May 31. CHAP. Carolina, objected that the vagueness of the lanI. guage might imperil the powers of the states. But 1787. Randolph disclaimed the intention of giving indefinite powers to the national legislature, and declared himself unalterably opposed to such an inroad on the state jurisdictions. Madison was strongly biased in favor of enumerating and defining the powers to be granted, although he could not suppress doubts of its practicability. "But," said he, "a form of government that will provide for the liberty and happiness of the community being the end of our deliberations, all the necessary means for attaining it must, however reluctantly, be submitted to." The clause was adopted by nine states, including New York and New Jersey. Oliver Ellsworth, voting against Sherman, divided Connecticut. 1 The clauses in the Virginia plan, giving to the national legislature the powers necessary to preserve harmony among the states, to negative all state laws contravening, in the opinion of the national legislature, the articles of union, or, as Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania added, "contravening treaties subsisting under the authority of the union," were agreed to without debate or dissent. Madison struggled to confer on the national legis lature the right to negative at its discretion any state law whatever, being of the opinion that a negative of which the rightfulness was unquestioned would strip a local law of every pretence to the character of legalJune ity, and thus suppress resistance at its inception. On another day, explaining his motives, he said: "A 1Gilpin, 760; Elliot, 139. 8. 1 I. June 8. 31. negative on state laws is the mildest expedient that CHAP. can be devised for enforcing a national decree. Should no such precaution be engrafted, the only remedy 1787. would be coercion. The negative would render the use of force unnecessary. In a word, this prerogative of the general government is the great pervading principle that must control the centrifugal tendency of the states, which, without it, will continually fly out of their proper orbits, and destroy the order and harmony of the political system." But the convention refused to adopt his counsel. Lastly: the Virginia plan authorized the exertion May of the force of the whole against a delinquent state.. Madison, accepting the argument of Mason, expressed a doubt of the practicability, the justice, and the equity of applying force to a collective people. "To use force against a state," he said, "is more like a declaration of war than an infliction of punishment, and would be considered, by the party attacked, a dissolution of all previous contracts. I therefore hope that a national system, with full power to deal directly with individuals, will be framed, and the resource be thus rendered unnecessary." The clause was postponed.' In this wise and in one day the powers of the legis lature which was to be the centre of the government were with common consent established in their outlines. On points essential to union, Yates and Hamilton, New Jersey and Pennsylvania voted together. On the first day of June the convention took into June consideration the national executive. The same spirit 'Gilpin, 822, 823; Elliot, 171. 2 Gilpin, 761; Elliot, 140. 1. I. 1787. June 1. CHAP. of conciliation prevailed, but with a chaos of ideas and a shyness in the members to declare their minds. Should the national executive be one or many?-a question which, from a difference among themselves, the plan of the Virginia delegates had left undecided. Should it be chosen directly by the people? or by electors? or by state legislatures? or by the executives of the states? or by one branch of the national legislature? or by both branches? And, if by both, by joint or concurrent ballot? or by lot? How long should be its term of service? far should its re-eligibility be limited? have the sole power of peace and war? have an absolute or a qualified veto on acts of legislation, or none at all? Should its powers be exercised with or without a council? Should it be liable to removal by the legislatures of the states, or by the na tional legislature? or by the joint action of both? or by impeachment alone? And how Should it Here the convention marched and countermarched for want of guides. Progress began to be made on the ascertainment that the members inclined to withhold from the executive the power over war and peace. This being understood, Wilson and Charles Pinckney proposed that the national executive should consist of a single person. A long silence prevailed, broken at last by the chairman asking if he should put the question. Franklin entreated the members first to deliver their sentiments on a point of so great importance. Rutledge joined in the request, and for himself supported Pinckney and Wilson. On the 1 Gilpin, 762; Elliot, 140. I. June other hand, Sherman, controlled by the precedents of CHAP. the confederacy which appointed and displaced executive officers just as it seemed to them fit, replied: 1787. "The legislature are the best judges of the business 1. to be done by the executive, and should be at liberty from time to time to appoint one or more, as experience may dictate."1 2 "I do not mean to throw censure on that excellent fabric, the British government," said Randolph; "if we were in a situation to copy it, I do not know that I should be opposed to it. But the fixed genius of the people of America requires a different form of government. The requisites for the executive department,-vigor, despatch, and responsibility,-can be found in three men as well as in one. Unity in the executive is the foetus of monarchy." "Unity in the executive," retorted Wilson, "will rather be the best safeguard against tyranny. From the extent of this country, nothing but a great confederated republic will do for it." To calm the excitement, Madison led the convention, before choosing between unity or plurality in the executive, to fix the extent of its authority; and the convention agreed to clothe it "with power to carry into effect the national laws and to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for."' On the mode of appointing the executive, Wilson said: "Chimerical as it may appear in theory, I am for an election by the people. Experience in New York and Massachusetts shows that an election of the first magistrate by the people at large is both a conGilpin, 765; Elliot, 141. 2 1 Gilpin, 763; Elliot, 140. Gilpin, 764; Elliot, 141. June CHAP. venient and a successful mode. The objects of choice I. in such cases must be persons whose merits have gen 1787. eral notoriety." "I," replied Sherman, "am for its 1. appointment by the national legislature, and for mak ing it absolutely dependent on that body whose will it is to execute. An independence of the executive on the supreme legislature is the very essence of tyranny." Sherman and Wilson were for a period of office of three years and "against the doctrine of rotation, as throwing out of office the men best qualified to execute its duties." Mason asked for seven years at least, but without re-eligibility. "What," inquired Gunning Bedford of Delaware, "will be the situation of the country should the first magistrate elected for seven years be discovered immediately on trial to be incompetent?" He argued for a triennial election, with an ineligibility after three successive elections. The convention, by a vote of five and a half states against four and a half, decided for the period of seven years;' and by at least seven states against Connecticut, that the executive should not be twice eligible.' 2. How to choose the executive remained the perplexing problem. Wilson, borrowing an idea from the constitution of Maryland, proposed that electors chosen in districts of the several states should meet and elect the executive by ballot, but not from their own body.' He deprecated the intervention of the states in its choice. Mason favored the idea of choosing the executive by the people; Rutledge, by the |