all the embellishment we can impart, is a free, accountable agent just in the same sense as the most insignificant particle of lifeless matter. Here we will close the present lecture by calling to mind what we have endeavored to exhibit. 1. We have endeavored to explain what is implied in the proper free moral agency of man. 2. We have endeavored to establish that doctrine by the evidence of consciousness; by an observation of the history of the world, and by an appeal to the Divine administration as set forth in the Scriptures. Let the reader decide

[blocks in formation]

LECTURE XX.

THE MORAL AGENCY OF MAN.- OBJECTIONS.

We propose, in this lecture, to examine some of the principal OBJECTIONS which have been urged against the view taken in the preceding lecture of the freedom of the will. Those most worthy of notice are

the following, viz. :—

I. It said to be absurd in itself.

II. It is said to be irreconcilable with the Scripture account of the Divine prescience.

III. It is said to conflict with the doctrine of motives.

We propose a respectful attention to each of these grand objections.

I. It is alleged that the view we have taken of the proper freedom of the will is absurd in itself. President Edwards has argued at great length that the self-active power of the mind in the determination of the will, as contended for by Arminians, is absurd in itself, because it implies a preceding determination of the will to fix each free volition, and that this would imply an infinite series of volitions, which is absurd. President Day, of Yale College, who seems to be an apt disciple of Edwards, has, in a late work on the Will, highly complimented the treatise of Edwards, as having furnished, in this argument, an unanswerable refutation of the Arminian notion of freedom. And truly we must say, that the position, "that if each active volition is necessarily preceded by another, this would imply an infinite series, and consequently be absurd," is a matter so obvious, that the numerous pages devoted by the learned author to this subject might have been spared. Indeed, he seems to have labored and proved, to an extent almost beyond endurance, a position which no intelligent mind can dispute. Had he shown the same solicitude for the establishment of his premises, and been equally successful in that particular, there could be no objection to his conclusion. That the Arminian notion of the self-active power of the mind in determining the will implies that each volition must be preceded by another volition, is what has been asserted, but has never yet been proved. The advocates of necessity, although they admit that by the self-determining power of the will is meant "the soul in the

exercise of a power of willing," yet, when they engage in argument, appear to forget this admission, and proceed as though the will were supposed to be an agent separate and distinct from the mind or soul in the act of willing. Hence they involve the discussion in confusion, and bewilder the mind in a maze of verbal contradiction and absurdity. In every act of the will, let it be distinctly understood that the mind or soul is the agent, and the will is only expressive of the act or state of the mind or soul at the time, and under the condition, of willing. Now let us inquire if every act of the soul in willing must, according to the Arminian notion of freedom, be preceded by another act of the soul in willing? Why is it that there can be no choice or act of willing per formed by the mind itself, unless it is preceded by another act that determines it? Surely a choice preceded by another choice which determines it is no choice at all; and to say that every free act, or selfdetermined act, must be preceded by another, by which it is determined, is the same as to say that there can be no free or self-determined act. And this is the very point in dispute that ought to be proved, and not taken for granted. Indeed, we may directly deny it, and make our appeal to common sense to sustain us in the position. For illustration, we refer to the first vicious choice ever made by man. Now let us contemplate the history of this matter as it really transpired. The tempter came to man for the first time, and presented the seducing bait. Man willed to disobey. Here we see but one act of the mind. There is not an act determining to choose the evil, and then another consequent act choosing the evil. The act determining to choose is really choosing. Determining to choose in a certain way, and choosing in that way, are the same thing. Now to say that Adam could not, in the exercise of his own powers, independent of a predetermining cause operating upon him, choose between the evil and the good, is the same as to say that God could not make a free agent. Indeed, to say that a choice free from the necessary determination of a preëxisting cause cannot exist, is the same as to say that there is not a free agent in the universe, and that the Deity himself cannot possess self-determining power, but is only acted upon by the impulse of fatality. If the Deity cannot choose or will without something external to himself determining his will, where are his self-existence and independence? For, if the Divine will is always determined by something external to the Divine mind that wills, then there must be something existing prior to all the Divine volitions, separate and distinct from the Deity himself. Again; if it be adinitted that the Divine mind can will or choose freely without being acted upon by a preceding choice, then it follows that it is not absurd in itself for the mind to determine its own acts, independent of

necessary preceding causes. If it be admitted that the Deity can will by the free exercise of his own powers, then the only question will be, can he confer this exalted power upon a creature? If we deny that he possesses it himself, we destroy his self-existence and independence. If we deny his ability to confer this power upon a creature, we deny his omnipotence. Then the whole question concerning the absurdity of the Arminian doctrine of the self-determining power of the will resolves itself into a question concerning the Divine power. Necessitarians contend that God cannot create a free, self-determining agent; and Arminians deny the assertion, and appeal to the self-existence and independence of the Deity to disprove the absurdity in the case; and rely upon the omnipotence of God to prove that the creation of moral agents in the Divine image, so far as the self-determining power of the mind is concerned, is not impossible. Το say that God cannot make a free agent capable of determining within himself his own volitions, is to limit the Divine power. But Edwards again contends that "this selfdetermining power of the will implies the absurdity of an effect without a cause." We deny the charge. We are not obliged to admit, that because the will is not determined in every case by a preceding act of the will, or some previous cause external to the mind itself, that, therefore, there is no cause in the case. By no means. If the mind wills one way instead of another, there must be a cause for it; but that cause must not necessarily be either preceding or external, as necessitarians contend. It may be both simultaneous and internal. That is, it may originate in the mind itself at the time of willing. If it be said that, "then the mind itself must be the cause of its own volitions, and if so, there must always be a previous something in the mind to determine it to will in one way instead of another," we reply, truly the mind is the cause of its own volitions to such extent that they are not necessarily determined independent of its own action; but it does not follow that there must be something previously existing in the mind, necessarily determining it to choose as it does. All the previously existing cause essential in the case is, the capacity of the mind, in the exercise of its powers, to will at the time either the one way or the other. In the exercise of this capacity upon the principles of free agency, and not impelled by stern necessity, the particular will in a given case originates; and thus we see how it was in the case given of the first transgression. Man had been endued with the power to choose, or to control his own will. The tempter came; in the exercise of that power, man chose the evil. Here the cause was in himself, and originated in and flowed from the manner in which he exercised his powers. This manner of exercising his powers resulted, not necessarily,

« AnteriorContinuar »