INTRODUCTION TO BOOK VI.

ARISTOTLE now proceeds to complete the analysis of his definition of Moral Virtue, and at the same time to discuss the Intellectual Virtues, the division of which was spoken of at the close of the First Book, p. 48.

Now Aristotle had defined Moral Virtue to be s προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν (p. 69.); in which definition three things remain yet to be explained :

1. What is λóyos?

2. Who is øgóviμos?

3. What is goalgeris? the consideration of which was left unfinished in iii. 3. p. 100. see n.

The nature of these then we now proceed to examine. And our enquiry is; What is that óyos which always directs us to the true mean in all Moral Actions, since there are many kinds of xóyo: and what is that Virtue of the pgóviuos by which he is enabled exactly to discover this true mean ? But to ascertain these, we must examine in what part of the soul they exist, and what λóyo or Virtues there are whose object is truth. If then there be two parts of the soul, as there would appear to be from there being two kinds of matter only, Contingent and Necessary, upon which the soul can operate, one of these will take cognizance of the Truth in Moral, the other in Scientific Matter. The first of these then will be the Deliberative, the other the Scientific part of the soul. And in whichever of these the λóyos is employed in finding and determining the truth in moral subjects, that will be λóyos, and that the virtue

of the govμos which we are endeavouring to discover. Now since necessary matter is that upon which the Scientific part operates, it cannot take cognizance of Moral Truth which is not Scientific, consequently cannot be that λóyos and that Virtue which directs the Moral Habits to the truth. If, therefore, we can discover how many Habits there are in both parts of the soul which take cognizance of Truth, we shall discover which direct our Moral Habits, and what are our Intellectual Virtues. Now the matter upon which they can operate are two; necessary and contingent: the ends which they can have in view are only three; truth purely, moral truth, truth in production, consequently these habits can be only,

(1.) One which has Moral Truth for its object (Φρόνησις).

(2.) The other which has Truth in production (TEXVÝ). (3.) Which has Scientific Truth.

But the matter of the latter subdivides itself into either pure demonstration, or the principles of demonstration. And consequently there will be, following the same analogy, a distinct habit for each, the first being science (Thun), the other apprehension (voũç), or the union of both which is wisdom (ropía).

Accordingly we obtain five divisions of Habits, all having Truth for their object.

The examination therefore of these five Habits, Torun, τέχνη, νοῦς, φρόνησις, and σοφία, occupies the following book; together with a consideration of their utility for promoting the happiness of man.

Aristotle then has not thought it necessary in this Book to investigate all the Intellectual Habits, reserving the consideration of them for another treatise. His principal attention is directed to those which form the intermediate link between the rational and irrational soul, and which have unmixed truth either theoretical or practical for their object (pyov)"; and hence the consideration of copía bears but a small proportion to that of govnois, and one of them (vous) is left so obscure, that, without recurring to his other writings, it is by no means easy to understand several portions of the ensuing chapters. It may be therefore useful to consider briefly such of the intellectual faculties of the soul as are not explicitly defined in the following Book.

The faculties of the soul may be divided then as follows:

Of these, as has been already shown, Aristotle divides

a The third book of the Treatise De Anima.

b See p. 47. and the note.

the purely rational according to their object-matter, confining Thun to necessary matter with demonstration, and góis to contingent matter. See the division, p. 212. Of such faculties then as are concerned with knowledge (γνωστικοί), the lowest is αἴσθησις, that of the five senses. These when employed, each upon its peculiar object-matter, seldom err. But they have a common object-matter upon which they frequently are at fault", such as motion, rest, number, figure, and magnitude, (κίνησις, ἡρεμία, ἀριθμός, σχῆμα, μέγεθος ). But besides this αἴσθησις which Aristotle designates by the name of ἴδια αἴσθη σις, there is another which is called κοινὴ αἴσθησις, of which he speaks in the 6th chapter of this Book, p. 240. For as every sense is confined to its own peculiar object-matter, there must be some other sense which compares the differences of things sensible with each other. Not vous, although somewhat resembling it, for vous cannot judge of things sensible. Not that vous is ignorant of their differences, but it uses this organ for the discovery of those differences; for without sense it is impossible to judge (yvava) of things sensible; and which, because it judges of all the energies of the senses, is called common (xový). Contrary to the other senses this faculty is both incorporeal (άowμaτos), and acts at any time (åxgóvws). For it does not at one time know that a thing is bitter and another time white, but at the same time (ev T aur vuv) that it is both bitter and white.

C ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις τῶν ἰδίων ἀεὶ anons. De Anima, iii. 3. §. 3. Compare also ii. 6. §. 2. and iii. 3. §. 12.

d See De Anima, iii. 3. §. 12.

e These are called the common matter of the senses, not because they are common to all the senses at once, but because they are subject to more than one; for instance, sight and touch can both judge of magnitude. See De An. ii. 6.

f See Chap. ix.

Compare De Anima, iii. 2. §. 10. ἑκάστη μὲν οὖν αἴσθησις τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ ἐστίν, ὑπάρχουσα ἐν τῷ αἰσθη τηρίῳ ᾗ αἰσθητήριον, καὶ κρίνει τὰς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ διαφοράς, οἷον λευκὸν μὲν καὶ μέλαν ὄψις, γλυκὺ δὲ καὶ πικρὸν γεῦσις. ὁμοίως δ ̓ ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον κρίνομεν, τίνι καὶ αἰσθα νόμεθα ὅτι διαφέρει; ἀνάγκη δὴ αἰσθήσει· αἰσθητὰ γάρ ἐστιν. ᾧ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἡ

Neither of these faculties are concerned with action (πρᾶξις ") except accidentally.

The next in order is imagination (φαντασία), the power of presenting visions to the mind', a motion proceeding indeed from the senses, not of the senses but of the soul, being necessary to διάνοια, and itself requiring αἴσθησις, yet differing from both. Differing from sense (αἴσθησις), because sense cannot energize without the presence of the sensible object, and we have power over our senses but not of our imagination *. Differing from ἐπιστήμη and νοῦς, because they are always of the truth (ἀληθευτικαί), whereas imagination is more frequently false. Differing from opinion, because upon opinion follows belief or persuasion (πίστις 1), but not upon φαντασία; our feelings and affections also immediately sympathize with dóza but not with φαντασία ". And, further, δόξα does not exist in brutes, but φαντασία does; the former is a rational the other an irrational faculty. By φαντασία they are guided in their actions either who have not reason, or whose reason is clouded by passion or disease".

The next of these faculties is dóca, which is employed either upon conclusions in contingent or in scientific matter, but without knowing the process by which such conclusions were deduced. And in this respect also it differs from science (ἐπιστήμη), for science knows both the conclusions and the process by which it arrived at

By thinking on phantastic summer's heat?

Richard II. Act i. Sc. 3.

· δόξῃ μὲν ἕπεται πίστις, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γὰρ δοξάζοντα οἷς δοκεῖ μὴ πιστεύειν. De Anima iii. 3. §. 8.

m ὅταν μὲν δοξάσωμεν δεινόν τι ἢ φοβερόν, εὐθὺς συμπάσχομεν, ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν θαρραλέον· κατὰ δὲ τὴν φαντασίαν ὡσαύτως ἔχομεν ὥσπερ ἂν οἱ θεώμενοι ἐν γραφῇ τὰ δεινὰ ἢ θαρραλέα. De Anima iii. 3. §. 4.

η καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν καὶ ὁμοίως εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὰς πράττει τὰ ζῷα, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν