In our opinion the District Court correctly refused to find an adverse impact on black property values based on that speculation.30

have on the property values in the Springdale area; just across Jackson there? A. I am intimately familiar with the Springdale area, having been a real estate agent who more or less was instrumental in providing some houses for those in low economic groups in that area.

"From an economic standpoint there would not be a lessening of value in those properties in the Springdale area, but from a psychological standpoint, it would have a tendency to have a demoralizing

"Mr. Holmes: (Interjecting) I object to that answer. He is not qualified as an expert in psychological opinions.

"Mr. Wharton: Well, if he would like to strike that whole answer, we don't have a problem with that.

"Mr. Holmes: Well, we only object to the psychological evaluation. He has stated that the property values in and of themselves would not go down.

"The Court: Right.

"Mr. Wharton: From his real estate background.

"Q. (By Mr. Wharton) Would you please continue with your response, Mr. Moore? A. In my opinion, with the 17 years experience in the real estate industry, psychologically it would have a deterring, depressing effect on those individuals who might live north of the Hein Park area. With the closure of the street, the creation of another little haven, the fact that these people are in a lower economic social group and wouldn't be able to actually afford housing with the illustrious price tags of those houses in the Hein Park area, it would be, in my opinion, like the individual looking in the pastry store who doesn't have a dime and who can't afford it. And consequently, as a result of such, their moralistic values on their properties could tend to be such that the upkeep would not be nearly so great and it could have a detrimental effect on the property values in the future." App. 111-112.

30 Plaintiffs also called Dr. Feit, a clinical assistant professor in the Department of Psychiatry, University of Tennessee Center of Health Sciences, as an expert witness. The District Court summarized Dr. Feit's testimony as follows:

"Dr. Marvin Feit, an assistant professor at the University of Tennessee School of Social Work, testified that it was his opinion that closing West Drive would result in negative consequences in the form of hostility towards the people who live in Hein Park, increased vandalism, school

In summary, then, the critical facts established by the record are these: The city's decision to close West Drive was motivated by its interest in protecting the safety and tranquility of a residential neighborhood. The procedures followed in making the decision were fair and were not affected by any racial or other impermissible factors. The city has conferred a benefit on certain white property owners but there is no reason to believe that it would refuse to confer a comparable benefit on black property owners. The closing has not affected the value of property owned by black citizens, but it has caused some slight inconvenience to black motorists.

II

Under the Court's recent decisions in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, the absence of proof of discriminatory intent forecloses any claim that the official action challenged in this case violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners ask us to hold that respondents' claims under § 1982 and the Thirteenth Amendment are likewise barred by the absence of proof of discriminatory purpose. We note initially that the coverage of both

harassment, and increased arrests by police. He also was of the opinion that the closure would result in more disgruntled drivers." Id., at 155. Over defendants' objection that he was testifying to matters outside his area of expertise, see Tr. 106-110, Dr. Feit also testified as follows:

"Q Before the luncheon recess we were at the point of asking Dr. Feit to give his professional opinion as to the negative psychological consequences of the possible closure of West Drive and how those consequences might affect property values, and I will ask you to answer that question.

"A Well, particularly on the north of Jackson it is very likely that the property values will go down, whereas in Hein Park it is most likely that they will rise equal to the rather exclusive area; whereas the area north of Jackson will go down because of the increase in the volume of traffic which has nowhere to go." Id., at 118-119.

The District Court did not credit this testimony.

§ 1982 and the Thirteenth Amendment is significantly different from the coverage of the Fourteenth Amendment. The prohibitions of the latter apply only to official action, or, as implemented by 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1976 ed., Supp. III), to action taken under color of state law. We have squarely decided, however, that § 1982 is directly applicable to private parties, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409; cf. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 170-174; and it has long been settled that the Thirteenth Amendment "is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 20. Thus, although respondents challenge official action in this case, the provisions of the law on which the challenge is based cover certain private action as well. Rather than confront prematurely the rather general question whether either § 1982 or the Thirteenth Amendment requires proof of a specific unlawful purpose, we first consider the extent to which either provision applies at all to this street closing case. We of course deal first with the statutory question.

Section 1982 provides:

III

"All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."

To effectuate the remedial purposes of the statute, the Court has broadly construed this language to protect not merely the enforceability of property interests acquired by black citizens but also their right to acquire and use property on an equal basis with white citizens. Thus, in Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S 24, the Court refused to permit enforcement of private covenants imposing racial restrictions on the sale of property even though the legal rights of blacks

to purchase or to sell other property were unimpaired." In Jones, supra, we held that § 1982 "must encompass every racially motivated refusal to sell or rent." 392 U. S., at 421– 422.32 In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, we interpreted the term "lease" in § 1982 to include an assignable membership share in recreational facilities." In Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., Inc., 410 U. S.

31 The Court stated:

"The Negro petitioners entered into contracts of sale with willing sellers for the purchase of properties upon which they desired to establish homes. Solely because of their race and color they are confronted with orders of court divesting their titles in the properties and ordering that the premises be vacated. White sellers, one of whom is a petitioner here, have been enjoined from selling the properties to any Negro or colored person. Under such circumstances, to suggest that the Negro petitioners have been accorded the same rights as white citizens to purchase, hold, and convey real property is to reject the plain meaning of language." 334 U. S., at 34.

32 The Court indicated that Congress had the power, through the passage of 1982, to eradicate such discrimination:

"At the very least, the freedom that Congress is empowered to secure under the Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy whatever a white man can buy, the right to live wherever a white man can live. If Congress cannot say that being a free man means at least this much, then the Thirteenth Amendment made a promise the Nation cannot keep." 392 U. S., at 443.

33 Little Hunting Park, Inc., was a corporation organized to operate recreational facilities for the benefit of residents of Fairfax County, Va. A person holding a membership share who rented his home to another was entitled to assign his share to the lessee. This Court held that both the lessor and the lessee had a cause of action under § 1982 for the corporation's refusal, on racial grounds, to approve such an assignment. The Court held that the membership was part of the lease and that the right to lease was specifically guaranteed by § 1982:

"There has never been any doubt but that Freeman paid part of his $129 monthly rental for the assignment of the membership share in Little Hunting Park. . . . Respondents' actions in refusing to approve the assignment of the membership share in this case was clearly an interference with Freeman's right to 'lease.'" 396 U. S., at 236-237.

122

Opinion of the Court

451 U.S.

431, we extended that holding to cover a preference to purchase a nontransferable swim club membership." Although these cases broadly defined the property rights protected by § 1982, our cases, like the statutory language itself, all concerned the right of black persons to hold and acquire property on an equal basis with white persons and the right of blacks not to have property interests impaired because of their race.35

34 Any resident of a geographical area within a 34-mile radius of the swim club received three preferences: the right to apply for membership without seeking the recommendation of a current member, a preference over nonresidents when applying for a vacancy, and the right to pass to the successor in title of his home the first option on the membership. 410 U. S., at 436. The Court held that these preferences conferred property rights on the owner of a home in the area of the swim club that could not be denied on the basis of the homeowner's race. The Court noted that the right to confer an option on a subsequent purchaser could have an effect on the value of a home. Furthermore:

"[T]he automatic waiting-list preference given to residents of the favored area may have affected the price paid by the Presses when they bought their home. Thus the purchase price to them, like the rental paid by Freeman in Sullivan, may well reflect benefits dependent on residency in the preference area. For them, however, the right to acquire a home in the area is abridged and diluted.

"When an organization links membership benefits to residency in narrow geographical area, that decision infuses those benefits into the bundle of rights for which an individual pays when buying or leasing within the area. The mandate of 42 U. S. C. § 1982 then operates to guarantee a nonwhite resident, who purchases, leases, or holds this property, the same rights as are enjoyed by a white resident." Id., at 437.

35 The lower federal courts have also required plaintiffs alleging a violation of § 1982 to demonstrate some impairment of property interests. In Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd., 632 F. 2d 309 (CA4 1980), the court held that the right to join a country club was a property interest attaching to a home in a subdivision when all residents of the subdivision were encouraged to join the club and residency as a practical matter assured approval of an application. See, e. g., Moore v. Townsend, 525 F. 2d 482 (CA7 1975) (discriminatory refusal to sell home); Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F. 2d 324 (CA7) (allegation that blacks forced to accept prices and terms in excess of terms available to whites purchasing