sensation, immediately produces a reaction correspondent to its nature, either to appropriate and enjoy, or to avoid and repel the exciting cause. This reaction is very properly distinguished by the term Emotion. The sensible effect produced at the first instant, by the cause of the passion, greatly agitates the frame; its influence is immediately communicated to the whole nervous system, and the commotions excited in that, indicate themselves by attitudes and motions of the body, and by particular expressions of countenance. These effects are such universal concomitants, that no very important change in the state of the mind can take place, without some visible change, of a correspondent nature, in the animal œconomy.

Emotions therefore, according to the genuine signification of the word, are principally and primitively applicable to the sensible changes and visible effects, which particular passions produce upon the frame, in consequence of this reaction, or particular agitation of mind. It is alone by these visible effects that the subject is discovered to be under the influence of any passion; and it is alone by the particular changes produced, or kind of emotion, that we are enabled to judge of the nature of the passion. Thus, although the passion exists prior to the

emotions, yet as these are its external signs, they must indicate its continued influence, as long as they continue to agitate the system. In consequence of this immediate connection, the words passions and emotions, are, in familiar discourse, where no philosophical precision is requisite, used synonymously; though, in reality, the latter are uniformly the effects of the former. Here, as in innumerable other instances, figurative modes of expression are adopted. The Synecdoche is perpetually employed, by which, cause and effect are confounded, or substituted the one for the other. Since emotions are faithful indications of their correspondent passions, and strong passions are always productive of emotions, we should deem it a pedantic precision to select, at all times, the appropriate word, when we mean simply to express the general effect.

However, the term Emotion is sometimes expressive of lively sensations which do not produce visible effects, in any degree proportionate to their feelings. In emotions the mind. is not so completely, or necessarily passive. In general it possesses some power over the external signs; and in many cases, where the feelings would be too strong to remain concealed, were they totally void of controul, some other influential affection, either of fear, respect, humanity,

&c. may serve to repress or moderate their effects, and confine them to inward emotions.

Again, the term is frequently employed to mark the first impression, which particular objects make upon susceptible minds, whether they remain concealed or not. Thus in the fine Arts, the charms of musical compositions which are novel to us; the first view of a gallery of paintings possessing distinguished merit;the surprise of a beautiful or elevated sentiment, or poetic or poetic description, will generally make a more vivid impression upon us, than that which is felt in a continued, or renewed contemplation of the same subjects; and yet these impressions may not be so forcible as to produce the transports accompanying emotions from other causes. But the difference is simply in degree, not in kind. This species of enjoyment is peculiar to minds highly cultivated, whose repeated enjoyments of a similar nature have gradually moderated transports, and whose emotions have gradually subsided into gentler undulations, if I may thus express myself, in place of those agitations which the Inexperienced would inevitably betray upon similar occasions.

The third term Affection, has, in itself, a different signification from either of the above. It always represents a less violent, and generally a more durable influence, which things have

upon the mind. It is applicable to the manner in which we are affected by them for a continuance. It supposes a more deliberate predilection and aversion, in consequence of the continued influence of some prevailing quality. This distinguishes it from the transient impulse of Passion. Nor is it intimately connected with any external signs; which distinguishes it from Emotions. The affections sometimes succeed to passions and emotions, because these may have been excited by something which becomes permanently interesting; or they may be gradually inspired, by a deliberate attention to the good or bad qualities of their objects.

In this philosophic sense of the word, Affection is applicable to an unpleasant as well as a pleasant state of the mind, when impressed by any object or quality. It may be produced by whatever torments or corrodes the heart, as well as that which charms and delights it. Usage, however, chiefly applies the word to the kindly and beneficent affections. When we remark that a person has an affectionate heart, we mean to applaud his being under the influence of the best affections, of a social and relative nature.

With other Writers on the Passions, we shall always use the term in the philosophical sense; and apply it equally to whatever produces more permanent feelings in the mind, whether

they be pleasing or painful, of a benevolent or malevolent character.

As in Passions and Emotions, thus in the Affections, several gradations of influence are observable. Some affections indicate themselves so strongly, that they approach to emotions; some may require a penetrating eye to discover them; -some may be powerfully indulged with such self command, that they shall elude the most critical observation;-and some have such an equal and uniform influence, as to blend, as it were, with the temper, and almost lose the name of affection; as generosity, fortitude, humility, patience, resignation.

When there is a propensity to indulge one particular affection, or class of affections more than another, arising from peculiarity of temperament, education, connections, habits, &c. we consider this propensity as an indication of Temper or habitual Disposition. Thus we speak of a benevolent, grateful, cheerful, timorous, revengeful temper. These characters do not imply, that the subject is perpetually under the influence of the particular affection, but they mark his propensity towards it. The Affections therefore refer to the actual impression made upon the mind by certain qualities, real or supposed; and the Temper or Disposition is that