little indication of any connection subsisting amongst the processes described under each head.

Whether you will be able to concur with me or not in the classification I have adopted, is a point, I would observe, not very material to the principal questions which I am about to discuss. They are quite independent of any such arrangement, and it will be sufficient for my design if I succeed in making perfectly clear the acceptations of the various terms contained in it.

I have already mentioned that a different classification might be adopted. As one variety, I give you the following, which comes nearer to the classification of some of my predecessors :

CLASS. THE PHENOMENA OF CONSCIOUSNESS. ORDER 1. EXTERNAL OPERATIONS AND AFFECTIONS.

Genus 1. Perceiving through the Organs of Sense.
2. Bodily Sensations.

ORDER 2. INTERNAL OPERATIONS AND AFFECTIONS.
Genus 1. Conceiving.

Species 1. Conceiving without individual re-
cognition.

Species 2. Remembering, or conceiving with individual recognition.

Genus 4. Reasoning.

1. Contingent reasoning.

2. Demonstrative reasoning.

Genus 5. Emotions.

6. Willing.

Species 1. Willing movements of the body.

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2. Willing operations of the mind.

This arrangement may possibly be regarded as the better of the two. My own taste, or rather judgment, without attaching much importance to the matter, decidedly, however, prefers the other; matter,—decidedly, in elucidation of which I shall proceed to offer you a few brief comments in my two or three ensuing letters.

LETTER VII.

SENSITIVE AFFECTIONS.

Ir will be observed that I have placed together in the first order bodily and mental feelings, which I have done because they agree in being sensitive affections as contradistinguished from intellectual operations.

An objection may be reasonably made to the terms bodily and mental being thus put in opposition to each other, inasmuch as all feelings are mental, i. e. are modes of consciousness; but I have found it impossible to avoid such language (and the same may be said in reference to the epithets external and internal), without either great circumlocution, or resorting to crabbed and repulsive terminology. Bodily sensations in my nomenclature are such as are really felt to be in some part of the body.

You will probably notice with surprise that acts of perception through the organs of the senses are not only separated from bodily sensations, but ranked under the head of intellectual operations; while bodily sensations themselves are placed under the same order as emotions. This point is perhaps the most difficult to deal with in the whole classi

fication, and requires to be elucidated at some length. My separation of the two kinds of mental phenomena in question is founded on certain facts of consciousness, to which I must beg your especial

attention.

1. We have, in the first place, a great variety of sensations which we feel to be in some definite part of the body without perceiving anything external to the organisation. Of this kind are sensations on the skin; as a glow on the cheeks, a prickling on any part of the surface, pulsations, hunger, thirst, morbid indications in the alimentary canal and elsewhere, and a hundred nameless feelings. They may be briefly described as sensations internal to the organisation, and localised, or felt to be in particular parts of it.

2. Through the organs of sense, we perceive objects to be external and different from ourselves, the percipient beings. We touch, see, hear, taste, and smell outward things.

3. We have emotions purely internal, which we feel to be wholly different, on the one hand from our intellectual states or movements, and on the other from our corporeal sensations. I scarcely need mention hope, joy, fear, sorrow, as instances of this kind.

From this brief glance at their respective characteristics, bodily sensation appears to differ so widely from the perception of external objects, that these two sorts of mental phenomena natu

rally fall, in any arrangement, under different heads; and the former being a kind of feeling, while the latter is a species of discerning, they may be conveniently ranged under the orders to which I have respectively referred them.

On the other hand, bodily sensations and mental emotions are so far allied that they both come within the description of sensitive affections or feelings; and although they may be said to be generically different, these genera may be fairly and advantageously placed under one and the same higher denomination.

The question, however, arises, whether this arrangement would not separate the functions of some of the organs of the senses from those of others.

"We undoubtedly," it may be said, "perceive external objects by the sight and the touch; but is it equally clear that we are conscious of perceiving something external in the mental states of hearing, tasting, and smelling? Are not these more nearly allied to what have been just described as bodily sensations, than to intellectual operations; and are they not in fact internal to our organisation, and originally felt to be so?"

To this I reply, that, as far as I can determine the point from self-observation, we have a consciousness, or more properly a perception, of something external in the exercise of all our organs of sense; in hearing, and tasting, and smelling, as well as in touching and seeing.