it will follow that there is but one agent in the universe, and that is God; and angels and men are only patients, no more capable of self-motion than a clod or a stone. This theory at once destroys the distinction between matter and mind, is directly repugnant to the whole tenor of Scripture, and most recklessly subversive of the plainest dictates of common sense! And yet, it will appear that it is the only theory consistent with the views of necessitarians on the subject of motives. Now let us take the opposite position, and suppose, according to common sense and Scripture, that two distinct classes of substances have been created,material and immaterial. In other words, that God has not only created dead, inanimate matter, capable only of moving as it is moved, but that he has also created intelligent beings, endued with self-moving energy, capable, not of themselves, but in the exercise of their derived powers, of voluntary action, independent of external and necessary force, and it will be at once apparent that there is a radical and essential distinction in nature between lifeless matter and these intelligent beings. If this distinction be admitted, which cannot possibly be denied while the voice of common sense or Scripture is allowed to be heard, then it will follow that lifeless matter and intelligent beings are regulated by laws as different as are their essential natures. Here we find the origin of the grand metaphysical blunder of necessitarians of every school, and of every age. They have made no distinction between matter and mind. The ancient Manichees, the Stoics, the Atheistic and Deistic philosophers, Spinoza, Hobbes, Voltaire, Hume, and others, have been followed, in this confounding of matter and mind, by many learned and excellent men, such as President Edwards of Princeton, and President Day of Yale College. Indeed, the whole treatise of Edwards, in which he has written three hundred pages on the human will, is predicated upon this blunder. His almost interminable chain of metaphysical lore, when clearly seen in all its links, is most palpably an argument in a circle. He assumes that the mind is similar to matter, in order to prove that it can only act as acted upon; and then, because it can only act as acted upon, he infers that, in this respect, the mind, like matter, is governed by necessity. Although he turns the subject over and over, and presents it in an almost endless variety of shape, it all, so far as we can see, amounts to this: - the mind in its volitions can only act as it is acted upon, therefore the will is necessarily determined. And what is this, but to say that the will is necessarily determined, because it is necessarily determined? Can any real distinction be pointed out between the labored argument of Edwards and this simple truism? But we shall soon see that this assumed position—that the mind can only act as it is acted upon-is philosophically false. This grand pillar upon which the huge metaphysical edifice has be been reared, may be shown to be rotten throughout, yea, it may snapped asunder by a gentle stroke from the hammer of reason and common sense; and then the edifice, left without foundation, must fall to the ground. Let us now contemplate these motives which are said to act upon the mind so as necessarily to influence the will. Let us look them full in the face, and ask the question, what are they? Are they intelligent beings, capable of locomotion? Are they endued with a self-moving energy? Yea, more, are they capable of not only moving themselves, but also of imparting their force to something external to themselves, so as to coerce action in that which could not act without them? If these questions be answered in the negative, then it will follow that motives, considered in themselves, can no more act on the mind, so as necessarily to determine the will, than a world can be created by something without existence. If these questions be answered in the affirmative, then it will follow that motives, at least, are free agents,-capable of acting without being acted upon, and endued with self-controlling and selfdetermining energy. Necessitarians may fall upon either horn of the dilemma. But on which horn soever they fall, their system must perish. If the attempt be made to evade this by saying that motives do not act themselves, but God is the agent acting upon man, and determining his will through the instrumentality of motives, -if this be the meaning, then I would ask, why not call things by their right names? Why attribute the determination of the will to the influence of motives, and at the same time declare that motives are perfectly inefficient, capable of exercising no influence whatever? Is not this fairly giving up the question, and casting "to the moles and to the bats" the revered argument for necessity, founded upon the influence of motives? Again; to say that motives exercise no active influence, but are only passive instruments in the hand of God, by which he determines the will, by an immediate energy exerted at the time, is the same as to say that God is the only agent in the universe; that he wills and acts for man; and, by his own direct energy, performs every physical and moral act in the universe, as really and properly as he created the worlds; and then will condemn and punish men everlastingly for his own proper acts! Is this the doctrine of philosophical necessity? Truly it is. And well may we say this is FATALITY! This is ABSURDITY! Now, let us turn from the absurdities of the necessitarian scheme, and see if we can perceive the true doctrine on the subject of motives. Suppose, as I pass the street, I perceive in the shop on my right the choicest liquors most invitingly displayed; I am tempted to drink to excess; I parley with the temptation; I long for the delicious wines; think of the dreadful consequences of inebriety; but then returns my love of strong drink, and I determine in my will to yield myself up to intoxication. Here we perceive an act has been performed, by which the will is fixed in a particular way; but the question is, who is the agent in this act? Necessitarians would say, the motive to intoxication has been the active agent, and man has been the passive instrument. But we ask, what motive, or what surrounding circumstance in this case, has put forth active energy, so as not only to move itself without being acted upon, but also to communicate an irresistible impulse to something external to itself? Can the wines in the bottles exhibit their eloquent tongues, and plead with the passer-by to devour them? Surely not; they are themselves as passive as the bricks in the wall. Can the love for strong drink assert a separate and independent existence, and rise up as an active agent, independent of the man, and use arguments with the understanding, and coercively determine the will? This is so far from being the case, that these motives have no existence itself, independent of the man. They only derive their existence through the exercise of the active powers of man; and shall it be said that they necessarily control those powers, and even that those powers cannot be exerted except as they are necessarily impelled by motives? Can motives be the cause. and the effect in the same sense, at the same time? The plain truth is, motives do not act themselves at all. It is the mind that acts upon them. They are passive, and only move as they are moved. The mind of man is the active agent that picks the motive up, turns it about, and estimates its weight. This will be rendered somewhat plainer when we reflect that two objects both passive can never act upon each other; some active power must first move the one, or it can never move the other. Suppose two blocks of marble placed near together in the same room; can the one arise up and impart a direct and resistless influence to the other, so as to cause it necessarily to change its place? Certainly not. And why? Simply because they are both passive. Now, as motives, arguments, and surrounding circumstances, are obviously passive in their nature, incapable of moving themselves, it necessarily follows, that if the mind is also passive, the one cannot act upon the other, neither motives upon the mind, nor the mind upon motives. Hence, agreeably to the assertion of necessitarians, that the mind is passive, the will cannot be influenced by motives at all. The fallacy of the reasoning of Edwards and others on this subject, consists in their considering the influence attributed to motives as an independent and active influence, whereas, motives are all the time passive, and are really acted upon by the mind, soul, or feelings of man. So far from motives actively determining the will, through the mind or soul, it is the mind or soul that determines the will, and, by its own active energy, gives to motives all the influence they possess. This is evident from the very nature of motives. What are they? Are they not arguments, reasons, or persuasions? Now, if the mind can exercise no free agency of its own, in attending to arguments, examining reasons, or yielding to persuasions, why address them to man, and exhort him to give them their due weight? The very fact that they are motives, arguments, reasons, or persuasions, is proof sufficient that they are designed to influence the will, not necessarily and irresistibly, but only through the agency of man. So that, when we admit that the motive having the greatest influence, at the time and under the circumstances, always prevails, or, in other words, that the prevailing motive always prevails,-the question is still before us, why does. it prevail? What gives it the greatest influence? Does it exercise this influence of itself independently? We have already shown that it cannot. What then gives it this prevailing influence? It is the free and uncoerced agency of the man himself which determines the influence of the motive, which gives it that influence, and thereby determines the will. If it still be asked, why the mind determines to give to a given motive a certain influence, and to fix the will accordingly; we reply, the reason is in the mind itself. God has endued us with this power. Without it, we could not be moral agents; we could not be accountable; we could no more be rewarded or punished than the earth on which we tread. We think we have said enough to show that the argument against free agency from the doctrine of motives is fallacious, and alike repugnant to reason, common sense and Scripture. And whether, in this lecture, we have successfully vindicated the doctrine of free agency from the objections, that it is absurd in itself, and inconsistent with the Divine prescience and with the doctrine of motives, we submit to the decision of the reader. QUESTIONS ON LECTURE XX. QUESTION 1. What are the three leading objections to free agency? 2. How is it attempted to prove that this doctrine is absurd in itself? 6. Is it admitted that it implies certainty? 9. How is this objection answered? 3. How is the objection answered? 5. Is the doctrine of foreknowledge admit-11. What is the precise point of dispute, in reference to motives? What has been aimed at in this lecture? LECTURE XXI. REPENTANCE. HAVING considered, in the preceding lectures, the great and leading doctrines of theology, so far as they relate more directly to the character of the Divine Being, the history of the creation and fall of man, and the dreadful consequences of that fall, together with the glorious provision made for his recovery in the atonement of Christ; and having in the two preceding lectures endeavored to establish and explain the free agency and accountability of man, we now enter upon the examination of some of those doctrines of revelation in which the benefits of redemption are more directly connected with man, as a fallen, but accountable, moral agent. As a subject appropriate to be discussed at this stage of our general investigation, we propose the doctrine of REPENTANCE. No apology for devoting a lecture to this subject will be requisite, when we reflect on its prominence, not only with the theologians and sermonizers of every age, but also with the inspired penmen of the New Testament. Repentance was not only a theme familiar with the prophets of the Old Testament, but it was the burthen of the message of John the Baptist, and an important point in the preaching of Christ himself and his immediate apostles. In the present investigation we propose to consider, — I. The NATURE of Repentance. II. The MEANS of Repentance. III. The NECESSITY of Repentance. I. In endeavoring to ascertain the Scripture doctrine, in reference to the nature of repentance, which is the point proposed as first to be discussed, we hope to be conducted, by the plain teachings of the Bible, to such conclusions as shall be clear and satisfactory to the candid mind. 1. In inquiring for the Scripture import of repentance, it is natural that our first appeal be made to the etymology of the word. Here, we find that two different words in the Greek Testament, varying in their signification, are rendered "repent." These are μerauɛhouat and μsτavoεo). The former implies a sorrowful change of the mind, or properly, contrition for sin; the latter implies all that is meant by the former, together with reformation from sin. That is, it implies a sorrow |